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"It is not the strongest of the species that survives, 
nor the most intelligent that survives.   
It is the one that is the most adaptable to change."  
 
— Charles Darwin 
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 ABSTRACT 
 
 
Formed at the crossroads of the Dawkins revolution in higher education and the 
decentralisation of the Australian industrial relations framework to make way for enterprise 
bargaining, the NTEU has from its outset had to adapt to change.  How did the NTEU learn 
to respond to the challenges of enterprise bargaining and to negotiate subsequent rounds?   
This thesis contributes to the current trade union renewal literature by offering a novel 
approach to the study of trade unions.  The key question driving this research is “how do 
trade unions learn?”  This thesis offers a research framework that combines traditional 
approaches to the study of trade unions with the observations of research in the field of 
knowledge management as well as enlisting social network theory to study the learning 
process in the NTEU.  The archived minutes and memos of the NTEU’s national office from 
the period of 1993 to 2005 have been used firstly to conduct a qualitative analysis of the 
decision-making process.  In chapter ten, this data is revisited to conduct a network analysis 
of the individuals and groups engaged in the decision making process over the same period 
to study how the NTEU’s structures may have impacted on the learning process.   
 
This thesis has been guided by the principle that all skills and talents are learned and that 
learning is a process that is inherently collective and driven by the task at hand.  Therefore 
all decisions documented in the NTEU’s archives have been treated as artefacts of the 
learning process that created them.  The task of this thesis has been to track the origins and 
the individuals and groups involved in decision making in the NTEU with regard to enterprise 
bargaining strategy and the context in which they were operating.   
 
Using this approach has enabled an analysis of what conditions are most conducive to 
building leadership capacity in the union.  It has also built an approach to understanding 
why some communication strategies have been effective whilst others have not.  Mapping 
the decision making process over time for four rounds of enterprise bargaining in higher 
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education has also shown how learning is cumulative as lessons learned are folded into a 
collective understanding which guided the NTEU’s approach to the next problem.  A further 
major finding relates to the process of innovation.  The process of adapting to the changing 
external environment was often accompanied by clashes of opinion and battles for 
influence as new ideas confronted the collective learning of the past.  Finally, the site of 
innovation can be found at any level of the organisation.  In the case of the NTEU, it was 
often from the periphery of the union, the branches, where the full impact of the changes in 
the external environment was being felt and where new ideas were being developed to 
address them.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
 
The introduction of enterprise bargaining in the early 1990s was a major shift for Australian 
industrial relations requiring all industries to make the transition from industry-wide 
determination of wages and conditions to a new enterprise based system.  In promoting the 
decision, the Commonwealth Government acknowledged that the shift required “a whole 
new management and workplace culture” [National Wage Case, 16 April 1991].  The 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission in the National Wage Case Decision of 16 April 
1991 openly expressed doubt that this culture had yet come into being maintaining that the 
“parties to industrial relations have still to develop the maturity necessary for the further 
shift to enterprise bargaining” (Dabscheck 1995: 70-71). 
 
The task of adapting to a new employment relations framework was particularly onerous for 
higher education as the introduction of enterprise bargaining was the first major sector-
wide regulation of university employment.  General staff at this time were covered by a 
patchwork of different state-based awards across the country whilst the employment 
contract for academic staff was primarily via informal, institution-based arrangements.  The 
difficulty of implementing enterprise bargaining was compounded by fundamental changes 
to the political economy of higher education as the sector ceased to operate as a national 
body and individual universities were increasingly encouraged to operate as semi-
autonomous enterprises and were opened up to local and global market forces.   
 
At the centre of all of these changes has been the National Tertiary Education Industry 
Union (NTEU), the organization representing the majority of the sector’s employees.  The 
NTEU was established in 1993 via the amalgamation of a range of general staff unions and 
institution based academic associations across the sector.  The formation of the NTEU was 
driven by the need for a national organization to address the employment relations reforms 
in higher education and has been the dominant union in enterprise bargaining negotiations.  
Focusing on various decision making committees at the national level of the NTEU this thesis 
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asks the question: how did the NTEU learn to adapt to the introduction of enterprise 
bargaining and to negotiate subsequent rounds? 
 
To answer this question, this thesis aims to plot the points along a steep learning curve as 
the newly formed NTEU quickly developed new skills and capabilities to adapt to the 
introduction of enterprise bargaining and to cope with subsequent rounds.  It is hoped that 
analysing the fortunes of one union operating in a hostile and turbulent period will enable a 
closer examination of some important themes in recent trade union research, issues of 
renewal, resilience and adaptation.  Perhaps it is helpful to point out what this thesis is not 
about.  There has been considerable research and commentary on the impact changes to 
higher education have had on issues such as teaching and learning, student demographics, 
staff morale and research performance.  This thesis only touches on these issues where they 
are directly related to the employment relationship.  This thesis also does not attempt to 
prescribe what the most effective management of employees in the higher education sector 
might be.  This thesis aims to build an understanding of how union organisations learn. 
 
Enterprise bargaining was first introduced to higher education in 1994 as a result of the 
National Wage Case decision of 30 October 1991.  The first bargaining round was short and 
uncontroversial with all parties to the contract attempting to maintain as much of the status 
quo as possible whilst meeting the bare minimum required by the legislation.  Looking back 
at the development of enterprise bargaining in higher education the turbulence, pace and 
foundational nature of the change in employment relations in the sector appear 
remarkable.  Higher education has undergone a series of rounds of enterprise bargaining 
and endured successive waves of intervention from the federal government culminating in 
the Liberal Government’s unyielding pursuit of the Higher Education Workplace Relations 
Requirements (HEWRRs) in 2003.  Employment relations in the tertiary education sector 
under the Liberal government was characterized by protracted disputes, media wars, 
industrial action, Senate inquiries and legal challenges.  After years of calm, higher 
education under the Coalition government, the period from 1996 to 2007, became one of 
the most turbulent and industrially active sectors in Australia.  Meanwhile, the deregulation 
of the sector has also had dramatic effects on the nature of academic and professional staff 
work, university management structures and in turn on university managements’ approach 
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to employment relations on the campuses.  The impact of these changes on the NTEU was 
to force it to adapt to an increasingly contested and volatile environment. 
 
A challenge for this research has been to locate an appropriate theoretical model to analyse 
the learning process in the NTEU.  Few accounts of industrial relations strategy have drawn 
on strategic management literature concerned with dynamic capabilities and knowledge 
management.  For researchers in the field of strategic management, studying the dynamic 
capabilities of a firm is about understanding how and why some firms are capable of 
building competitive advantage in times of rapid change.  In the knowledge or resource 
based view of the firm, effective knowledge management, or managing the creation and 
dissemination of new knowledge, has been identified as critical for an organization’s ability 
to adapt to change enabling a firm to more readily develop skills and capabilities in the face 
of new threats and to grasp new opportunities.  Whilst generating new ideas to increase 
profitability was obviously not the key concern for the NTEU, external forces nonetheless 
created the imperative to quickly learn and disseminate ideas to adapt to change.   
 
This thesis offers a novel approach to studying the trade union movement.  Firstly, there 
have been very few studies of how enterprise bargaining is conducted and particularly in the 
context of a well unionized white collar public sector.  Secondly, there is the originality of 
the theoretical approach which contributes to the current trade union renewal literature by 
combining traditional approaches to the study of trade unions with the observations of 
research in the field of knowledge management to analyse the way in which knowledge is 
shared and built and how new ideas are generated within an organization.  Using this 
framework this thesis has accessed codified knowledge data sets including the archived 
minutes, memos and reports devoted to enterprise bargaining strategy in the NTEU during 
the period 1993 to 2005 to study the learning process in the NTEU.  This thesis has also 
enlisted social network theory to allow an analysis of the same data from a different 
perspective.  The attendance lists from the meetings and forums related to enterprise 
bargaining have been used to generate a visual representation of the individuals, groups 
and networks in the NTEU who were involved in learning to navigate enterprise bargaining.  
The period 1993 to 2005 covers the emergence of the NTEU and its subsequent engagement 
in four rounds of enterprise bargaining across the higher education sector.  The conclusion 
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of round four of enterprise bargaining in 2005 was the most recent full round of enterprise 
bargaining at the time that research for this thesis began.  Round four of enterprise 
bargaining was also the final round of negotiations before the change of federal government 
in 2007 which resulted in the introduction of new legislation. 
 
Chapter two of this thesis conducts an analysis of recent literature devoted to trade union 
renewal to contribute to a framework for understanding the learning process undertaken in 
the NTEU.  Recent trade union literature has been devoted to questions of renewal, 
resilience and revitalization of union organizations against external pressures such as 
globalization, individualism and anti-unionism and aggressive employer strategies.  This 
literature is helpful for this study as at its heart it is a discussion about how union 
organizations build the capacity to respond to external threats and opportunities and, 
importantly, where researchers believe adaptation and innovation are generated in union 
organizations.  An important theme of this chapter is the issue of trade union democracy 
and the relationship between leadership and membership participation, issues that separate 
the study of trade union organizations from other organizational studies and must be added 
to the research framework to adequately develop an understanding of the NTEU. 
 
Similar to chapter two, chapter three conducts a review of knowledge management 
literature to analyse what this body of research can contribute to the goal of understanding 
the learning process in the NTEU.  Applying concepts of knowledge management enables 
important insights into how the NTEU adapted to change and how effective organizations 
approach training and accumulating and disseminating organizational knowledge.  
Knowledge management literature may also help to explain the many pitfalls encountered 
during negotiations.  The decentralization of the sector into semi-autonomous enterprises 
required that individual enterprise agreements be negotiated at every campus throughout 
Australia, placing a strain on the NTEU’s resources and leading to problems of co-ordination.  
Looking at the progress of the rounds there was considerable variability, with some 
bargaining rounds at various campuses virtually collapsing and others dragging on for years, 
bogged down in minutiae or intransigent disagreement.  Which groups or organizations 
coped better than others and why?  Were there key individuals or pivotal moments or 
decisions that helped shape events?  What strategies did the NTEU adopt to pursue their 
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interests?  What were the constraints on their efforts?  What did the NTEU learn from these 
experiences? 
 
Chapter four is devoted to combining the conclusions reached in chapters two and three to 
develop a research framework.  Chapter four therefore compares, contrasts and combines 
the observations of trade union strategy literature and the knowledge management 
literature to develop a framework for understanding the learning and adaptation process in 
the NTEU.  This chapter finishes therefore with a discussion on the research methodology 
undertaken in the rest of the thesis.  Chapter four discusses how this research framework 
has guided an approach to the volumes of archival data devoted to enterprise bargaining 
that was available in the national office of the NTEU.   
 
Before this thesis can begin to discuss the enterprise bargaining process, it has been 
necessary to first build an understanding of the context in which enterprise bargaining was 
being pursued in higher education.  Chapter five therefore examines the dramatic changes 
to the political economy of higher education during the period 1993 to 2005.  During the 
period studied higher education experienced a tectonic shift in its political economy from a 
government funded, centrally co-ordinated system to a corporatized and decentralized 
system competing in the local and global market for fee paying students and industry 
investment.  Chapter five discusses these changes and their impact on employment 
relations in the sector.   
 
Chapters six, seven, eight and nine conducts a qualitative analysis of the empirical data 
covering the formation of the NTEU and rounds one, two, three and four of enterprise 
bargaining respectively to unlock the learning process undertaken by the NTEU.  Then in 
chapter ten, this thesis returns to the same empirical data to approach it from a different 
perspective.  In chapter ten the archival data is used to conduct a network analysis to 
investigate the decision making structures for the entire period.  This chapter explores how 
these structures may have impacted on the learning process in the NTEU.  In Chapter 11, 
this thesis concludes by drawing together the qualitative analysis of the learning process 
undertaken by the NTEU and the network analysis of the individual and groups engaged in 
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this process to develop a holistic explanation for how the NTEU learned to navigate 
enterprise bargaining in the sector. 
 
Taken as a whole, this thesis charts the dramatic changes to employment relations in higher 
education in Australia which is a valuable exercise in itself.  However, the primary focus of 
this research is organizational learning in the NTEU.  This thesis analyses the strategic 
decision making at the national level of the NTEU to develop an understanding of those 
elements that helped and those elements which hindered its ability to adapt.  Combining 
knowledge management with more traditional approaches to the study of trade union 
strategy enables this thesis to analyse the learning process in the trade union movement in 
new ways.  How do unions develop the strategic capacity of their union leaders?  Where in 
the organization are innovative ideas most likely to be found?  What is the most effective 
approach to training and disseminating information within a trade union organisation?  It is 
hoped therefore that this thesis will make a valuable contribution to the study of trade 
union renewal by offering a novel and effective approach to understanding how unions can 
rebuild their capacity in an increasingly hostile and turbulent environment.   
 
13 
 
Chapter Two  
Trade union strategy 
 
 
This chapter conducts an analysis of trade union strategy literature with the aim of 
establishing an appropriate framework for analysing the learning process undertaken by the 
NTEU during the negotiation of enterprise bargaining rounds in the period 1993 to 2005.  
Much of the recent trade union strategy literature has been prompted by the impacts of 
globalization.  The pressures that globalization has placed on the business world has had 
knock on effects for the trade union movement creating a more complex, hostile and 
turbulent environment that has put union organizations under considerable strain.  This 
situation has inspired discussion and debate among researchers devoted to questions of 
renewal, resilience and revitalization of union organizations.  The resultant literature is 
particularly helpful for this study as at its heart it is a discussion about how union 
organizations build the capacity to respond to external threats and opportunities and, 
importantly, where researchers believe adaptation and innovation is generated in the union 
organisation. 
 
The analysis of this literature begins by discussing the service, organizing and social 
movement models of union renewal.  This discussion is particularly helpful as it enables a 
close analysis of the question of union leadership and membership participation from the 
perspective of where in the union organization proponents of these various models believe 
innovation, adaptation and learning might occur.  The discussion of this literature dissects 
some of the limitations of these models and moves to explore more dynamic approaches to 
the question of union strategy.  The second half of this chapter therefore offers a series of 
alternative models to analyse what researchers consider effective union strategy is, and 
using a very different approach, how and where in the organization they believe it might be 
generated.  A recurring theme throughout this chapter is the issue of trade union 
democracy and the relationship between leadership and membership participation, issues 
that separate the study of trade union organizations from other organizational studies and 
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must be added to the research framework to adequately develop an understanding of the 
NTEU. 
 
The organizing and service models for trade union renewal 
As many researchers have pointed out, much of the debate regarding union renewal and 
resilience in the current difficult environment can be categorized around two broadly 
opposing models of union representation: the service model versus the organizing model.  
The distinctions between these models are significant to this discussion as each model has 
implications for the role of leaders and members and where in the organization power and 
decision making reside (Heery and Kelly 1994: 1-2).  In the service model, the emphasis is on 
the leadership working on behalf of a membership, power and decision making therefore 
tends to be concentrated in the hands of the leadership who generally employ grievance 
and arbitration processes to act on behalf of membership who are presumed to be passive 
(Schenk 2003: 245; de Turberville 2004: 776; Fairbrother, Williams et al. 2007: 34).  In direct 
contrast, the organizing model is based on participative union principles where members 
are seen as the controlling body of the union formulating and pursuing their own interests 
via collective decision making and professional officers are relegated to facilitators in this 
process (Heery and Kelly 1994: 4).  The two models also tend to define the scope of trade 
union activity.  The service model of unionism is prone to limit the scope of union activity to 
instrumental and purely industrial issues of wages and conditions and tends to be reactive 
to management agenda (Schenk 2003: 246).  By comparison, the organizing model is 
proactive and does not limit itself to formal bargaining or negotiation activities and seeks to 
develop its agendas independent of management (Schenk 2003: 247).  
 
In recent times a third model, social movement unionism, has attempted to break free of 
the binary position described above.  The social movement model takes the principles of 
participative unionism one step further by encouraging the engagement of not just rank and 
file members of the union but by reaching out to the wider community and other social 
movements to influence union direction (Schenk 2003: 248).  Social movement unionism 
also includes new tactics to enhance the impact of union activity such as forming coalitions 
with consumers (Phelan 2005: 349).  Social movement unionism shares many of the 
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philosophies of the organizing model but emphasizes the development of an alternative 
ideology which goes beyond the immediate workplace to incorporate the wider community 
and broader social issues (Schenk 2003: 248).   
 
Returning to the question proposed at the outset of the chapter, the purpose of this chapter 
is to attempt to locate where researchers believe innovation and learning might be 
generated in the union organization.  In assessing the current literature, two key limitations 
to the various models discussed above become apparent:  firstly, the simple “top down” or 
“bottom up” dichotomy tends to distort an understanding of the roles of union members 
and leaders and secondly, by pitting one model against another there is a tendency to 
override the specific circumstances of individual unions distorting an understanding of the 
relationship between the internal and external context in which individual unions operate.   
Each issue will be discussed in turn below. 
 
The role of members and leaders 
The first major difficulty with the service, organizing and social movement models is their 
tendency to be overly prescriptive of the presumed roles of union members and leaders.  
Those in both the organizing and social movement camps tend to share a desire to limit the 
power of the trade union leadership and bureaucracy arguing that leaderships are prone to 
form bureaucracies that become increasingly conservative and insular in their approach.  In 
his seminal contribution to this philosophy, Michels produced the “iron law of oligarchy” 
which argued that all organizations are predestined to develop an oligarchical leadership 
that become entrenched over time, skew the direction of the organisation in their own 
interests and grow increasingly conservative in their goals (Voss and Sherman 2000: 305).  It 
is therefore assumed that only informal organizations, such as the formative stages of social 
movements, have the flexibility to innovate and to use radical tactics as it is the lack of an 
entrenched bureaucracy that enable fresh approaches (Voss and Sherman 2000: 306-7).  
Applied to the union movement it is therefore assumed that established union leaderships 
are inherently incapable of radical innovation and that the impetus for change will 
necessarily come from below.  For example, Schenk argues that implementing the social 
movement model requires increasing democratic control by removing any bureaucratic 
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hurdles to the full expression of rank and file innovations throughout the organization, via: 
direct election of more key positions and job rotation and short term secondment of 
activists to build stronger links between life in the workplace and representative structures 
(Schenk 2003: 252).  In this approach, change and innovation is assumed to come from the 
bottom up (Schenk 2003: 254) and even from outside of the organization, from the ranks of 
community and activist alliances (Schenk 2003: 252) and the role of union leaders is 
essentially to step aside and allow the full expression of the non-bureaucratised rank and 
file.   Social movement unionism therefore does not challenge the binary assumptions of the 
organizing model but in essence merely extends it to include the broader community.  The 
implications for how a union such as the NTEU should adapt to changing conditions are 
obvious enough. 
 
However, as Heery and Kelly point out the key limiting factor to pure participative unionism 
of this kind is the membership’s inability to effectively defend their own interests without 
the professional assistance of union officers (Heery and Kelly 1994: 14).  Professional 
officers have accumulated knowledge and experience in bargaining, formulating demands, 
negotiation, communication and industrial relations law and policy which place them apart 
from the majority of members (Heery and Kelly 1994: 14).  Their autonomy from the 
workplace also gives them independence from managerial coercion or manipulation and a 
broader overview of the situation not enjoyed by most union members (Heery and Kelly 
1994: 14).  Therefore, the weakness of being removed from the “shopfloor” is also the 
strength of the union officialdom, giving them the distance necessary to strategize.    
 
Empirical research has demonstrated that the relationship between union leaderships and 
memberships are more complex than the proponents of Michel’s “oligarchy” imply.  Recent 
attempts to reinvigorate activism through implementing the organizing or social movement 
models have largely been driven by top-down initiatives (de Turberville 2004: 780).  Voss 
and Sherman in their research of the union movement in the United States showed rather 
than being a spontaneous revolt from below as some in the social movement camp might 
imply, it was union leaders who identified and argued that radical transformation of their 
union was necessary (2003: 75).  They also found that the most significant variable in the 
successful implementation of the social movement model has been the political experience 
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and will of the leadership (Voss and Sherman 2003: 59) who were willing to devote 
significant resources to the project (2003: 65).  Further, a significant impediment to change 
was entrenched cultures and that members and staff contributed to the maintenance of 
these cultures (Voss and Sherman 2003: 74).  Rank and file members were often reluctant to 
get involved and showed a preference for the service model where the unions solved their 
problems for them (Voss and Sherman 2003: 59) and many union officers resisted the 
increase in their workload and a shift in the nature of their work required by the model 
(Voss and Sherman 2003: 60).  Moreover, centralized pressure from labour confederations 
and the international union leadership were significant factors in developing innovative 
ideas and encouraging change (Voss and Sherman 2003: 75).  This reinforces the claim that, 
in actual practice, change often comes from “above” or even “outside” of the union. 
 
Observations of the attempted implementation of the US “organizing model” in Britain 
through the Organising Academy tend to support Voss and Sherman’s position.  The 
Organising Academy initiative has been driven top-down by the highly centralized General 
Council of the TUC (Heery, Simms et al. 1999: 40; Fairbrother and Stewart 2003: 167).  From 
their analysis of this initiative, Heery et al have coined the term “managed activism” where 
they observed union leaders adopting essentially management techniques to deliberately 
cultivate activists and an organizing culture: directing resources towards organizing and 
recruitment, developing specialist union activists roles and encouraging activists to project 
manage campaigns with work plans, workplace maps and recruitment and organizing 
targets (Heery, Simms et al. 2000: 1004).  As with Voss and Sherman’s observations, Heery 
et al’s ongoing investigation of the fortunes of the Organising Academy in Britain shows 
some resistance to the initiative arising from staff, members and activists unaccustomed to 
the new approach (Heery, Simms et al. 1999: 51).  However, Carter’s analysis of the top-
down approach to introducing the Organising Works model in the Manufacturing, Science 
and Finance sector shows evidence that resistance encountered may have resulted from the 
leadership’s insensitivity to the demands being placed on those being tasked with the 
implementation of change (Carter 2000: 128; Fairbrother, Williams et al. 2007: 34).  This 
finding points to the complex relationship between union leaders, the bureaucracy and the 
membership and suggests that this study of the NTEU requires an involved inquiry into the 
roles these various groups played in innovating and adapting to change.  As Hyman points 
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out, studying trade union practice therefore should not be a study of two separate or 
opposing camps but of building an understanding of the relationship among bureaucrats, lay 
officials and the membership (Hyman 1989: 156) and folding in more recent social 
movement union perspectives perhaps to include individuals outside of the union 
altogether.   
 
Context 
The second limitation to the organizing, service and social movement models is their 
tendency to assume that “one size fits all” regardless of the context in which the union is 
operating.  De Turbeville uses the example of attempting to apply the organizing model with 
its high risk, adversarial strategy to a low skill, poorly organized service sector company 
which may result in the persecution of activists and will unlikely contribute to union 
strength (de Turberville 2004: 785).  The object therefore is to create an understanding of 
the relationship between the internal life of the organization and the demands of the 
external environment (Fairbrother, Williams et al. 2007: 34).  Carter sums it up: “policies are 
an outcome of histories confronting new circumstances, mediated by complex internal 
processes” (Carter 2000: 118).  Effective union strategy is therefore based on locating “best 
fit” for the specific context in which the individual union is operating (Pocock 2000: 18; de 
Turberville 2004: 783).    
 
Dynamic approaches to study union strategy 
In recent times researchers have moved beyond the prescriptive recommendations of 
organizing, service and social movement models to offer more dynamic approaches to the 
study of trade union strategy.  The importance of these more dynamic approaches for this 
study of the NTEU is that it breaks the framework free from rigid assumptions about 
members and leaders to allow a focus on the organization as a whole and the networks of 
relationships both within and without the organization that might enable the NTEU to learn 
and adapt to change.  Levesque and Murray, Pocock and Hyman have developed similar 
models which illustrate an interactive relationship among the various layers of the union 
and between the internal life of the union and the external environment.  Levesque and 
Murray’s approach centres around the notion of a trade union’s “power resources”  
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(Levesque and Murray 2002: 46; Fairbrother, Williams et al. 2007: 35).  For Levesque and 
Murray, a union’s ability to most effectively respond to external pressures rests in its ability 
to accurately audit its internal resources in the context of these pressures and to identify 
the most appropriate or relevant resources needed, take steps to develop those resources 
and then to strategically apply them (Levesque and Murray 2002: 45).  They argue that 
three power resources are critical for union action in a globalised environment and are 
mutually reinforcing: proactivity, internal solidarity and external solidarity (Levesque and 
Murray 2002: 39).  Levesque and Murray define proactivity as the ability of unions to 
develop and pursue their own agenda (2002: 45).   Internal solidarity refers to the structure 
and processes put in place to ensure democratic and collective cohesion among members 
(Levesque and Murray 2002: 46).  External solidarity refers to the ability of local unions to 
build support and to work with their communities to build solidarity with other unions and 
their ability to effectively influence and coordinate these activities to increase their power 
(Levesque and Murray 2002: 46).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pocock’s five dimensions of union power builds on Levesque and Murray’s “power 
resources” model.  Pocock has argued that Levesque and Murray’s term “internal solidarity” 
is too broad a description and could incorporate any combination of: delegate structures, 
Levesque and Murray: Power Resources 
 
Proactivity:  
agenda, strategy and the 
capacity to communicate 
External solidarity:  
alliances and articulations 
within the larger union, 
between unions and the 
community 
Internal solidarity: 
democracy in the  
local union 
20 
 
communications among different levels of the union, representativeness in the workplace 
and/or membership participation levels (Pocock 2000: 20).  She therefore recommends 
breaking this concept into two separate categories: “structural capacity” and “mobilizing 
and organizing power” (Pocock 2000: 20).  Structural capacity refers to membership density, 
internal cohesion, levels of solidarity and financial strength and mobilizing and organizing 
power refers to the union’s capacity to recruit, campaign and mobilize its membership in 
pursuit of its goals (Pocock 2000: 20).  Pocock’s discursive power is similar to Murray and 
Levesque’s notion of proactivity.  Discursive power refers to the articulation of an agenda 
that is able to engender membership commitment (Pocock 2000: 20).  Pocock’s concept of 
“culture and competence” is a distinct addition to Levesque and Murray’s model.  Culture 
and competence refers to the internal life of the union: its ability to recognize its situation 
and to institute change in the context of changing circumstances (Pocock 2000: 21).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hyman’s “organisational capacity” model offers an important addition to Levesque and 
Murray’s “power resources” and Pocock’s “union power” model introducing the issue of 
“interest representation” (Hyman 1997: 311).  By discussing the issue of capacity under the 
broader banner of “interest representation”, Hyman places a much stronger emphasis on 
the role of the leadership in strategizing and shaping the involvement of members.  For 
Pocock: Union Power 
 
Mobilising and 
organizing 
power 
External 
solidarity 
Culture and 
competence 
Discursive power 
High Power 
Structural capacity 
External environment 
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Hyman, organisational capacity is therefore conflated with the effectiveness of trade union 
leadership: the efficacy of a union rests largely on the “skill, sensitivity and imagination” of 
the representatives themselves and the characteristics of the union’s representative 
structures (Hyman 1997: 311).  In discussing effective representation Hyman offers another 
set of three to form an interactive triangle: autonomy, legitimacy and efficacy (Hyman 1997: 
311).  Hyman’s autonomy intersects closely with Levesque and Murray’s proactivity and 
Pocock’s discursive power.  Autonomy is defined by a union’s ability to develop a 
“representative mechanism” independent from the employers (Hyman 1997: 310).  
Likewise, Hyman’s legitimacy is similar to Levesque and Murray’s internal solidarity, but is 
perhaps more narrowly defined coming closer to Pocock’s mobilizing and organizing power 
rather than touching on Pocock’s “structural capacity” element.  Legitimacy for Hyman 
refers to the membership’s ownership of the union’s strategic objectives (Hyman 1997: 
311).  Hyman’s efficacy intersects closely with Pocock’s variable of competence and culture.  
For Hyman efficacy refers to “organisational capacity” which he breaks down into three 
broad categories: “the ability to acquire information (intelligence), to formulate policies 
coherently and dynamically (strategy) and to implement them appropriately (competence)” 
(Hyman 1997: 311). 
 
 
Hyman:  Effective representation 
autonomy 
legitimacy efficacy 
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Union power and the NTEU 
Drawing the work of Levesque and Murray, Pocock and Hyman together, what insights can 
be gained to help assess the power resources available to the NTEU?  The three models can 
be summarized to provide five broad and interrelated categories for analysing the strengths 
and weakness of the NTEU: levels of responsiveness, proactivity or autonomy from 
management’s agenda, ability to inspire membership commitment, levels of legitimacy with 
the membership and competence, culture and organizational capacity. 
 
1. Responsiveness 
Responsiveness is the result of a dynamic relationship between the external environment 
and the internal structures and processes of the union.  As Carter points out unions are 
neither passive recipients of the external environment nor can they hope to act as 
independent agents free of the constraints of their external environment (Carter 2000: 118).  
Whilst the external environment may set the parameters for the scope of choices available 
(Boxall and Haynes 1997: 569) the strategic choices the NTEU makes can have significant 
impacts on its fortunes.  As Pocock points out any combination of external factors can 
impact on a union: “product markets, employer strategies, the general state of the 
economy, the legislative environment, the dominant political discourses (individualism, anti-
unionism, etc), and numerous historical legacies that shape national and international 
solidarities” (Pocock 2000: 21).  However, it is important to note, that as with industry, the 
external environment offers not just threats but also opportunities.  As Kelly points out, 
unions operate in the context of a contradictory employment relationship where employer 
hostilities and restructures and retrenchments threaten unionism whilst also providing the 
platform and wellspring for renewal (Kelly 1998 quoted in Fairbrother, Williams et al. 2007: 
48).   Voss and Sherman argue that “crisis” offers the shock necessary for the union 
organization to break with the past tradition exposing the weaknesses of the current 
strategy (2000: 308-9; 2003: 75) and providing an opening for  new protagonists with new 
strategies to step forward (Voss and Sherman 2000: 309).  In line with Kelly’s argument, 
Voss and Sherman’s empirical evidence showed that a negative shock or crisis offers more 
fertile environment as organizations in adversity are more likely to adopt alternative 
agendas (Voss and Sherman 2000: 309).   
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 Responsiveness appears to depend on two related processes: firstly, developing an accurate 
understanding of external threats and opportunities and secondly adapting union strategy 
and the organization to best fit this context.   The more accurate the union’s information 
about its environment, the more appropriate will be its strategic response.  As Levesque and 
Murray point out, globalisation has dramatically increased the speed in exchange of 
information (Levesque and Murray 2002: 42).  Corporations have access to superior 
information capacities in the new global era and so therefore unions need to also increase 
this capacity (Hyman 1997: 311; Levesque and Murray 2002: 42) and the ability to process 
and disseminate this information (Levesque and Murray 2002: 48).  Unions need to 
therefore develop their levels of “receptiveness”.  In an environment of high volatility and at 
times external hostilities, what processes did the NTEU adopt to monitor its environment?  
How accurate was its assessment of the external environment?   
 
The second aspect to responsiveness is locating the best strategy to adapt the organization 
to meet these threats or opportunities.  Several researchers have pointed out that some 
unions have demonstrated more responsive capacities than others.  Heery et al in their 
study of the implementation of the Organising Academy focused on three factors for 
successful recruitment “incentive, opportunity and expertise” indicating a dynamic 
relationship between the internal life “incentive” and “expertise” of the organization and 
external “opportunities” made available to the union (Heery, Simms et al. 2000: 987).  
Similarly, using the poker metaphor, Ganz argues that chance may determine the outcome 
of any one hand, or even a game but in the long run some players are more likely to be 
winners than others (2000: 1008).  An organization can always stumble on an opportunity 
but the likelihood it will make use of it depends on its strategic capacity (Ganz 2000: 1008).  
How effective was the NTEU in making strategic use of the external environment? 
 
2. Autonomy 
The second element of union power or effectiveness refers to its ability to go beyond merely 
reacting to its opponent’s agenda to develop an independent union voice.  Levesque and 
Murray define proactivity as the ability of unions to develop and pursue their own agenda 
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(2002: 45).  An effective union strategy breaks the union free from purely a reactive stance 
that external pressures often impose on unions (Levesque and Murray 2002: 51).   For 
example, in the context of workplace change it has been discovered that both simple 
opposition or simple acceptance tend to weaken membership support (Levesque, Murray 
and Lequeux, 1998) (Levesque and Murray 2002).  The union therefore needs to develop a 
strategy that best articulates the membership’s concerns and enhances their identification 
with their union (Levesque and Murray 2002: 50).  Similarly Hyman’s term autonomy goes 
beyond merely reacting to management’s agenda to refer to the development of an 
independent “representative mechanism” from the employer; an articulation of a “coherent 
employee ‘voice’” (Hyman 1997: 310).  This leads to the question of the effectiveness of the 
NTEU in maintaining its independence in the face of the demands of management and the 
federal government.  
 
3. From autonomy to inspiration 
Following on from the need for an autonomous position is the third characteristic of 
effective union strategy which is that it must inspire support.  Researchers have pointed out 
that an important element to the development of an autonomous voice is to develop an 
independent world view, a strategic vision for what the union hopes to achieve (Hyman 
1997: 310; Pocock 2000: 14; Levesque and Murray 2002: 50).  Levesque and Murray argue 
that one of the impacts of globalization is that workers are often better educated and better 
paid producing a tendency towards individualization making it more difficult to capture and 
articulate a collective set of beliefs or opinions (Levesque and Murray 2002: 48).  Workers 
interaction with fast-paced, globally based information may also have the propensity to 
make them more “discerning consumers of ideas” (Levesque and Murray 2002: 49).  The 
fragmentation of the workplace is compounded by increasingly diversified workplaces with 
the influx of women in particular and including sexuality, ethnic and age demographics.  The 
challenge for the union is therefore to offer credible explanations to events and a 
convincing alternative way forward to an increasingly individualized and sceptical 
membership base (Levesque and Murray 2002: 49).   
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For many theorists and particularly those in the social movement camp, unions must 
therefore combat the perception of unions as only concerned with the narrow interests of 
its membership and to emphasize broader issues such as fairness, justice, dignity at work 
(Bronfenbrenner 2003: 44).  Similarly Johnson and Jarley discuss how justice perceptions 
from outside of the workplace such as global issues, discrimination and inequality can 
inspire workers to join unions (Johnson and Jarley 2004: 557). Heery et al’s analysis of the 
Organising Academy also emphasized the social movement aspects of the campaign: 
“justice”, “respect”, “dignity”, “rights” and “fairness” such as the slogan “Respect at Work 
Zone” (Heery, Simms et al. 2000: 998).  The union movement is encouraged to frame its 
goals in such a way as to capture social and political goals rather than narrow economic 
concerns (Hyman 1997: 326-7; Fairbrother, Williams et al. 2007: 47).  
 
It is argued that the new globalised environment is characterized by a political pessimism 
and therefore unions must also keep belief in the possibility of social change alive (Levesque 
and Murray 2002: 49).  As Fairbrother points out, at the heart of union renewal is the 
proposition of an “alternative world view of society” which emphasizes “participation, 
accountability, and public involvement” (Fairbrother, Williams et al. 2007: 47).   That is the 
union needs to inspire, not just respond or react, which in turn requires a sophisticated 
understanding of its constituents and their goals and beliefs.  How effective was the NTEU in 
inspiring its membership?  What demands, goals and strategies did they adopt to attempt to 
unite its constituents behind its goals? 
 
4. Democratic legitimacy 
The fourth characteristic of effective union strategy is closely related to issues of autonomy 
and inspiration, that is: it must have legitimacy with the membership.  A strategy’s 
legitimacy with the membership is essential as, in the final analysis, the membership must 
display a “willingness to act” (Offe and Wisenthal 1985) in pursuit of these goals (Hyman 
1997: 311).  For a proactive agenda to have legitimacy with the membership it obviously 
cannot be imposed from the leadership but must be constructed in concert with 
membership participation (Levesque and Murray 2002: 51).  Levesque and Murray take 
legitimacy a little further in indicating that internal solidarity might act as an antidote to the 
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fragmentation and individualisation of the current era enabling the construction of “new 
collective identities” and builds the “cohesion of the union as an institution on which its 
power depends” (2000: 12 quoted in Pocock 2000: 15).  The issue of developing a proactive 
or strategic agenda is therefore intimately linked to the issue of internal solidarity (or 
democracy).   
 
However, although membership participation is crucial to successful union strategy, the 
membership is in many ways beholden to the union leadership to frame their situation for 
them.  For Hyman legitimacy refers to the “representativity” of representatives (Hyman 
1997: 311).  The important distinction that Hyman makes is that representation is mediated 
by the leadership (Hyman 1997: 311): “the self-negating consequences of purely 
decentralized democracy can be transcended only when articulated … by coordination from 
above” (Hyman 2007: 199).  Union effectiveness therefore requires “the capacity to 
interpret, decipher, sustain and redefine the demands of the represented, so as to evoke 
the broadest possible consensus and approval” (Regalia, 1988: 351 quoted in Hyman 2007: 
5).  Union leaderships do not just respond directly to external pressures nor is there an 
immediate clear line of communication internally from the membership to the leadership.  
Union memberships of course are not a homogenous grouping but have many varied and 
conflicting views (Hyman 1989: 150).  Therefore, the union official must collate, assess and 
prioritize the wishes of the membership within the context of the pressures of the external 
environment (Hyman 1997: 311).   
 
Effective union leaders therefore do not just respond to member’s grievances, they 
formulate strategy that mediates or reframes these grievances in order to direct members 
into a particular course of action.  For Hyman  the skill of being a union officer  is the ability 
to “manipulate ideological resources”, to convince in terms that resonate with members, or 
even the “mobilization of bias” to encourage the most effective response to the challenges 
at hand (Hyman 1997: 311).   Similarly, Johnson and Jarley argue that effective union 
representatives “convert” individual perceptions of workplace injustice into a collective 
need to act (Johnson and Jarley 2004: 556).   Kumar and Murray in their empirical research 
into the Canadian union movement showed that  deliberate interventions to shape and 
prioritise membership demands was the most significant variable in bargaining success in 
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what in what they term “newer agenda” items such as work-life balance, gender and 
workplace change issues (2002: 22).  How did the NTEU National Office mediate the many 
conflicting demands of its membership to arrive at its strategy?  In what ways did it attempt 
to shape these demands to enhance its approach? 
 
5. Competence, culture and organizational capacity 
The fifth element of a union’s power resources draws attention to the “inner life” of the 
NTEU.  The effectiveness of any strategy is mediated by what Pocock calls competence and 
culture or what Hyman would similarly call efficacy.  As Pocock points out, the importance of 
this factor is that the development of an effective union strategy is not a linear process of 
establishing effective goals and then seamlessly implementing them for union success 
(2000: 10).  In fact, regardless of the merits of the goals and strategies established many 
union initiatives stumble at the “muddy process of change” that characterizes the 
implementation phase (Pocock 2000: 29).  A union may have very effective representative 
structures and the capacity to develop sophisticated, responsive policy but not have the 
organizational ability to implement these strategies.  In Pocock’s discussion of a 
manufacturing union in Australia, she showed that whilst there appeared to be general 
agreement on the strategic direction of the union, entrenched cultures and an internal 
climate of rivalries, divisions and vested interests hampered the realization of this direction 
(2000: 48).   
 
Competence and culture is closely related to the issue of responsiveness as it encompasses 
issues of entrenched traditions and path dependence.  As Johnston points out trade union 
policy-makers “tend to rely on familiar repertoires or behavioural scripts when faced with 
new conditions” (1994: 37 quoted in Hyman 2007: 202).  Gardner calls this a union’s 
“preferred strategy” or its characteristic approach to achieving its goals (1989: 55).  This 
preferred strategy may not be explicitly understood but may be made up of unconscious 
choices that are based on customs built incrementally over time (Gardner 1989: 55).  As 
Pocock points out, the internal climate, history and traditions of individual unions can also 
act to constrict either the strategic choices available to actors or even constrain the 
perceived options available (2000: 59).  Making a similar point, Gardner draws on Lange et 
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al’s (1982) concept of “strategic inertia” (1989: 64).  Strategic inertia is attributed to the 
entrenched traditions of the union as well as the requirement to maintain union 
membership support which constrains a union’s ability to quickly develop new strategies in 
response to changed circumstances (Gardner, 1989: 64).  Unions with their emphasis on 
traditions and precedent can become “path dependent” (Hyman 2007: 202) or fall victim to 
“competency traps” (Levitt and March 1988 quoted in Hyman 2007: 202) where tactics that 
may have worked in the past and so have gained respect and become entrenched becomes 
an obstacle to developing new approaches when circumstances change (Hyman 2007: 202).  
Therefore, before a union can learn new approaches it may need to “unlearn” established 
routines and assumptions which may no longer be effective or appropriate (Hyman 2007: 
202).   
 
Competence and culture also incorporates issues that are often neglected in union strategy 
discussions: administration and financial management (Pocock 2000: 51).  Effective union 
strategy requires taking stock of the administrative functioning of the union, its: finances, 
assets and staffing levels, human resource management, conflict management, pay and 
conditions (Pocock 2000: 51).  Pocock showed how the allocation of cars and the difficulty in 
cutting down their use and numbers in light of dire circumstances were symbolic of the 
problems that beset the manufacturing union and compromised its competence (Pocock 
2000: 52).  What elements of the inner life of the NTEU, its resources, traditions and 
processes impacted on its ability to implement strategy? 
 
Summary 
How can the union renewal literature reviewed in this chapter assist research into how the 
NTEU built the capabilities required to meet the challenges of bargaining during the period 
1993 to 2005?  One of the key lessons to be drawn from the discussion in this chapter is that 
the unit of analysis in examining union effectiveness is not the leadership or the 
membership in isolation but the relationship between the two.  Effective lines of 
communication among the various layers of the union would appear to underpin most of 
the elements of effective trade union strategy; effective communication enables access to 
the knowledge necessary to respond to the specific demands of the external environment 
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and is also central to the development of an autonomous agenda that has the democratic 
legitimacy necessary to inspire the union membership and its supporters into action.  This 
chapter has discussed how it is not enough for a union to develop effective strategy it must 
also have the capacity to put that strategy into motion.  Chapter three will show how many 
of the skills and capacities, such as organizational responsiveness and creativity, required to 
build trade union effectiveness can be more readily explained by those in the field of 
knowledge management.   
 
As this chapter has shown, with varying emphasis on the leaders or the lead, the 
development of effective union strategy could be understood to rely on three key factors: 
firstly, the strategic capacity of union leaders, secondly the engagement and contribution of 
union memberships and supporters and thirdly and perhaps most importantly, structures 
and processes that maximize the effectiveness of the relationship between the two.  These 
three factors will be discussed in greater detail in chapter four.  The union renewal literature 
therefore directs this research of the NTEU national officers to examine the relationships 
they maintained with the various layers of the union in the development of its strategy.  
What networks did it maintain to help it monitor its external environment?  How did the 
NTEU national office mediate the many conflicting demands of its membership to arrive at 
its strategy?  In what ways did it attempt to shape these demands to enhance its approach?   
And in discussing its capacity to pursue its strategy, what elements of the inner life of the 
NTEU, its resources, traditions and processes impacted on its ability to implement strategy? 
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Chapter Three 
Knowledge Management 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to conduct an analysis of knowledge management literature 
to consider how the insights and approaches of this research might contribute to the trade 
union strategy literature discussed in chapter two.  This chapter begins with a brief 
discussion on what knowledge management is and how it might be applied to analysing 
learning in the NTEU.  The chapter then conducts a review of the knowledge management 
literature to build an understanding of what kinds of knowledge the NTEU might employ.  
Once it is known what “knowledge” is in the context of the NTEU, this chapter then asks the 
question: how is this knowledge built and disseminated?  Chapter four will return to the 
findings of this chapter and combine it with the observations of the trade union literature in 
chapter two to build a research framework for analysing the learning process in the NTEU.  
 
Knowledge Management which came to prominence in the early 1990s can best be 
understood as a heightened appreciation of the value of intellectual assets and their 
potential to deliver competitive advantage in the context of the fast paced globalized 
markets and the advancement of information technology (de Cieri and Kramar 2004: 586; 
Dess, Lumpkin et al. 2005: 119; McKinlay 2005: 242).  The study of knowledge management 
is therefore concerned with the way in which organizations attract, develop and retain 
“talent” (Dess, Lumpkin et al. 2005: 124) and “gather, store, share and apply knowledge that 
can enhance competitiveness” (de Cieri and Kramar 2004: 342).  Another related strand of 
knowledge management is devoted to “innovation” (Dess, Lumpkin et al. 2005: 408) and 
“knowledge creation” (Nonaka 1991: 96) where the creative generation of new knowledge 
enables the development of new products, technology or services for competitive 
advantage (Nonaka 1991: 96; Dess, Lumpkin et al. 2005: 409).  There has therefore been 
considerable discussion and debate among researchers offering valuable insights into what 
constitutes knowledge in an organization and in turn where it resides in an organization and 
how this knowledge is shared and new ideas are generated.   
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Of what use is knowledge management theory for understanding the NTEU?  As was 
established in the previous chapter, trade unions are dramatically different from other 
organisations in that at least theoretically power flows upward; that is its leaders are 
servants to the democratic wishes of their membership (Strauss and Warner 1977: 116).  
However, although the NTEU has very different governance structures and quite different 
goals and objectives to most companies, knowledge management theory would appear to 
be relevant for some of the same reasons that industry has found it helpful.  Firstly, in a 
time of rapid change the NTEU, like many companies has been under considerable pressure 
to develop their dynamic capabilities.  Secondly, knowledge management has often focused 
on professional workers whose output is primarily knowledge-based (Blackler 1995: 1022). 
Like many companies, the NTEU primarily employs knowledge workers: legal and industrial 
staff whose “craft” is the development, application and dissemination of often tacit 
knowledge based around bargaining and negotiations.  In an increasingly litigious and 
complex industrial relations environment, the ability of the NTEU to respond to external 
pressures demands high levels of legal, industrial and political expertise and in the ability to 
creatively apply this knowledge in an unpredictable environment.   
 
However, trade union democracy creates an additional complication for knowledge 
management in the context of the NTEU requiring an analysis not just of how the NTEU 
manages the process of developing the skills of its employees but also its approach to the 
task of building and sharing knowledge at every level of the organization.  As discussed in 
the previous chapter developing the strategic capacity of union leaders is an essential 
ingredient to effective union strategy.  It was also found that engaging the union 
membership is vital for ensuring the democratic legitimacy of the union’s goals, to inspire 
support as well as to monitor the external environment.  It is therefore vital to empower 
elected representatives and members of the union to generate new ideas and to have these 
ideas disseminated and to gain influence in decision making.  Understanding the nature of 
unions as organizations of a particular kind with very different governance structures to 
those routinely researched in knowledge management literature is important for 
understanding the particular pressures on the NTEU in learning to navigate enterprise 
bargaining.   
 
32 
 
What kinds of knowledge? 
The starting point for this discussion is to analyse what kinds of knowledge is being referred 
to in this analysis of the NTEU.  In an attempt to describe the various forms of knowledge, 
researchers have tended to make a distinction between explicit and tacit knowledge.  
Explicit knowledge is conscious and can be articulated or codified and therefore easily 
disseminated (Lubit 2001: 166).  It tends to be timeless, generic and not bound to any 
particular context (McKinlay 2005: 243) and incorporates formalized, theoretical or abstract 
knowledge such as those learned at university or college for professional or technical roles 
(Frenkel et al. 1995: 779) or what Blackler would term “embrained knowledge” (1995: 
1023).  Encoded explicit knowledge is often located in an organization’s prescriptive 
manuals, rules, regulations and codes of practice and is often recorded and transmitted 
electronically (Blackler 1995: 1025; McKinlay 2005: 243).  In contrast, tacit knowledge is 
more difficult to express or share in line with Polanyi’s view that “we know more than we 
can tell” (Leonard and Sensiper 1998: 113).  For Lubit tacit knowledge is not a particular 
piece of information that can be easily articulated and shared but knowledge that 
incorporates "know how" or a way of making sense of the world which is often 
unconsciously accumulated and stored (2001: 166). 
 
However, there are a series of difficulties with this simple explicit and tacit dichotomy.  
Many researchers support Polanyi’s seminal observation that all knowledge has a tacit 
dimension (Leonard and Sensiper 1998: 113).  For example, Leonard and Sensiper argue that 
knowledge exists along a spectrum: at one extreme is knowledge that is completely tacit, 
semiconscious or subconscious and at the other is knowledge that is completely explicit, 
codified and accessible to others, with most knowledge existing at a point between these 
extremes (1998: 113).  In practical terms, there is no point in knowing formal, abstract or 
codified knowledge without the tacit knowledge needed to apply it (Brown and Duguid 
2001: 204).  Therefore implicit and explicit dimensions are not two distinct “types of 
knowledge” but are interdependent (Brown and Duguid 2001: 204), reflecting what Blackler 
terms “embodied knowledge” or knowledge which is only partially explicit but also relies on 
sensory input and physical contact (1995: 1024).  All work requires both abstract and 
contextual knowledge (Frenkel et al. 1995: 779; McKinlay 2005: 243).  A good example of 
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this interplay is reflected in Orr’s field study of photocopy technicians where a technician’s 
“know how” depended not just on their abstract or explicit blue-print of how the machine 
works, but on a physical interaction with the machine using instincts and senses (for 
example, listening to the sounds the machine makes), interaction with users (including 
verbally imitating the distinctive noise the malfunctioning machine makes) and looking at 
print copy to guide the diagnosis of the problem (1998: 441).  Whilst the importance of the 
technicians' manual is not in question here, such material has difficulty in codifying the ker-
clunk and whirr of a malfunctioning photocopy machine, this information must be tacitly 
understood by the technician (Orr 1998: 442).  In summary, as Blackler points out 
knowledge is “multifaceted and complex, being both situated and abstract, implicit and 
explicit, distributed and individual, physical and mental, developing and static, verbal and 
encoded” (1995: 1032).  Understanding the relationships between the variety of its 
manifestations is as important as identifying their categories (Blackler 1995: 1033).    
 
If knowledge is so complex and ephemeral, how then can the kinds of knowledge the NTEU 
requires in the formation of strategy be analysed?  The solution can be found in activity 
theory (1995: 1035).  Blackler folds researchers like Lave, Engestrom, Orr, Ellstrom and 
Brown and Duguid into a broad category of research based on Vygotsky’s “activity theory” 
(1995: 1035).  Activity theory reinforces the term “knowing” over “knowledge”, emphasizing 
the link between knowledge and the constantly evolving learning process as opposed to 
knowledge as a static abstraction (Blackler 1995: 1035): “rather than studying knowledge as 
something individuals or organizations supposedly have, activity theory studies knowing as 
something that they do and analyses the dynamics of the systems through which knowing is 
accomplished” (Blackler 1995: 1039).  For activity theorists, knowledge is “situated” in a 
particular context, “provisional” or constantly evolving and “pragmatic” or practical and 
focused on the task at hand (Blackler 1995: 1039-40).  Therefore, for Brown and Duguid 
among others, the solution is to keep the analysis focused on “practice”; the way work gets 
done is the key to understanding what knowledge is and how it is generated and 
transmitted to others (2001: 200).  Similarly, Orr argues that the context in which the work 
is carried out determines how knowledge is applied and what is “known to be true” (1998: 
446).   
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Activity theory and the NTEU 
There are some clear intersections between activity theory and the observations of the 
trade union renewal literature in the previous chapter.  Activity theory with its emphasis on 
contextual, constantly evolving and practical knowledge would appear to be a very helpful 
theory in addressing issues of trade union responsiveness.  In applying activity theory to the 
NTEU, it is clear that this study must go beyond an analysis of the encoded knowledge 
embedded in the myriad of policies, enterprise agreements, awards and legislation which 
govern the employment contract to focus on practice: the skills, information, experience 
that individuals and groups within the NTEU draw on in their attempt to solve problems 
generated by the context in which they are operating.  In an environment where both the 
legislation regarding industrial relations and higher education were in flux what strategies 
did the NTEU adopt to attempt to stay abreast of the most current and relevant information 
and to develop responses to the new challenges they were confronted with?     
 
The NTEU: what kinds of knowledge? 
In line with activity theory, therefore, the best way to understand what kinds of knowledge 
or “know how” the NTEU required is to focus on practice.  Frenkel et al. have developed a 
model which offers a way to represent the knowledge element of work roles in the modern 
workplace.  For Frenkel et al the level and forms of knowledge required to perform a work 
role can be understood in terms of three dimensions: the predominant form of knowledge, 
the relative levels of creativity and type and level of skill (Frenkel, Korczynski et al. 1995: 
781). The form of knowledge dimension makes a distinction between contextual knowledge 
or information which is grounded in concepts and practice that are not easily generalized to 
other contexts and theoretical or abstract knowledge (Frenkel, Korczynski et al. 1995: 779).  
As discussed earlier in the chapter, theoretical or abstract knowledge is a form explicit 
knowledge learned in higher education or colleges required to perform professional or 
technical roles (Frenkel, Korczynski et al. 1995: 779).  For example, a laboratory technician 
will likely have low levels of theoretical knowledge but require high levels of contextual 
knowledge (Frenkel, Korczynski et al. 1995: 782) where a doctor will likely require high 
levels of both forms of knowledge with perhaps a predominance of theoretical knowledge.  
Therefore a work role can be understood along a spectrum as to the levels and predominant 
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form of knowledge required from contextual to theoretical (Frenkel, Korczynski et al. 1995: 
779). 
 
Creativity refers to the generation of original responses, ideas or solutions to a problem or a 
product (Frenkel, Korczynski et al. 1995: 779)  Creativity is enlisted when an employee needs 
to infer a course of action from diverse sources of information (Frenkel, Korczynski et al. 
1995: 779).  Frenkel et al have defined creativity using three attributes: the extent to which 
the given problem or issue is heuristic (open-ended) or algorithmic (with a clear path to 
solution), the originality and quality of the output required and the extent to which original 
insight builds on other knowledge or must be developed and realized from scratch (1995: 
779).  Orr’s photocopy technicians were shown to use their tacit knowledge or “know how” 
to fill the gap where the official manual was deficient to develop solutions to malfunctions 
that were not anticipated when the copier was designed or when installed in a particular 
workplace (Orr 1998: 444).  In developing their distinction between actual practice as 
compared to “abstract knowledge”, Brown and Duguid use the analogy of a journey as 
experienced by those on the ground as compared to how it looks when drawn on a map 
(1991: 41-42).  The map smoothes over the myriad of decisions made when navigating 
obstacles or challenges created by changing conditions (Brown and Duguid 1991: 42).  
Creative, improvised strategies are often employed when there is a clash or mismatch 
between the canonical practice and the unpredictable reality (Brown and Duguid 1991: 42).  
A work role can therefore be categorized according to the level of creativity from high to 
low required to perform it (Frenkel, Korczynski et al. 1995: 779).   
 
Frenkel et al’s category of type and level of skills is broken into three types: action centred, 
intellective and social (1995: 780).  Action centred skills refer to physical ability such as 
reflexes and dexterity (Frenkel, Korczynski et al. 1995: 780).  Intellective skills refer to the 
ability to reason to synthesize information and to make inferences and can enlist either 
theoretical or contextual knowledge (Frenkel, Korczynski et al. 1995: 780).  Social skills 
includes the ability to develop inter-personal relationships to assist in the realization of 
goals, the ability to convince or persuade, the ability to communicate, teach and learn from 
others (Frenkel, Korczynski et al. 1995: 780) Thompson et al would term this 
knowledgeability at work (Thompson et al. 2001: 926).  
36 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ellstrom’s research into “work-integrated learning” has focused on the conditions that 
promote the development of the various kinds of “know how” required to perform roles 
(2001: 421).  Ellstrom has developed two broad categories for modes of learning in the 
workplace: adaptive and developmental (2001: 422).  Under these two broad headings, he 
has developed a taxonomy which defines four different levels of learning: reproductive, 
productive (type I), productive (type II) and creative (Ellstrom 2001: 423).  Adaptive learning 
which is reproductive is work-integrated learning where the tasks, methods and results are 
clearly prescribed allowing for minimal discretion or decision making (Ellstrom 2001: 423).  
This kind of work involves the “lowest” level of learning which would correspond to routine, 
low skilled work roles (Ellstrom 2001: 424). At the other end of the spectrum, work which 
requires developmental learning involving high levels of creativity (Ellstrom 2001: 423) 
might be what is required to develop Frenkel et al’s intellective skills (1995: 780).  This 
highest level of "developmental learning" involves engaging active knowledge-based 
problem solving and hypothesising where the learner must define the problem from first 
principles and attempt to make explicit that which is perhaps only partially understood so 
that assumptions can be tested and experimentation can take place (Ellstrom 2001: 424).  In 
line with activity theory, Ellstrom is careful to point out that the two main modes of learning 
are not mutually exclusive but that many skilled and professional roles will likely involves all 
Frenkel et al’s Three Dimensions of Work 
Contextual 
Predominant form 
Creativity 
Low 
High 
Intellective skills 
Low 
Theoretical 
High 
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four modes of learning to varying degrees moving between routine and non-routine work 
depending on the task at hand (Ellstrom 2001: 424). 
 
Ellstrom’s levels of learning as a function of the scope of action 
 Levels of Learning 
Aspects of work-
learning situation 
Adaptive learning Developmental learning 
reproductive productive (type I) 
productive (type 
II) 
creative 
Tasks given given Given Not given 
Methods given given Not given Not given 
Results given Not given Not given Not given 
 
The observations of activity theory are helpful for this study of the NTEU.  By focusing on 
practice, activity theory enables the incorporation of a spectrum of explicit and tacit, formal 
and informal forms of “know how” and learning.  As Heery and Kelly point out, there is no 
formally recognized set of skills or knowledge that an individual must have in order to 
qualify for the position of elected union official (1994: 13).  Therefore, a preliminary 
application of Frenkel et al’s model would indicate that whilst the NTEU likely requires some 
level of abstract or theoretical knowledge the union predominantly relies on contextual 
knowledge built up over time and learned through experience.  Drawing on Ellstrom’s 
taxonomy, it requires creative learning where the task, method and results are not clearly 
defined.  The NTEU was overwhelmingly confronted with heuristic or open ended problems 
requiring the creative application of knowledge and “know how”.  For example, whilst 
enterprise bargaining at each university campus would appear to have repetitive themes 
debating similar issues, an approach that might work on one campus may not on another.  
In negotiating an enterprise agreement there was no reliable map available as every journey 
is a new journey and every decision made along that path creates another vista which also 
has not been mapped.   
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The NTEU:  sharing knowledge through building community 
In the previous chapter devoted to trade union effectiveness, it was argued that it was not 
sufficient for a union to have a skilled leadership, but that this leadership must forge an 
effective inter-relationship with all other constituents within the union and in particular its 
membership and supporters if it is to formulate effective strategy that has sufficient 
legitimacy with its support base to inspire action.  The union must have the capacity to 
adapt its internal life and priorities to meet the challenges of its environment.  The key to 
effective unionism therefore is the free flow of information and the capacity to process this 
information to formulate and implement appropriate strategy.  However, if the information 
the NTEU relies on is overwhelmingly “know how” as distinct from explicit and codified 
information, how then does this kind of knowledge get transmitted?  Activity theorists argue 
knowledge creation and dissemination is inherently a group activity (Teece et al. 1997: 15; 
Leonard and Sensiper 1998: 115); knowledge is “mediated” and therefore located in 
community discourse (Blackler 1995: 1039-40).  So, the verb is “becoming” a member not 
“learning” a set of practices (Brown and Duguid 1991: 48).  This is what Blackler would call 
developing “encultured knowledge” (1995: 1024).  Engestrom has a similar notion of 
“socially distributed activity systems” where individuals have their own activities but these 
activities are mediated by interaction with the activity system of rules, language, 
technologies and norms of their community (Blackler 1995: 1037).   
 
Like many occupations, the role of trade union representative is more of a vocation or an 
occupation than merely a job.  Learning in the NTEU can be understood as becoming a 
member of a community, learning its particular language and developing relationships 
which enable access to the repository of knowledge available.  In drawing a distinction 
between a job and an occupation, Standing argues that a job is a “set of tasks that might or 
might not be combined into an occupation.  Often, it has had a pejorative meaning attached 
to it, implying a lack of permanency, a lack of accumulated wisdom and skill…A job is what 
one does, an occupation is what one is” (Standing 2002: 255).  Individuals draw from 
“existing social, moral, physical and intellectual character” of their occupations (Van 
Maanen and Barley 1984: 289) and form communal bonds with others who share their 
occupation (Van Maanen and Barley 1984: 298).  They also suggest that membership of an 
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occupational community becomes a central element of presenting the self often with a 
sense of pride to others and particularly to those outside of that community (1984: 298-9).  
As Van Maanen and Barley point out occupations that are often stigmatized by outsiders 
and that require “adopting a particular style of life” are particularly prone to encouraging 
strong bonds of support within the community (1984: 303-5).  In line with this idea, certain 
characteristics of the NTEU can therefore be understood to encourage a collective “value 
system” and strong bonds of understanding to be created.  For example, the “ordeal like 
atmosphere” (Van Maanen and Barley 1984: 305) of representing members in a particularly 
hostile negotiation where the outcome is unknown and the best path to take is unclear will 
tend to encourage members of the community to look to each other for support.  Van 
Maanen and Barley also note that occupations where responsibility for others is central to 
the role will also tend to encourage tight bonds within the community (Van Maanen and 
Barley 1984: 303). 
 
It is not possible to adequately discuss the notion of membership within the context of the 
NTEU without also tackling the thorny issue of ideology.  Lubit's notion of "know how" a way 
of approaching problems or conceptualizing “cause and effect” and what meaning to 
attribute to those events (2001: 166) when applied to the NTEU necessarily entails a 
political world view.  The union world view contains within it a raft of philosophical and 
moral meanings drawing on a range of abstract theories which either consciously or 
unconsciously inform approaches to solving problems.  Van Maanen and Barley argue that 
learning the community’s codes, values and languages can often be all embracing and 
determine an individual’s outlook even when they are not at work (1984: 300).  The ethos 
encouraged within the occupational community becomes a way of seeing the world that 
sets community members apart from others (Van Maanen and Barley 1984: 300).  Further, 
whilst their union commitment may set them apart from others it acts to forge stronger 
relationships within their occupational community.  The activist may choose to spend their 
leisure time with other members of their occupational community where they gain comfort 
and support in their shared outlook.  Van Maanen and Barley’s “visual tie signs” that 
symbolize membership (1984: 299) are also in plain view: NTEU t-shirts, hats, stickers and 
badges act to symbolically identify and visually stamp the individual as a member of this 
community as a matter of pride.    
40 
 
 How do researchers recommend analysing the way in which experience is transmitted 
within an organization?  Activity theory, with its emphasis on practitioners, recommends 
focusing on the way in which these practitioners interact both formally and informally and 
how their community ties are built and maintained.  Orr and Brown and Duguid argue that it 
is through narration or storytelling that intangible or tacit experience is generated and 
shared within communities.  Storytelling unlike reading a manual or a road map has the 
flexibility to enable the articulation of instincts, hunches, misinterpretations and concerns 
and perhaps even subconsciously held thoughts and ideas to develop a shared 
understanding of cause and effect and bring coherence to a series of seemingly random 
events (Brown and Duguid 1991: 45).  New insights are folded into the shared narrative 
(Brown and Duguid 1991: 44).  Stories therefore act as repositories for accumulated wisdom 
(ie. noncanonical practice).  Similarly Srivsastva and Barrett emphasise the need to focus on 
language, metaphor, symbols and imagery as central to the building of encultured 
knowledge (Blackler 1995: 1024).  They further show that as circumstances change often 
there is a composite experimentation and ultimately a shift in the shared metaphors 
(Blackler 1995: 1024).   
 
Taken from this perspective, the trade union “war story” is not just for entertainment value 
but plays a vital role in transmitting knowledge and binding those communities.  When it 
comes to disseminating the trade union world view, storytelling has the flexibility to 
implicitly argue for an approach to problem solving or a course of action whilst 
incorporating a raft of philosophical or political meanings.  Through storytelling, the 
individual contributes to the shared wisdom of the community as well as constructs their 
own identity within that community by demonstrating the perspective with which they 
would like to be known, such as a reliable “fixer of problems” or someone who can 
contribute valuable information (Brown and Duguid 1991: 47).  As Orr showed in his field 
study of photocopy technicians, storytelling and group learning and innovation happened 
not just at work, but progressed throughout the morning, took place over lunch and then 
back in front of the copier in the afternoon (Brown and Duguid 1991: 44).  Therefore, the 
transmission of knowledge does not just occur in the workplace but can be recounted in 
pubs and coffee shops and barbecues and help to forge relationships that extend into the 
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personal sphere.  The pleasures in sharing union war stories can blur the boundaries 
between work and leisure.  The key therefore to studying knowledge sharing and creation in 
the NTEU is to focus on the way in which individuals interact with others both formally and 
informally to build an appreciation of the NTEU as a learning community or more accurately 
a community of communities. 
 
Knowledge: sticks and leaks  
In response to the claim by many researchers that the limitation of explicit knowledge is 
that it is easily replicated (“leaked”) to other organizations while tacit knowledge is difficult 
to disseminate (and therefore “sticks”), Brown and Duguid argue that there is no such 
simple distinction as “sticky” and “leaky” knowledge but it is the extent to which sets of 
practices are similar that impacts on the transfer of knowledge (2001: 204).  For activity 
theorists, it is the shared experience of communities that enable knowledge to be 
transferred.  Storytelling assumes a communal understanding where the similarity of 
experience allows for the ready transfer or “leaking” of information among peers (Brown 
and Duguid 1991: 44).  Anthony Gidden’s notion of “disembedding” and “re-embedding” 
knowledge unpacks this issue: the critical element is to what extent the conditions at both 
ends of the communication process are similar (Brown and Duguid 2001: 204).  Knowledge 
leaks where there is shared practice and sticks where there is not (Brown and Duguid 2001: 
207).  For example, knowledge may leak outside an organization among a community of 
practitioners with similar roles or occupations whilst being sticky inside an organization 
(Brown and Duguid 2001: 209).  This point may be significant for the NTEU as it might help 
to explain why information was successfully transmitted within the organization in some 
instances and why communication failed in others.  Is it possible that the extent to which 
experience was shared among national officers and negotiators was the key to 
understanding how effectively information was transmitted and assimilated?  The national 
office, as a centralized hub for these ideas, could be understood as a facilitator in a national 
conversation in which the success or otherwise of its communications depended on the 
extent to which participants were “speaking the same language”.  
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Limitations to the community of practice 
Understanding the NTEU as an organization comprised of communities of practice may also 
assist in explaining the many pitfalls and challenges encountered during its development.  
Researchers have identified two key limitations to the effectiveness of communities of 
practice.  Firstly, communities of practice are inherently exclusive and therefore can be 
resistant to change.  As Swan et al argue communities of practice may be very effective in 
encouraging learning and innovation within the community but they may obstruct the flow 
of information across communities and therefore constrain the wider organization (2002: 
478).  Van Maanen and Barley observed that whilst innovations generated from within the 
community can be readily accepted and promoted, occupational communities can prove 
very resistant to change that may be perceived as a threat to their collective autonomy or 
viability (1984: 343-4).  What’s more, individuals will likely form much tighter bonds within 
their own professional community rather than with their organization as a whole (Brown 
and Duguid 2001: 202).  The boundaries of communities are maintained by codes and 
language which are often impenetrable for outsiders (Van Maanen and Barley 1984: 336) 
enabling them to insulate themselves from alternative approaches (Van Maanen and Barley 
1984: 337).  What difficulties did the NTEU have in transmitting its ideas across the 
organization?  Can some of the difficulties encountered by the NTEU in uniformly applying 
its strategy by explained by the limitation of communities of practice? 
 
Secondly, whilst communities of practice may be effective in day to day problem solving, it 
is argued that radical innovations occur at the interstices across groups and that 
communities of practice may make these connections more difficult (Swan et al. 2002: 478).  
Leonard and Sensiper argue that intellectually heterogeneous groups are more innovative 
than homogeneous ones as homogeneous groups are prone to “group think” (1998: 118).  
They argue that true innovation relies on reframing or reformulating a given problem, not 
just solving the problem in the usual way (Leonard and Sensiper 1998: 114-5).  Similarly, 
Ellstrom identifies the learning potential in “errors, disturbances and problems” where the 
old approach stops working and employees may have the opportunity to participate in 
group discussion to redesign work systems or processes (2001: 430).  “Creative abrasion” 
occurs when each person in a group focusing on the one problem, brings their own set of 
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understandings to the table enriching the process and increasing the likelihood of breaking 
the “frame” (Leonard and Sensiper 1998: 118).  Conflicts between diverse viewpoints 
generate new ideas (Leonard and Sensiper 1998: 118).  Often in group discussion a minority 
opinion will be offered which may not in itself be beneficial but will spark a new train of 
thought which leads to the ultimate solution (Leonard and Sensiper 1998: 118).  Leonard 
and Sensiper argue that the tacit knowledge (or deep skills) of individuals required for 
innovation can only be unlocked in group interaction (Leonard and Sensiper 1998: 117) and 
that perhaps the most important aspect of tapping tacit “know how” is that hunches only 
partially conscious or a deep understanding of how things work enables the preparation and 
incubation of ideas that are the precondition for “flashes” of new insight (Leonard and 
Sensiper 1998: 114-5).  During the progress of successive rounds of enterprise bargaining 
the NTEU encountered a series of road blocks, in some cases intentionally constructed by its 
opponents to stymie the NTEU’s progress.  The old ways stopped working and a complete 
rethink of the NTEU’s approach was required.  What was the process required to generate 
major innovation?  Where did the “big ideas” come from?  Were they generated “in house” 
or did the NTEU need to go outside of its established communities to break with its old 
routines to find new approaches?    
 
Another important element of the coming together of heterogeneous groups involves 
feeding in new information from the outside world.  Accessing new information is what 
enables an organization to change (MacDonald, 1995: 558).  The term “boundary spanner” 
refers to individuals whose relationship to the external world enable the exchange of 
information between the organization and the outside world (Hoe, 2006: 9).  Amongst other 
roles boundary spanners enable an organization to monitor conditions in the external world 
(Hoe, 2006: 10).  As Tushman and Scanlon point out successful transmission of information 
between the internal and external environment depends on a two-step process: obtaining 
the information from the external environment and secondly successfully transmitting this 
information within the organization (Tushman and Scanlon: 1981: 292).  Therefore it 
depends on the individual’s ability to learn the language of both the external and internal 
environments (Tushman and Scanlon, 1981: 292) and to translate between the two.  The 
individual must have successful external connections but also be well connected internally 
to disseminate the information (Tushman and Scanlon, 1981: 292).  A “star” boundary 
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spanner is one who has significant external connections as well as the respect and status, 
generally earned through perceived competence, internally to influence the organization 
(Tushman and Scanlon, 1981: 290).  The successful transmission of information from the 
outside world also requires synthesis with the current body of internal knowledge to 
develop a new approach to the current issue (MacDonald, 1995: 562).  This process can 
happen at any part of the organization. 
 
Another term for drawing in knowledge and resources from the outside world via 
relationships is “social capital”.  Social capital is defined as the sum of knowledge and 
resources that an individual or group accrues through virtue of its connectedness to other 
individuals or groups (Burt 2001: 32).  Like other forms of capital it is productive in that it 
makes possible the achievement of goals or objectives that would not otherwise be possible 
(Putnam 1993 in Burt 2001: 32).  As Jarley points out “if human capital entails ‘what you 
know’, social capital involves ‘who you know’ (and who and what they know)” (2005: 3).  For 
organizations, social capital involves harnessing the networks of contacts that individuals or 
work units create with other individuals or workplaces to access resources (Knoke 1999, 
Lazega 1999 cited in Jarley 2005).  Social capital is a very broad term which can be applied to 
workplaces or communities and can refer to almost any resource that has been gained via 
human interaction, such as access to goods and services, friendship circles, education, 
health care or emotional support.  Research methods developed to study how social capital 
is built and maintained has been enlisted in this study.  This will be discussed in the 
following chapter.  However, this research has a much more specific focus than social 
capital.  This thesis is concerned with the transmission of information or “know how” among 
groups and individuals both within the NTEU and from the external environment to develop 
trade union strategy. 
 
Summary  
How can the knowledge management literature reviewed in this chapter assist an 
investigation into how the NTEU learned to navigate enterprise bargaining during the period 
1993 to 2005?  The literature has highlighted the fact that there are many aspects of 
knowledge that will not be immediately apparent in the formal record of events that might 
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be captured in memos, minutes and policy documents but that perhaps the most important 
forms of knowledge are those that are forged through relationships in the context of 
problem solving in both day to day situations in the development of new ideas.  Codified 
information should therefore be treated as an artefact that points to the process by which 
that information was developed.  This issue will be discussed in the research methodology 
section of the following chapter. 
 
Activity theory argues that generating and sharing “know how” is inherently practical; that 
learning and innovation is driven by the demands of the context in which participants are 
operating.  To understand what skills the NTEU therefore requires a focus on the problems 
and challenges generated by the context in which participants are operating.  Further, the 
emphasis on communities of practice encourages this research to focus on the relationships 
among participants as the primary unit of analysis for understanding how learning and 
innovation occurs.  Therefore this thesis is looking for evidence of the development of 
learning communities and other relationship ties involved in problem solving and strategic 
decision making in the NTEU.   
 
The literature has therefore inspired a series of questions to guide further investigation.  If 
knowledge creation is inherently a group activity as researchers have argued then who or 
which groups were involved?  How was “know how” disseminated, stored and built over 
time within the organization?  How were new ideas created?  What motivated officers to 
push beyond the safe confines of current practice to seek alternative approaches?  Also, 
how conscious was this learning process and what attempts were made to codify or 
otherwise store and share these lessons? 
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Chapter Four 
Combining trade union and activity theory  
literature to develop a research method 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to draw the observations of both the trade union strategy and 
knowledge management bodies of literature together to guide the development of a 
framework for the empirical research in this thesis.  Chapter two of this thesis was devoted 
to a discussion of recent trade union renewal literature which has moved beyond the 
organizing versus service model binary to more dynamic, context driven ways of 
understanding trade union strategy.  Effective trade union strategy involved developing an 
autonomous message which has legitimacy with the union membership and can therefore 
inspire them into action.  Effective trade union strategy must also be responsive to the 
external environment whilst at the same time mindful of the “inner life” of the union to 
ensure it has the competency and capacity to implement the strategy.  Three key factors for 
a union’s ability to develop effective union strategy were identified: firstly, the strategic 
capacity of the union leadership, secondly the engagement and contribution of the union 
membership and supporters and thirdly and perhaps most importantly, structures and 
processes that maximize the effectiveness of the relationship between the two.  This 
chapter returns to these three factors in depth superimposing the observations from the 
knowledge management literature discussed in chapter three to build an understanding of 
how these three factors might be analysed in the context of strategic decision making in the 
NTEU.  The second half of this chapter outlines the research method that will be adopted for 
the empirical research of this thesis. 
 
1. Developing the strategic capacity of leaders 
A recurring theme in the trade union literature, from Voss and Sherman’s “political will” and 
“knowledge, vision, and sense of urgency” (2003: 65) to Hyman’s “skill, sensitivity and 
imagination” (1997: 311) is the objective of developing the ability of union leaderships to 
create and implement effective strategy.  However, there is limited discussion on how these 
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skills might be built.  For Voss and Sherman, “know how” and new ways to interpret 
situations from the international union movement (Voss and Sherman 2003: 69) or from 
leaders with activist experience from outside the labour movement (Voss and Sherman 
2000: 303) were essential ingredients to union revitalisation implying that unions in decline 
must import expertise from outside its ranks.   But the question remains: how did those 
leaders develop their skills?  Voss and Sherman observed it was the practical experience 
gained through other campaigns that could be transmitted to similar environments in the 
union movement (2003: 65-66).  The union leaders who were successful in implementing 
the social movement model were either an older guard of activists from the ‘60s and ‘70s or 
a new younger layer of student activists involved in campus activism and identity politics 
(Voss and Sherman 2003: 65-66).  Interestingly, it was not a specific brand of politics or 
campaigning, but the experience of activism itself.  As one research participant outlined, 
union officers: “[needed] some sort of political organization, some sort of socialist 
organization, even, who are actively committed to building the union movement, and have 
some new ideas about how to do that, and will use the strategies developed [in other social 
movements]” (Voss and Sherman 2003: 66).  In Voss and Sherman’s depiction of social 
movement unionism it seems whether consciously or not part of its goal is to create an 
environment where activist or ideological skills learned elsewhere may be more easily 
assimilated into the union movement.  This is what knowledge management literature 
would refer to as knowledge being leaked from one organization to another (Brown and 
Duguid 2001: 204).  The necessity to import talent from elsewhere may be because of the 
particularly distressed state of the union organizations Voss and Sherman researched.  Or 
perhaps it is in line with Michel’s “iron law of oligarchy” that Voss and Sherman believe only 
non-bureaucratised movements are capable of producing fresh talent.  However, is it 
possible that union organizations could discover ways to build these skills in-house? 
 
Knowledge management has much to offer a discussion regarding the development of the 
tacit skills such as creativity, intellective and social skills required to develop the strategic 
capacity of union leaders.  Activity theory with its emphasis on “situated”, “provisional” and 
“pragmatic” knowing over more abstract, static forms of knowledge (Blackler 1995: 1039-
40) would argue that tacit skills of the nature required to lead in a union can only be learned 
through experience and transmitted via a community of like practitioners (Brown and 
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Duguid 2001: 200).  Activity theory also argues that new ideas are often generated when 
there is a clash between the current pool of knowledge and the demands of a new situation 
(Brown and Duguid 1991:41-2; Orr 1998: 444) and further that radical innovation is 
inherently a group process and occurs best in heterogeneous groups (Leonard and Sensiper 
1998: 118; Swan, Scarbrough et al. 2002: 478).  Ganz’s analysis of the strategic capacity of 
the leadership team of the United Farm Workers’ successful campaign to unionize 
California’s farm workers in 1960s and 1970s tends to support these observations.  Ganz 
outlines three factors that he believes develops the strategic capacity of trade union 
leaderships: salient knowledge, heuristic processes and motivation (Ganz 2000: 1011). 
Salient knowledge refers to the leaders’ access to relevant information about the “operating 
environment” (Ganz 2000: 1012).  Significantly, Ganz refers to “local knowledge” and 
information about the “domain” (Ganz 2000: 1012) in which the leaders are operating 
implying not static information but the rich understanding or a feel or instinct for the 
demands of the campaign.  In this instance, Ganz attributed this superior salient knowledge 
to the leadership team’s affinity with the mostly Mexican Catholic constituents in the 
workforce and their community (Ganz 2000: 1012).   
 
Ganz’s term heuristic processes is perhaps problematic in that it appears to conflate two 
separate processes.  The first aspect is the impact of being confronted with a novel situation 
which enables reframing of situations which triggers the creative process and enables 
alternative explanations and pathways to be considered (Ganz 2000: 1012). This is similar to 
what Voss and Sherman might term a “shock” or “crisis” that jolts the union out of past 
practices and opens it up to new ideas (Voss and Sherman 2000: 309).  The second aspect of 
Ganz’s heuristic processes refers to the process by which a solution is devised.  Here, Ganz 
emphasizes a “leadership team” (as opposed to an individual leader) with a diversity of 
backgrounds and perspectives.  Ganz argues that the more different ideas are generated, 
“the greater the likelihood there will be good ones among them” (Ganz 2000: 1012); diverse 
viewpoints facilitated innovation.  This second aspect of Ganz’s heuristic processes can be 
explained drawing on Leonard and Sensiper’s concept of “creative abrasion”.  Finally, 
motivation fuelled the persistence and energy required for the extra effort of acquire the 
skills and knowledge necessary to develop new ideas (Ganz 2000: 1014).  Activity theory can 
therefore assist trade union strategy by helping to explain the process by which leadership 
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skills might be developed.  An understanding of how skills are built may help to break union 
strategy research away from an over-emphasis on the individual skills of particular leaders 
and to build an appreciation of the inherently collective nature of strategic capacity. 
 
2. Developing the strategic contribution of members 
Activity theory also has much to contribute to researchers’ observations that increased 
levels of democracy and membership participation is central to union effectiveness.  As 
discussed in chapter two, many trade union researchers have argued that the key purpose 
of internal solidarity or democracy is that it builds membership commitment and the 
legitimacy of its demands (Hyman, 1997: 311, Levesque and Murray, 2002: 51).  Is it possible 
there is something more going on here?  Researchers have observed that effective union 
leaders and structures encourage the membership to “contribute their own knowledge and 
expertise” (Hyman 1997: 311).  Membership experience and knowledge might therefore be 
added under Murray and Levesque’s “internal solidarity” banner as an important 
contribution to the union’s “power resources”.  As Barker et al. point out “leadership is 
exercised at all manner of levels and locations… and not only by those obviously designated 
as ‘leaders’” (Barker et al 2001: 15-17 quoted in Hyman 2007: 5).  Levesque and Murray 
raise the development of a critical, fragmented membership in a globalised environment as 
a challenge for the union movement.  Is it possible that a critical membership of diverse 
opinion could also be seen as an important resource?  With their higher levels of education 
and/or skills required in their workplace roles and their critical engagement with greater 
levels of information and ideas via the internet, the membership might be able to contribute 
inside intelligence on the workings of their company or other ideas that might enhance the 
responsiveness of the union.  From a knowledge management perspective, the benefits of 
democracy therefore goes beyond shoring up membership involvement or commitment to 
incorporate enabling the generation of new ideas and the dissemination of information and 
understanding to enhance the union’s strategic capacity. 
 
Activity theory might also help to explain another quality to increased levels of democracy 
and membership participation, their relationships to other individuals or groups.  As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the term social capital refers to the resources embedded 
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in relationships to other individuals or groups (Burt 2001: 32).  Sociologists argue that the 
better connected an individual or group, the greater access they have to a broader range of 
opportunities and resources.  Jarley has enlisted the theory of social capital to discuss how 
enhancing this quality might contribute to union renewal (Jarley 2005: 1).  However, Jarley 
enlists social capital to only limited effect.  Jarley argues that unions should promote the 
networks and opportunities embedded in the union’s social capital to encourage mutual aid, 
in-kind services among members and access to others social networks as potential sources 
of assistance (Jarley 2005: 17).  The union therefore acts as a broker for members to access 
the resources of other members (Jarley 2005: 14).  Jarley argues that currently the union 
movement’s inability to build social capital locks members out of the union’s discourse 
where “the union officer has a virtual information monopoly about the activities in the 
other departments” (Jarley 2005: 7).   
 
However, it is likely that with unions in decline that the problem is the inverse: the union 
movement’s inability to both build its own social capital and tap into the pre-existing social 
capital within a workplace cuts the union off from the rich understanding of the workplace 
of members and potential members.  Unions, due to their lack of connectedness are on the 
outside trying to gauge the feelings and motivations of their members, to locate the issue 
that will inspire them and to develop strategy without the requisite inside information on 
how the employer operates.  Jarley also argues that social capital builds an emotional bond 
among workers and between workers and their union which will enable them to unite 
against workplace injustice (Jarley 2005: 13).  Similarly, Hyman argues that unions derive 
their “vitality from the networks of social relationships among the individuals who 
constitute the (actual or potential) membership and that the quality of their interpersonal 
or “sociable” relationships gives the union its human face and ultimately its capacity to act” 
(Hyman 2007: 9).  Whilst emotional bonds and a sense of belonging are an essential 
component of the solidarity required to act, activity theory argues that social capital 
performs another important role.  Interacting with the membership and encouraging 
interaction among them improves the union’s capacity to act by enabling it to draw on the 
raft of skills of its membership and those it interacts with.   
 
From a knowledge management perspective, a network of people is the mechanism which 
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enables the transmission of ideas; know how, tacit skills, a world view, the potential for the 
generation of new ideas and access to other communities of practice.  Social and 
professional networks can form a conveyor belt through which information can flow 
forwards and backwards in a web of members, leaders, staff, potential members and 
supporters.  For example, Ganz argues that the “sociocultural networks” of the United Farm 
Workers were central to their success  (Ganz 2000: 1014).  When it comes to reaching out to 
other unions and community organizations, the links and networks often already exist 
within the union organization (Levesque and Murray 2002: 60; Voss and Sherman 2003: 68).  
Therefore effective methods of encouraging membership participation can enhance the 
knowledge pool by tapping the connections members already have to draw in the 
knowledge and expertise from the broader community.  This capacity was particularly 
critical to the success of the NTEU’s campaigns enabling it to draw on the broader 
community gaining at minimal cost lawyers, political economists, journalists, politicians and 
other unions among many others to boost their power at critical times.  Knowledge 
management offers a more complete explanation for why increased democracy or internal 
solidarity has been shown to enhance union effectiveness: open discussion and clear flows 
of information boosts the union’s knowledge capital.   
 
Trade union strategy research has emphasized the importance of membership education in 
promoting greater levels of participation (Levesque and Murray 2002: 53) or even to 
increase their capacity to run the union for themselves (Schenk 2003: 249).  As Hyman 
points out: “Intelligence is in part an organizational matter: the extent to which unions and 
confederations possess specialist expertise in research, education and information-
gathering, and the means to disseminate knowledge throughout the organization (which is 
to some degree a question of resources); but it is also (and perhaps more importantly) a 
matter of the degree to which, at all levels within union movements, knowledge is seen as 
an essential component of union power” (Hyman 2007: 198).  However, if overwhelmingly 
union expertise is built on tacit skills, “know how” learned through practice what should 
unions teach their members and how?  Activity theorists all agree that knowledge is best 
created and transmitted in an organization through dialogue and storytelling among like-
minded community members (Van Maanen and Barley 1984: 300; Blackler 1995: 1039-40; 
Teece, Pisano et al. 1997: 15; Leonard and Sensiper 1998: 115).  In her study of union 
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elections in the United States Bronfenbrenner’s (2003: 41) findings would tend to support 
this view.  She showed that those unions that won elections emphasized face to face 
contact with the membership through door-knocks and small meetings which both built 
leadership and educated members (Bronfenbrenner 2003: 41).  She contrasts this approach 
with the indirect communication through glossy leaflets and mail-outs of unsuccessful 
campaigns (Bronfenbrenner 2003: 41).  She argued that direct interaction with the 
membership enabled the union not just to counteract management’s agenda but to 
formulate policy and slogans that best resonated with the membership (Bronfenbrenner 
2003: 42).  She discussed the approach of encouraging rank and file volunteers from other 
successful campaigns to speak directly to members and non-members in the campaign 
workplace works best (Bronfenbrenner 2003: 43).  This is what knowledge management 
would call “sticking and leaking” (Brown and Duguid 2001: 204), that is information was 
readily transmitted from other volunteers who “spoke the same language” and could 
therefore speak directly to their shared experiences on the shop floor.  There was a closer 
affiliation and so a more effective line of communication between workers from similar 
workplaces than from professional union leaders to workers.  Therefore democracy and 
increased knowledge capital are mutually reinforcing: increased democracy increases the 
flow of information and ideas which makes the union better able to articulate and appeal to 
the issues of the membership which increases participation which further contributes to the 
flow of ideas.   
 
3. Building the structures and process to maximize the relationships among the various 
layers of the union 
The third factor in the development of effective union strategy is building the structures and 
processes that maximize the relationship among the various layers of the union.  If, in line 
with Fairbrother’s observations, union effectiveness comes from neither leadership nor 
membership but is about capitalizing on mutually supportive relations between layered 
levels of representation (Fairbrother, Williams et al. 2007: 34) then this third factor is 
perhaps the most critical.  The observations of trade union renewal and knowledge 
management researchers appear to support each other on this important issue.  From a 
knowledge management perspective, building the communities necessary for promoting 
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knowledge capital is an ongoing process where new insights are constantly being folded into 
collective understanding (Brown and Duguid 1991: 44; Blackler 1995: 1024) which occurs in 
both formal and informal settings (Brown and Duguid 1991: 44).  As Dufour and Hege point 
out trade union “’representative capacity” derives in part from formal institutional 
provisions but depends no less on the quality of the interrelationships between 
representatives and their constituents, on the responsiveness of representatives to the 
often individualized everyday concerns of workers, indeed their readiness to act as a kind of 
social worker in dealing with issues arising outside of work itself.” (Dufour and Hege (2002) 
quoted in Hyman 2007: 204).  Using the language of  social capital literature, “dense 
networks” built over time are favoured as they promote the trust, mutual cooperation, the 
easy circulation of resources and “generalized reciprocity norms” that encourages the 
offering of resources without immediate gain with the knowledge that benefits will be 
indirectly repaid within the network (Jarley 2005: 4).  Therefore, ideally the processes and 
structures within the union should promote the formation of strong relationships which are 
flexible enough to enable the introduction of new ideas and which may take time and may 
occur in either formal or informal settings.   
 
What kinds of structures and processes are ideal for encouraging the development of the 
formal and informal networks and communities considered ideal for creating and sharing 
knowledge?  Knowledge Management researchers from all disciplines almost universally 
support a heterarchical structure.  Researchers tend to endorse an organisational structure 
which maximizes autonomy and the freedom to innovate at the local level but with enough 
centralization to give this innovation strategic direction, avoid reinvention of the wheel and 
also to generalize positive approaches to other areas (Spender 2005: 102).  Once again the 
observations of trade union researchers would appear to support this view.  Research has 
shown that the most resilient union organisations are those that are both highly centralized 
but have also maintained strong organization at the local branch and ensure effective 
communication between the two (Kjelberg 1983 quoted in Hyman 1997: 313).  The union’s 
central organization is able to provide information and strategy and the capacity to draw a 
disparate organization into coordinated action (Hyman 1997: 313) to effectively respond to 
a generally highly organized and centralized opponent.  While as Fairbrother points out 
emphasis on local initiatives can enable and encourage local members to participate 
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(Fairbrother, Williams et al. 2007: 38).   
 
However, again in line with the observations of activity theorists in their study of the 
potential limitations of communities of practice, a union structure made of disparate 
communities of this nature has the potential to inhibit the flow of information across the 
organization as a whole and may be prone to “group think”.  Hyman’s observations of the 
union movement tend to support these observations.  As Hyman points out, one challenge 
for this structure is that it relies on the willingness of local branches to align their own 
objectives to a broader collective interest (Hyman 1997: 313).  The difficulty in doing this for 
local branches is that it at least implies the necessity to subjugate the particular interests or 
ambitions of the local membership in favour of national strategic objectives (Hyman 1997: 
313).  This places significant pressure on local leaders who will feel a strong pull to represent 
their local interests.  Foregoing local interests in the interests of a broader strategic goal 
may threaten their legitimacy with their local constituents.  In summary, both researchers in 
trade union strategy and activity theory would tend to agree that the optimal structure is a 
heterarchical structure with a local emphasis but with an element of centralization 
necessary for broader strategic co-ordination but with the acknowledgement that there are 
inherent challenges to this model.  These observations inspire questions for investigation in 
the empirical study into the workings of the NTEU.  What structures and processes in the 
NTEU enhance the sharing of knowledge and which ones might be considered to hamper it? 
 
Towards a research methodology 
The purpose of the above discussion has been to draw the observations of both the trade 
union strategy and knowledge management bodies of literature together to guide the 
development of a framework for the empirical research in this thesis.  This thesis will focus 
on the three key factors that have been identified for a union’s capacity to develop effective 
union strategy: firstly, the strategic capacity of union leaders, secondly the engagement and 
contribution of union memberships and supporters and thirdly and perhaps most 
importantly, structures and processes that maximize the effectiveness of the relationship 
between the two.  This empirical research project has analysed the minutes and reports of 
all meetings conducted by the NTEU during the period 1993 to 2005 related to the strategic 
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decisions made to negotiate the first four rounds of enterprise bargaining in the higher 
education sector.  Whilst the project has of course required a trade union analysis to build 
an understanding of the context in which these meetings are occurring, the key goal of this 
thesis is to analyse the learning process undertaken by the NTEU.  This thesis will therefore 
draw from the knowledge management literature, and particularly activity theory, discussed 
in chapter three and further developed in this chapter to build an understanding of how the 
NTEU learned to navigate enterprise bargaining.   
 
When it comes to studying the first element, developing the strategic capacity of union 
leaders, the observations of some trade union literature but particularly researchers in the 
field of activity theory have highlighted the fact that the “know how” required to lead can 
only be built through experience and is inherently a collective process.  The research 
encourages a focus not on the particular talents of individuals but on groups of people 
interacting to solve the problems generated by the context in which they are operating: 
communities of practice.  Lessons learned are stored within these groups either consciously 
or unconsciously, codified or embodied, to over time develop a pool of know-how, a shared 
approach or world view, with which to approach the next problem that comes along.  
Activity theory insists that knowledge (or “knowing”) is a process not an object.  Therefore 
codified information unearthed in formal and informal minutes and memos should be 
treated not just on face value but as artefacts that point to the process by which that 
information or idea was developed.  Activity theory also indicates that understanding the 
way people learn in groups requires close scrutiny of metaphor, storytelling, shared 
meanings and ideology of which there may be only remnants in the documentation.   
 
In analysing the second element of effective union strategy, the engagement and 
contribution of the membership, throughout this study there will be attempts to address the 
way in which the national leadership related to the broader membership.  How effectively 
did the national leadership tap into the “know how” of its membership to formulate 
effective strategy.  Unfortunately, this research cannot hope to investigate the discussions 
that occurred among many thousands of members at the branch level.  However, one 
measure of how successfully the national leadership has engaged with the membership will 
be to look at membership uptake of campaigns, protests and industrial action.  Particular 
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attention will also be paid to how the leadership communicates with the broader 
membership (face to face, glossy brochures, education campaigns, formal and informal 
gatherings) and attempt to interpret the effectiveness of these approaches.   
 
The third aspect of the development of effective union strategy, structures and processes 
that maximize the effectiveness of the relationship between the leadership and the 
membership, will require a different approach.  In chapter ten, this thesis will use the 
attendance list of the various meetings mentioned above to construct a social network, or 
visual image of the individuals and groups engaged in strategic decision making in NTEU at 
the national level.  The remainder of this chapter is devoted to a brief discussion of social 
network theory and how it will be applied to this study.  The theories discussed in this 
section will be enlisted in greater detail in chapter ten in the analysis of the empirical data.  
 
Social network analysis has gained popularity in organizational studies (Wasserman, Scott et 
al. 2005: 1-2) which can be attributed to a heightened awareness of the role of 
interpersonal relationships, or social capital, on organizational performance.  Social network 
analysis originated with anthropologists and sociologists who were concerned with the 
study of how interpersonal relationships impact on social issues such as access to resources 
and opportunities (Scott 2000: 7).  The structure of the network of an organisation and 
indeed a whole society can therefore be designed to facilitate the flow of social capital or to 
impede it and further that certain individuals or groups within a structure will likely be 
privileged over others by virtue of their position within the structure (Burt 2001: 32).  The 
unit of analysis for a social network study is not individuals or groups but the relationships 
between them (Pope and Lewis 2008: 447) which is visually represented in the network via 
“links” or lines connecting points (individuals) to generate a web of interactions.  However, 
when measuring relationships actually what is being measured is an attribute of the 
relationship (Borgatti and Everett 1997: 243): the strength of a tie might measure degrees of 
influence or closeness of friendship.  What then, do the ties represent in this research?  The 
attribute of the ties measured in this study is the flow of “know how” (knowledge in all of its 
forms) within the NTEU that contributed to the development of union strategy.   
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Measuring the flow of ‘know how’ in a network 
Using the observations of social network researchers, this study hopes to identify the 
elements of the NTEU’s network structure that may have strengthened or weakened the 
ability of “know how” to be transmitted and adopted within the organization.  Burt has 
researched two competing network models that are believed to generate social capital 
(2001: 31).  One theory is that social capital is created by a closed network characterised by 
strongly interconnected elements (Burt 2001: 31).  The second theory argues essentially the 
opposite which is that social capital is created in a looser structure in which there are many 
opportunities to broker connections among elements which would otherwise remain 
disconnected (Burt 2001: 31).  The gap between two individuals or clusters which would 
otherwise remain separate is called a “structural hole” (Burt 2001: 31).  Often individuals 
will act to fill these structural holes and act as “brokers” (or boundary spanners).  Burt 
argues that both processes are at work in developing social capital within a network: the 
process of brokering a structural hole is the source of value added whilst closure is critical to 
realizing the potential of the value being added (Burt 2001: 31).   In this way, Burt comes 
close to the central argument of this thesis which is that whilst day to day learning happens 
within communities of practice, it is also important to be feeding new ideas or approaches 
into this community or it will tend to become insular and prone to group think.  What Burt 
alerts this research to is that there are structural implications for this process and that it is 
possible to assess factors that impact on an organisation’s capacity to learn by analysing its 
network.  
 
Centrality, power and influence 
Related to the issue of information flow is the impact of power or influence within an 
organization.  Network analysts believe that in the contest for ideas and influence within an 
organisation, success is related to an actor’s relative position within the network.  Freeman 
has linked three operational definitions of centrality to theoretical concepts of power or 
influence: degree (ability to community directly with others), betweenness (ability to 
control or restrict the communication of others) and closeness (ability to reach large 
numbers of actors with minimal reliance on intermediaries) (Mizruchi and Potts 1998: 355).  
However, more recent research has discovered a more complex relationship between 
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centrality and power.  Whilst social network theory would argue that the most central actor 
is the most powerful, research has shown that it is often those with intermediate centrality 
(the brokers among various individuals and groups) that will be the most powerful as the 
most central actor may be reliant on the intermediaries for influence over others (Mizruchi 
and Potts 1998: 356).  Privileged places in the network enable actors to act first on the 
information and puts them in a position of control over the diffusion of information to 
others (Burt 2001: 34).  On the other end of the spectrum, the term “local dependency” is 
where one point is dependent on another point through which it connects to others (Scott 
2000: 87).  A peripheral player (a member with the lowest centrality) that is with only one 
point of contact to the network has high levels of dependency on that one point (Scott 
2000: 88).  In chapter ten, a network analysis of the NTEU to dissect the role that structural 
positions of relative power or influence might have on how “know how” flowed or was 
constrained within the organisation.   
 
Elements of social network theory can also be used to analyse the nature or the NTEU 
enterprise bargaining network as a whole.  Density describes the overall cohesion or 
interconnectedness (Scott 2000: 89) and centralisation refers to the overall cohesion or 
integration of the whole network towards a central focal point (Scott 2000: 82, 89).  For 
example, does a network bind closely together with many interrelated ties towards a central 
focal point or is it perhaps made up of clusters of tight cliques only loosely connected to 
each other?  What do these different structures say about how the organization operates?  
Cook, Emerson et al introduce another important concept “network vulnerability” (1983: 
299).  Network vulnerability measures the extent to which the network is beholden to key 
points or actors for the flow or resources (Cook, Emerson et al. 1983: 299).  The network is 
therefore dependent on those key actors to hold it together and also potentially vulnerable 
to control by these key actors (Cook, Emerson et al. 1983: 299).  In chapter ten, this thesis 
will enlist these theories to analyse the network as a whole as well as to chart the changes 
to the network of decision makers over time.  What do the changes in the network over 
time represent?  The structure of the network as a whole will be analysed to assess its 
impact on the flow of “know how” within the NTEU.   
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Summary 
This empirical research project analyses the minutes and reports of all meetings conducted 
by the NTEU during the period 1993 to 2005 related to the strategic decisions made to 
negotiate the first four rounds of enterprise bargaining in the higher education sector.  
Using the insights gained from both trade union and knowledge management bodies of 
literature shapes the analysis of this data.  By analysing the content of the minutes and 
reports this thesis builds an understanding of the decision making process and how this has 
enabled the NTEU to navigate enterprise bargaining.  Chapters six, seven, eight and nine will 
therefore be a close qualitative analysis of rounds one, two, three and four of enterprise 
bargaining respectively to unlock the learning process undertaken by the national leadership 
and its interactions with the membership to respond to the challenges of each round.  The 
research data has been organized in accordance with each individual enterprise bargaining 
round.  Although this may lead to some “messiness” in terms of actual calendar dates as 
some rounds bled into the following round particularly as rounds got longer and more 
complex and dispersed across the sector, it is the most meaningful way to organize the 
information and is in line with the NTEU’s record keeping.  Then in chapter ten, this 
empirical data will be approached from a different perspective to focus on the decision 
making structures within the NTEU to explore the flow of “know how” among the various 
layers of the organization and in particular between the leadership and the contribution of 
its membership. 
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Chapter Five:  
The political economy of  
higher education 1993 to 2005 
 
 
To build an understanding of the NTEU’s strategic approach to enterprise bargaining during 
the period of 1993 to 2005 it is essential to first address the dramatic changes to the 
political economy in higher education.  During the period studied higher education 
experienced a foundational shift in its political economy from a government funded, 
centrally co-ordinated system to a corporatized and decentralized system competing in the 
local and global market for fee paying students and industry investment.  The 
corporatisation of higher education has had profound impacts on the nature of academic 
and general staff work on the campuses and in turn employment relations in the sector 
creating both challenges and opportunities for the NTEU.  The purpose of this chapter 
therefore is to examine the changing political economy of higher education as a vital 
companion to understanding the NTEU’s navigation of its turbulent and at times hostile 
employment relations. 
 
The Dawkins revolution 
The Dawkins revolution in higher education precipitated a tectonic shift in the political 
economy of higher education which would in turn have far reaching impacts on 
employment relations in the sector.  In 1987 the Minister for Employment, Education and 
Training, John Dawkin’s, Green Paper Higher education: a policy discussion paper (1987) 
announced a massive expansion of higher education.  The goal was to increase university 
graduates from 80,000 to 125,000 over a fifteen year period (Marginson and Considine 
2000: 30).  To cope with this dramatic increase in student intake it was proposed to fold the 
50 institutes of technology and colleges of advanced education in with the 20 existing 
universities to achieve economies of scale (Marginson and Considine 2000: 30; Marginson 
2002: 409).  The ratification of the Dawkins White Paper on Higher Education: a policy 
statement in July 1988 therefore unleashed a flurry of activity as universities sought to 
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increase their influence through mergers as well as to capitalise on Dawkin’s generous 
capital grants and increased student allocations (Marginson and Considine 2000: 34).  In the 
space of just four years, sixteen new universities were established through upgrading and 
mergers producing a total of 36 universities (Marginson and Considine 2000: 30; Marginson 
2002: 409).  To cope with the budgetary demands of the expansion of university places, 
students would be partially levied for the cost of their tuition (Marginson and Considine 
2000: 28) under the HECS scheme.   The Dawkins reforms therefore first introduced the 
concept of higher education as an industry (Marginson and Considine 2000: 30) where 
university places became a commodity for sale.  As a result, a competitive relationship 
developed among institutions as they vied for increased revenue through local and 
international student intake (Marginson and Considine 2000: 28; Meek 2002: 260).  The 
concept of education as a product that could be exported, particularly to the Asian market, 
also became the focus of policy discussion (Marginson and Considine 2000: 30).  
  
The traditional status of universities as autonomous, sovereign institutions self-governed in 
the public interest which had remained intact even during the massive expansion under the 
Whitlam era (Marginson and Considine 2000: 24) was fundamentally challenged by 
Dawkins.  The federal government oversaw not just the major operations of real estate 
deals and university mergers but also began to use discretionary funding to encourage 
corporate practices through performance targets and efficiency measures (Marginson and 
Considine 2000: 28; Meek 2002: 260).  Competition led by professional executives, as 
opposed to the perceived haphazard, non-transparent and outmoded forms of direction 
such as collegiality, was the prescription for the perceived inefficiencies of the sector (Meek 
2002: 254). 
 
The Howard years 
The election of the conservative Coalition government in 1996 marked the introduction of 
market forces to the campuses (Marginson and Considine 2000: 36).  Whilst in some regards 
the Coalition’s measures could be seen as an extension of the logic begun under Dawkins, in 
fact the Coalition’s “market governance” thoroughly tilted the balance away from education 
as a service in the public interest towards a commodity guided by competition and income 
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generation (Marginson and Considine 2000: 37).  Policy shifted from government directives 
to ensure a co-ordinated supply of skilled labour under Dawkins (Marginson and Considine 
2000: 38)  to an approach which would allow the demands of the open market to drive the 
sector.  Market forces over time led to the industrialisation of academic life, carved up the 
university sector into strata of education providers where "prestige" became an important 
marketable commodity, encouraged the rise of market fundamentalism and executive 
power over academic and democratic governance and lastly led to the emergence of the 
role of Vice Chancellor as CEO at the head of each institution.  Each of these issues will be 
discussed in turn below. 
 
Market forces 
Market forces were primarily driven by substantial declines in government funding which 
forced institutions to seek out alternative sources of revenue to fill the funding shortfall.  
Federal government funding of higher education fell from around 90% in the 1970s to late 
1980s (de Zilwa 2005: 388) to 54% in 1997 (Marginson and Considine 2000: 56) to just 40% 
in 2003 (AVCC 29 April 2005).  Student fees became the primary source of alternative 
revenue a trend actively encouraged by waves of government deregulation of student fees.  
Alongside its 1996 budget cuts to higher education, the Coalition enabled funded “over-
enrolment” where universities could recoup at least some of the funding shortfall by 
allowing full fee paying places into courses which had already reached capacity (Marginson 
and Considine 2000: 58).  In 1997 differential HECS was introduced where those programs 
more expensive to deliver and/or with higher expected graduates incomes paid 
substantially more than under the previous regime (de Zilwa 2005: 388).  Under this 
scheme, fees rose by 92% for engineering and business students and 125% in law and 
medicine (Meek 2002: 263).  Then in 1998, up to 25% of undergraduate places were opened 
up to domestic fee paying places (de Zilwa 2005: 389).  Similarly, postgraduate study was 
opened up to fee paying coursework programs (Meek 2002: 260).  The most dramatic 
change was the introduction of full-fee paying international and postgraduate places.  As a 
result of the coalition's deregulation of the international student market, the number of 
international students rose from 17,248 in 1987 where most were at least partly supported 
by the Australian government and numbers were capped up to 72,183 in 1998 nearly all of 
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whom were full-fee paying students (Marginson and Considine 2000: 56).  
  
The major impact of the declines in government funding coupled with successive rounds of 
deregulation initiatives was to cause fierce competition to develop among institutions for 
lucrative student markets, particularly international and postgraduate fee paying students.  
Another major impact was the over time, higher Education became big business.  In 2000 
alone, 107,622 international students generated $3.7 billion of income to the national 
economy (Meek 2002: 263).  According to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Training by 
2006-7 education services was the third top export product after coal and iron in the 
Australian economy. 
 
Another much less successful source of alternative revenue was to seek corporate 
investment into research and development.  The marketisation of research and 
development was government driven with the implementation of research performance 
indicators such as the DEST points system, commercialisation incentive schemes and to 
encourage competition for research funding among universities and even with commercial 
entities and other government agencies.  However, in comparison to other OECD countries, 
investment from the Australian private sector in higher education has remained low (Meek 
2002: 270).  Despite all of the market incentives the multinational companies that dominate 
the Australian economy tend to invest in Research and Development in their parent country 
(Meek 2002: 270) and there is not the extraordinary private wealth or culture of corporate 
largesse towards higher education enjoyed in the United States (Marginson 2002: 420).   
 
Industrialisation of academic life  
The net effect of market forces has been to ramp up workloads and to decrease the implicit 
rewards of university work with the “mass” treatment of students and intrusive 
performance measurement of administrative and research output.  Dramatic increases in 
student intake were not matched by increases to funding to meet the increased demand 
with impacts on workloads, class sizes, administrative support, support for teaching and 
research and library resources and other infrastructure (de Zilwa 2005: 390).  Student-staff 
ratios rose from 12 to 1 in 1983 (Marginson 2002: 416) up to 15 to 1 in 1996 to over 20 to 1 
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in 2006.  Allowing the market to decide student intake and pricing meant that the impacts 
of cuts to government funding were unevenly distributed.  For example, areas such as 
business and computing experienced a “mini-boom” (Marginson 2002: 416) claiming two 
thirds of international fee paying enrolments (Marginson 2002: 424) whilst arts faculties and 
the basic sciences on every campus went into decline.  Restructures and redundancies 
became a feature of campus employment relations and campaigns to defend particular 
departments or areas adversely hit by market forces often ran alongside enterprise 
bargaining campaigns on each campus.  Meanwhile, competition for research funding 
opportunities also led to inequalities in opportunities among staff and undermined the 
intrinsic rewards of research endeavour for all staff.  In this way, market forces permeated 
all aspects of working life on the campuses.  In contrast to the collegiality of negotiations in 
the pre-Dawkins/Coalition years, employment relations became increasingly hostile and 
budget driven with disputes over standard industrial issues, such as: workloads, job security 
and casualisation.   
 
Carving up the sector 
Market driven forces increased inequality not just among students and staff but among 
institutions (Marginson and Considine 2000: 38) with important impacts on the negotiation 
of  enterprise bargaining.  Marginson has developed five categories for Australian 
universities: Sandstone (oldest), Redbricks (post-second world war), gumtrees (founded 
1960-75), unitechs (Colleges of Education made university during the Dawkins era) and New 
Universities (post 1986) (Marginson and Considine 2000: 189; de Zilwa 2005: 388). In 2001 
the Sandstone and Redbricks (The Group of Eight plus an old, but poor cousin, University of 
Tasmania) combined enjoyed more than 46% of the total operating revenue in the sector 
with the remaining 53% of operating revenue divided (very unevenly) among twenty eight 
Gumtree, University of Technology and New Universities (using DETYA Higher Education 
Finance 2001 statistics compiled by  de Zilwa 2005: 402-4).  The stratification of the sector 
led to a wide disparity of strategic approaches within the sector with significant impacts on 
their approach to enterprise bargaining negotiations.  For example the prestigious Group of 
Eights in competition with each other for premium staff in a fairly tight market for skilled 
labour (as well as to price poorer institutions out of the labour market), were amenable to 
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higher salaries.  However, on the opposite end of this status spectrum, cash strapped 
campuses were increasingly ruthless in driving down wages and conditions generating bitter 
disputes on those campuses.   
 
Marketing and prestige 
Universities in competition with each other became increasingly aware of the importance of 
their public image in attracting both local and international student and research 
opportunities.  In their analysis of the marketisation of the sector, Marginson and Considine 
refer to the resultant higher education form as “Enterprise Universities” to capture the 
complexity of the emergent product (2000: 5).  Whilst some elements of the higher 
education sector could be considered “pure corporation” beholden to marketisation and 
corporatism in other areas of research and scholarship, independence of thought have 
survived but became beholden to competitive systems and performance evaluation 
(Marginson and Considine 2000: 5).  For example, the non-corporate element of “prestige” 
remains at a premium in the enterprise university (Marginson and Considine 2000: 5).  Elite 
universities having already established their prestigious status enjoyed a virtuous circle: 
prestige attracts research income, research high flyers, high paying students thereby 
increasing its prestige and so forth (Marginson 2002: 7).  So long as a campus maintains its 
prestige the rest will follow (Marginson 2006: 7).  Meanwhile, prestige by its very nature is 
available only to the few and those universities lower down the hierarchy, experienced a 
low prestige closed loop, battling head to head on an uneven playing field for increasingly 
scarce markets and resources (Marginson 2002: 7).  The very real need to maintain prestige 
at the Group of Eights as well as the desire of other campuses to achieve it was a point of 
vulnerability for these campuses.  Negotiating enterprise bargaining rounds exposed the 
uncomfortable contradiction between management’s cost-driven commercialism and the 
need to maintain institutional “prestige”.  The contradiction for staff members was 
apparent: their institution offering sub-standard wages and conditions and with an 
adversarial approach to negotiations whilst marketing itself as an “elite” university. 
 
The sector's focus on prestige also led to a prioritisation of the more prestigious areas of 
research output often at the expense of the less prestigious areas of teaching and student 
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welfare.  As Marginson argues, current student dissatisfaction has little impact on prestige 
and does not factor into a potential student’s choice of institution (Marginson 2006: 7) a 
feature exploited by managements at all strata of the campuses.  The lack of prestige for 
teaching therefore had a negative impact on working conditions for those in the front line of 
increasingly mass based student education and administration.  Larger class sizes, higher 
workloads and most dramatically the introduction of armies of casuals hired to teach 
reached epidemic proportions even in elite institutions.  Again, the contradiction for staff 
working in these institutions was apparent: a “prestigious” university engaging in low cost, 
mass education.   
 
Management fundamentalism 
Despite the dramatic changes to university governance structures already implemented 
under Dawkins, the West Report, Learning for Life (1998) insisted that universities 
reorganise themselves in line with corporate models (Marginson and Considine 2000: 36, 
61).  The new model of governance which predominated asserted management prerogative 
over all other interests (O'Brien 1999: 83; Marginson and Considine 2000: 35).  As Meek 
points out, in a marketised climate,  
institutions compete with one another in attempting to interpret how best to take 
advantage of the financial incentives available and in so doing have been caught in a 
continuous process of attempting to second guess both the “market” and 
“government policy”        (2002: 268) 
Increasingly powerful executives were therefore given the responsibility for calculating the 
market and government policy and shaping the internal structures of the university 
accordingly (Marginson and Considine 2000: 9).  Competition rather than fostering the 
intended innovation and diversity has had a tendency to undermine diversity as universities 
adopt similar strategies to compete for the same market, such as international students or 
research funding (Marginson 2002: 422; Meek 2002: 270).  Also, as Marginson and 
Considine have argued, universities felt compelled to mirror corporate practices in order to 
better serve corporate interests where being “useful to business” was conflated with “being 
like business" (2000: 5).  In reality the corporate practices adopted were not derived from 
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the corporate sector itself but from a distilled, artificial “ideal” (Marginson and Considine 
2000: 4) a form of “management fundamentalism” (Marginson and Considine 2000: 61).  
This was similar to practices being implemented at the same time in the Australian public 
service (Meek 2002: 257).  This last point is important as, where perhaps the corporate 
sector might be more pragmatic in its approach, the universities became beholden to the 
idea of managerialism as much as its practical application and with little appreciation of 
what might be unique about the university sector.   
“The outcome is that universities in Australia seem less sure of themselves.  They are 
constantly being reinvented, “re-engineered” in the corporate sense, yet less capable 
of genuine self-production than before.  The danger is that by becoming a 
corporation, the Australian university is ceasing to be a university”  
(Marginson 2002: 422-3). 
Meanwhile, as outlined above, real corporate investment in Australian universities has 
remained low.  The higher education sector has become corporatized but with minimal 
actual corporate investment.  The core competency of the campus, its unique environment 
for teaching and research has been placed at risk for a “corporate ideal” that has not been 
delivered with predictable impacts on staff morale. 
 
The rise of Executive power 
By comparison to international standards, Australia has been at the extreme end of both 
loss of public funding, neo-liberalism and the resultant “destructive stand-off” between the 
academic and corporate cultures (Marginson 2002: 420).  The proposed corporate model 
seemed to insist on executive power presiding in direct conflict with academic autonomy 
and decision making (Marginson and Considine 2000: 67).  The predictable tension between 
academic staff and this new executive layer has been supported by empirical evidence.  In a 
1997 survey of attitudes of senior and middle managers in Australian universities, Meek and 
Wood discovered that the majority of executive officers (52.2%) felt that tenure was a major 
obstacle to change, 42% of senior executives believed that academic staff resistance to 
changes was an “impediment to effective management” and collegial governance had just 
19 percent support among senior managers with 62.5% registered “disagree/strongly 
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disagree” to the statement “collegial decision making should take precedence over 
executive management” (Meek and Wood, 1997 discussed in Marginson and Considine 
2000:65-6).  Academic collegiality within disciplines, as a frequent site of at least passive 
resistance to managerial prerogative or change initiatives, was increasingly regarded by 
executives as a nuisance, a block to progress (Marginson and Considine 2000: 10).   
 
A series of executive strategies were adopted to dilute the impact of scholarly debate, such 
as: restructuring small disciplines into larger cross-disciplinary schools, executive driven 
performance targets and the use of soft money in short term projects or research centres to 
undermine academic tenure (Marginson and Considine 2000: 10).  Devolution gave school 
heads and deans “autonomy” but where the parameters for true decision making were 
artificially compressed within the framework set by executive strategic plans and most 
especially resource allocation with the effect of driving responsibility down the line whilst 
maintaining tight control (Marginson and Considine 2000: 10).  Incidentally, Meek and 
Wood showed that in contrast to their executive overseers, 61% of school heads supported 
collegial governance (Meek and Wood, 1997 in Marginson and Considine 2000: 65).   
As a result of these changes, decisions that were once the domain of collegial discussion in 
small spheres within disciplines or openly debated at Academic Board increasingly came to 
be made by Vice Chancellor’s advisory committees or other less transparent internal forces 
(Marginson and Considine 2000: 4).  An increasing divide developed between decision 
makers and those engaged in the core business of the university, teaching and research 
(Marginson and Considine 2000: 9) raising issues of “institutional autonomy” and “academic 
freedom” (Meek and Wood 1997: 53), university governance and collegiality. 
 
The cult of the Vice Chancellor 
The marketisation and globalisation of higher education have also allowed for the 
concentration of power at the head of each institution (Marginson and Considine 2000: 72). 
The cult of the Vice Chancellor emerged; in many places rebadged “president” or “Chief 
Executive Officer” in line with industry counterparts (Marginson and Considine 2000: 72).  
Vice Chancellors in this environment took on not just executive powers but were charged 
with defining their university in line with their personal vision (Marginson and Considine 
2000: 74) and used their authority over funding to develop new positions, new units and, 
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like their government masters, use performance measures and discretionary funding to 
shape the behaviours of faculties, schools and disciplines (Marginson and Considine 2000: 
72).  Management strategy at the institutional level therefore is overwhelmingly 
hierarchical; the personal vision and ideology and even personality of the Vice Chancellor at 
each campus is a major determinant in management strategy.  Each campus therefore 
became more and more distinctive defined in line with the idiosyncrasies of its Vice 
Chancellor and senior management culture.  By the early 2000s, most Vice Chancellors were 
appointed from outside of their institutions, the university sector favouring their 
detachment from the networks and cultures of the institution (Marginson 2002: 421).  
Moreover, Vice Chancellors tend to surround themselves with a largely unaccountable 
“court” of advisors who have no formal status on any of the governing boards of the campus 
but who exercise considerable influence (Marginson and Considine 2000: 87).  In this way, 
senior management have become increasingly centralised and detached (Marginson 2002: 
421).   
 
This chapter has provided an overview of the rapid pace of the changes to the political 
economy of higher education since the Dawkins reforms.  Although the Dawkins 
“revolution” transformed the university sector, arguably the true revolution has been the 
impact of market forces.  Market forces has lead to: the carving up of the sector along a 
spectrum of “elite” to “non-elite”, fierce competition for markets and resources among 
institutions, the rise of market fundamentalism and the emergence of centralised executive 
power concentrated around the Vice Chancellor.  Market forces have in turn driven the 
industrialisation of academic work, casualisation, increased workloads for all staff and a loss 
of engagement of staff in decision making.  Understanding this process is vital information 
for analysing the many challenges that beset the NTEU during the period of 1993 to 2005.  
As this thesis moves to discuss the NTEU’s navigation of each round of enterprise bargaining 
in the sector, the various impacts of market forces discussed above will become evident.  
The overall impact for the NTEU was to generate a progressively hostile and turbulent 
employment relations environment.  The decentralisation of the sector in particular placed 
considerable strain on the NTEU’s ability to strategize at the national level as each campus 
became more and more distinctive both in terms of management strategy and of financial 
status. 
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Chapter Six 
The formation of the NTEU and the  
introduction of enterprise bargaining 
 
The NTEU formed in 1993 emerged in the heat of the Dawkins revolution of higher 
education and at a time when the Australian industrial relations system was moving towards 
enterprise bargaining.  The decisions made and ideas generated to cope with these changes 
during the formative years of the NTEU had longstanding impacts on the NTEU’s strategic 
approach to enterprise bargaining, its structure and personnel and in turn the way in which 
knowledge was created and shared in the organisation.  As O’Brien points out,  
“The behaviour of unions can be understood as combining elements of explicit 
strategy that involves the setting of clear objectives and the development of 
deliberate approaches to their achievement with more implicit adjustments being 
made along the way.  This process of continuous adjustment produces emerging 
strategies that remain focused on the objective” (1999: 81). 
In this way explicit, implicit and emergent strategy are woven together in policy formulation 
and implementation.  A key focus of this chapter is to “unweave” these strands to analyse 
the strategic decision making of national officers in the NTEU, the process with which 
decisions were made and future paths determined during the early years of the NTEU.  
Using the archived minutes and memos of the NTEU National Executive in the years 1993 to 
1995, this chapter aims to chart the key innovations of round one and their origins, to map 
the flow of information and the emergence of key individuals and communities of practice 
as the NTEU navigated this very turbulent period in its history.  The first half of this chapter 
charts chronologically the NTEU’s attempts to navigate the dramatic changes in the sector 
leading up to the introduction of enterprise bargaining.  The second half of this chapter 
returns to look at this same period enlisting the observations of the trade union strategy 
and knowledge management literature to analyse the learning process the NTEU underwent 
at this time. 
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The Dawkins White Paper 
One of the goals of the Dawkins White Paper legislation was to bring academic conditions 
into the mainstream industrial relations arena (O'Brien 2003: 39).  Before Dawkins, 
Australian academic salaries had been uniform across the sector and in 1973 the Academic 
Salaries Tribunal was established to regulate a federal wage fixing system (Meek and Wood 
1997: 50).  Academic working conditions were determined at each individual institution 
through collegial and direct negotiations with Vice Chancellors and senior managers.  
Academics were represented on each campus by one of the NTEU's precursor organisations, 
Federated Australian University Staff Association (FAUSA) which was a federation of 
institutional staff associations, not an industrial body, and the outcomes were not registered 
as industrial agreements.  In 1988, FAUSA (along with Union of Australian College Academics 
(UACA) and the Australian Teachers Union) was a party to the first industrial award for 
academic staff, the Australian Universities’ Academic Staff (Conditions of Employment) 
Award which became known as the “Second Tier Wage Agreement Award” under the 
Accord (Meek and Wood 1997: 50-1; O'Brien 2003: 37).  This was the first major system-
wide regulation of university employment.  The other two parties to this agreement were 
the federal government and the Australian Higher Education Industry Association (AHEIA), 
the Vice Chancellor’s organisation.   
 
The Dawkins White Paper specifically targeted the senior, tenured academic: “over the next 
two years each institution should double the proportion of non-continuing employment 
load at senior lecturer level and above (excluding ‘research only’ staff)” (Dawkins 1988: 
109).  Taken alongside the Paper’s emphasis on “early retirement” provisions (with the 
government advancing $17.7million in 1988 to assist its early retirement drive), 
“redundancy” and “unsatisfactory performance” and “flexible hierarchies” (Dawkins 1988: 
110-1), the implications were clear; the traditional model of securely employed, tenured 
academic was to be “modernised” in line with other sectors.  The White Paper also made 
the first steps towards deregulating academic salaries.  Salary flexibility enabled above 
award wages to be offered in recognition of the competitive market for highly skilled staff 
(Dawkins 1988: 112).  Negotiations regarding the proposed changes to the award involved 
the government, AHEIA, FAUSA and UACA which covered academics in the former colleges 
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(O'Brien 2003: 41).  FAUSA and UACA took united industrial action with a national stop work 
meeting which made the decision to place bans on the transmission of final results in 
universities (O'Brien 2003: 42).  Although the prospect of an amalgamation had been 
flagged as early as 1985 following a coverage dispute at Curtin University (O'Brien 2003: 37), 
the united industrial action put the amalgamation of FAUSA and UACA firmly on the agenda.  
This was the first time that FAUSA had engaged in industrial action and although industrial 
action was not new to UACA members the benefit of united action with academics in the 
larger, established universities was obvious (O'Brien 2003: 42).  The outcome of these 
negotiations was the 1991 Award Restructuring Agreement which codified career structures 
for established and emerging universities and placed a series of caps and limitations on the 
employment of non-continuing (untenured) academics as well as measures to resist 
institutional discretion on redundancies, redeployment and dismissals (O'Brien 2003). 
 
The formation of the NTEU 
The regulation of academic labour under the Dawkin's White Paper was the primary 
impetus for the formation of the NTEU which was created out of a series of coincidences of 
necessity (O'Brien 2003: 37).  The NTEU was formed in 1993 through the amalgamation of 
five associations with very different professional cultures and industrial approaches.  Many 
of the features and characteristics both of the individual associations themselves and of the 
process of negotiation and compromise required for the amalgamation became embedded 
in the union and played a determining role in the union’s strategic direction.  FAUSA and 
UACA were the major players.  They were joined by the Australian Colleges and University 
Staff Association (ACUSA) (which included general staff in Victoria), the Australian Teachers 
Union (ATU) and in later years by a miscellany of general staff unions (O'Brien 1999: 82). 
 
In 1989, FAUSA had around 9,000 members nationally and had nationally registered 
coverage of all academics in the traditional university sector (O'Brien 1999: 82).  FAUSA had 
limited industrial experience due to its origins as a staff association (O'Brien 2003: 35).  
FAUSA’s structure was focused at the individual branch level with high levels of branch 
autonomy (O'Brien 2003: 40).  UACA had around 7-8000 members and had coverage of 
professional and teaching staff from the colleges of advanced education (O'Brien 1999: 82).  
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Colleges of advanced education were state-based institutions which were closely regulated 
by their respective state governments (O'Brien 2003: 40).  UACA therefore had a different 
approach to employment relations, with extensive experience in industrial negotiation with 
external bodies for wages and conditions and the resulting agreements were registered as 
awards at the state level (O'Brien 2003: 40).  Similar to FAUSA, the College sector also had 
federation of college based staff associations, the Federal Council of Academics (FCA) 
(O'Brien 2003: 40).  The FCA was not nationally registered and had no tradition of acting at a 
national level (O'Brien 2003: 40).   
 
With Dawkins’ “unified national system” of higher education drawing the colleges into the 
university system, FAUSA and UACA were forced to rethink their strategy (O'Brien 2003: 38) 
and preliminary discussions towards amalgamation began.  For FAUSA, the new national 
system, merging universities with colleges, threatened to dilute their research-based 
university work and undermine the elite nature of their employers’ institutions (O'Brien 
2003: 37).  These concerns were bolstered by a real fear that universities would lose their 
research-based funding supplement and would experience increased competition for 
research funding if colleges became part of the university sector (O'Brien 2003: 37).  On the 
positive side, FAUSA enjoyed federal coverage of all university academics, therefore opening 
up opportunities for recruitment and expansion in the newly formed universities (O'Brien 
2003: 37).  The legislation meanwhile threw UACA into crisis.  The state-based UACA had a 
strong presence in the colleges but moving to a federal system required that UACA have 
federal registration.  UACA’s best option was to graft itself to a national body.  The obvious 
choice was to amalgamate with FAUSA.  Another advantage of joining FAUSA was the 
benefit of uniting with a body whose members had much higher wages and conditions and 
access to research funding (O'Brien 2003: 37).  The decision was uncontroversial with a 
majority voting to seek amalgamation at the UACA Council in September 1986 (O'Brien 
2003: 37).  There was much more resistance from FAUSA members, many of whom saw 
merging with college staff as entrenching the loss of prestige and therefore risked 
membership losses (O'Brien 2003: 38).   
 
The amalgamation of FAUSA and UACA and then the folding in of smaller organisations all 
left their mark on the perhaps unusual structure of the NTEU with its national, branch and 
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division offices as well as contributing their own cultures and experience to the mix.  At the 
time of amalgamation, FAUSA was clearly the dominant force with coverage of all academics 
in universities whilst UACA only had jurisdiction over the fast disappearing college sector 
(O'Brien 2003: 42).  FAUSA’s dominance is reflected in the relative autonomy of branches as 
well as the collegial "staff association" model over the industrial strategy which would 
dominate the NTEU for many years (O'Brien 2003: 42).  The autonomous branch based 
structure has had major implications for strategy, democracy and knowledge management 
within the NTEU.  
 
The Division, or state-based, structure within the NTEU is also a product of amalgamation.  
In a sector which is predominantly governed by enterprise level managements or by the 
federal government, the Division structure is a residual component of UACA’s state based 
system in Victoria (which was UACA’s stronghold with 45% of its membership) and FAUSA’s 
stronghold in NSW (with 40% of its membership) and its membership of a state based 
organisation with UACA called the Academics Union of NSW (O'Brien 2003: 43).  In South 
Australia, there was conflict between UACA and FAUSA representatives.  The compromised 
result that UACA’s state based presence remained with a UACA General Secretary but under 
the insistence of FAUSA representatives this was allowable only on the understanding that 
power and autonomy remain at the branch level with a FAUSA leadership.  In this way, the 
branch and division structures and their composite cultures were an emergent product 
resulting from the decisions and compromises reached during the process of amalgamation.  
In the meantime, the NTEU (and its constituent unions) had to respond to the industrial and 
political pressures of the Dawkins reforms (O'Brien 2003: 38) and in particular the 
confrontational tactics of the AHEIA.  
 
The Second Tier Dispute 
On 26 August 1993, the AHEIA lodged an application to the AIRC proposing major 
amendments to the “Second Tier Award” without prior consultation with FAUSA.  The 
employers sought major changes to academic dismissal, disciplinary and redundancy 
procedures in line with the private sector (NTEU NE Minutes 25 October 1993).  This move 
represented the first serious, national challenge to academic tenure leading to the NTEU’s 
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first dispute, the “Second Tier dispute”.  FAUSA and UACA had received early warning of 
AHEIA plans via a leaked document and on this basis called mass meetings of academics in 
May 1993 which endorsed an industrial campaign (NTEU campaign flyer October 1993).  At 
issue was the defence of tenure as vital to the academic profession and academic freedom 
of expression (NTEU NE Minutes 25 October 1993: 4).  The NTEU demanded that academic 
peers be involved in any assessment of “unsatisfactory performance” or “serious 
misconduct” and argued that private sector provisions for unsatisfactory performance, 
misconduct and redundancy were inappropriate to the academic environment (NTEU NE 
Minutes 25 October 1993: 4).   FAUSA notified a dispute with the AHEIA and plans were well 
underway for a 24 hour national strike scheduled for mid October when discussions began 
about the formation of the NTEU in August 1993 (NTEU Transitional Executive minutes 26 
August 1993).  Therefore the minutes of the informal meeting of the NTEU Transitional 
Executive 26 August 1993 had two major agenda items: primarily discussions around the 
proposed structure, administration and resource allocation for the NTEU and the steps 
necessary for amalgamation and secondly plans for the national strike and negotiations 
around the Second Tier Dispute (NTEU NE Minutes 25 October 1993). As a result the NTEU 
although only officially formed on 1 October, 1993, conducted its first national strike on 14 
October of that year.  Reflecting the transitional nature of the new NTEU, resolutions in 
support of the strike day were carried at the NTEU National Executive as well as both UACA 
and FAUSA Annual General meetings (NTEU NE Minutes 25 October 1993). 
 
Focusing on national strategic decision making, three key issues arise out of the NTEU’s first 
dispute, the Second Tier Dispute: the formation of the National Executive, the emergence of 
a culture of democratic dialogue between the national body and branches and divisions and 
finally an entrenched policy commitment by leading figures in the NTEU to the preservation 
of a uniform, national standard of wages and conditions for academic staff.  With the 
introduction of enterprise bargaining, still more innovations were folded into the mix.  Each 
will be examined in detail below. 
 
The National Executive 
The NTEU national executive was initially formed to oversee the murky process of 
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amalgamation but morphed into the steering committee for the Second Tier Dispute.  It had 
proportional representation from all of the five constituent organisations: FAUSA, UACA, 
ACUSA and two very small organisations, a federation of college staff associations in 
Queensland (QAASCAE) and a union covering senior general staff with 130, the Australian 
National University Administrative and Allied Officers Association (ANUAAO) (O'Brien 2003: 
43).  The National Executive was also the steering committee for the Second Tier Dispute.  
The National Executive nominated a Secretariat from its ranks with representatives from the 
various constituent unions: a president (FAUSA), three vice presidents (FAUSA , UACA and 
ACUSA) and two joint secretaries (UACA and ACUSA) (NTEU NE Minutes 25 October 1993: 
1).  The secretariat was the formal negotiators with the AHEIA and therefore the National 
Executive was the conveyor between the negotiators and representatives of the NTEU 
membership around the country.  The National Executive in consultation with branch and 
division representatives set the parameters for what was to be negotiated with the AHEIA 
(NTEU NE Minutes 25 October 1993: 4).   
 
Democracy in decision making 
Another important development out of the Second Tier Dispute was a thoroughgoing 
internal debate about the importance of branch and division consultation in National 
Executive decision making and an insistence on consensus decision-making wherever 
practicable.  The 14 October strike was well supported but did little to shift the AHEIA and 
so the National Executive increased the pressure by initiating a nationwide ban on the 
transmission of student examination results (NTEU NE Minutes 25 October 1993: 3).  
Despite the bans, the AHEIA proved intransigent and the AIRC was unlikely to arbitrate while 
industrial action was still in place (NTEU NE teleconf Minutes 12 November 1993).  The 
Commission insisted on the lifting of the bans to enable further conciliation but had also 
made substantial concessions in the NTEU’s favour (NTEU NE teleconf minutes 15 
November 1993) at a teleconference meeting of 12 November, the NTEU National Executive 
faced its first controversial decision, whether or not to lift the bans (NTEU NE teleconf 
Minutes 12 November 1993).  It became clear during the teleconference that those in 
favour of lifting the bans “had the numbers”.  The chair of the executive (FAUSA) who was 
also in favour of lifting the bans, recognising the majority support for lifting the bans moved 
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quickly to a vote (NTEU NE teleconf Minutes 12 November 1993).  However, Graham 
McCulloch (UACA), joint national secretary, was opposed to lifting the bans and put a 
procedural motion to the meeting in an attempt to postpone the decision.  The procedural 
motion was lost and in a divided vote with not all NE participants present the Executive 
voted to lift the bans (NTEU NE teleconf Minutes 12 November 1993).  This incident sparked 
an intense internal debate about democratic decision making.   
 
From an exchange of letters following this decision it is clear it was deeply controversial 
both in terms of process and the decision itself.  UACA representatives with experience in 
industrial action knew that to lift the bans was no straightforward matter as it required 
mass meetings of members at each branch and division.  The important lesson drawn from 
this is reflected in a letter by Graham McCulloch which insisted on an approach “eschewing 
the use of numbers”  and based on a “reasonable degree of consensus” (McCulloch 18 
November 1993).  A letter from Ted Murphy (UACA), Secretary of the Victorian Division of 
the NTEU, explicitly pointed out the importance of democratic legitimacy:  
 “It will be a difficult choice for members whether to accept the recommendation to 
lift the bans.  This difficulty will only be exacerbated now given the fact that members 
will be suspicious of the process followed in arriving at that recommendation” and 
argued for a “major shift in approach to internal decision-making for the Victorian 
Division to have confidence in the federal organisation’s capacity for proper political 
management of important industrial disputes”  
(Murphy 15 November 1993). 
The teleconference was discussed at length at the next face-to-face National Executive and 
to codify the lesson into policy, a very prescriptive “Standing Orders for Teleconference 
Procedures” motion was carried (NTEU NE teleconf Minutes 8 December 1993).  Meanwhile, 
by the end of 1993 conciliation with the AHEIA over the Second Tier Dispute had reached an 
impasse and with the end of the academic year and Christmas shutdown of the campuses 
approaching further industrial action was not viable.  The dispute proved intractable and 
negotiations stretched into early 1995 (NTEU NE minutes 7&8 April 1995).    
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National cohesion to maintain uniform wages and conditions 
The Second Tier Dispute enshrined the NTEU's commitment to a nationally negotiated 
award for all academics across the sector into NTEU policy.  It did so not only amongst the 
National Executive but as a collective goal of the membership who had taken protracted 
industrial action in its defence.  This policy was also in line with the traditional opinions of 
the NTEU's constituent organisations, as Grahame McCulloch pointed out in a letter to the 
NTEU leadership: “The NTEU union in their earlier FAUSA, UACA and ACUSA garbs opposed 
the introduction of this system [enterprise bargaining] but we have been rolled!!” 
(McCulloch 23 December 1993).  This shared conviction among key players that the best 
way to defend academic and general staff wages and conditions was through a national 
award system greatly enhanced the national unity of the NTEU.  The NTEU’s goal to codify 
and enshrine conditions (particularly very vulnerable academic conditions) into a national 
standard in a context of fragmentation of both the sector (under the Dawkins’ White Paper 
reforms) and the industrial relations environment (with the introduction of the Industrial 
Relations Reforms 1993) was the tacitly understood purpose of the NTEU National 
Executive.   
 
The NTEU was being both pushed and pulled by the industrial relations legislation of the 
time.  Whist the NTEU was campaigning to defend current award conditions and to attempt 
to codify and protect non-registered academic conditions into an award the award system 
itself was being disbanded.  The first moves towards Enterprise Bargaining in Australia 
started in March 1987 when the Commission announced the Accord Mark III recommending 
a two-tiered system of national wage fixing alongside a second tier of decentralised award-
by-award or industry-by-industry wage negotiation (Dabscheck 1995: 32).  The NTEU was 
formed the same year as the announcement of the 1993 Industrial Relations Reforms (which 
took effect on 30 March 1994) which aimed to make provision for the expansion of 
enterprise bargaining to all sectors in Australia.   
 
The introduction of enterprise bargaining 
The introduction of enterprise bargaining to the higher education sector in 1993-94 took 
place in phases.  A National Framework Agreement (NFA) was to be struck between the 
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NTEU and AHEIA which was to form the scaffold for the negotiation of Local Framework 
Agreements (LFA) between the NTEU and Vice Chancellors at each institution.  With the 
introduction of the 1993 Industrial Relations Reform Act, the LFAs became known as 
Enterprise Agreements.  However, whilst the LFA assumed that the ‘object’ of negotiation 
was each university institution, this was not a given under enterprise bargaining where the 
“bargaining unit” was also up for negotiation.  Preventing the further fracturing of 
institutions to smaller bargaining units was crucial to future negotiations.  
 
In line with its policy, the NTEU’s first and preferred line of defence for academic wages and 
conditions was via a national award either via defending the 1991 Award Restructuring 
Agreement in the Second Tier Dispute or via the National Framework Agreement.  Both of 
these avenues involved going head to head with the AHEIA which was determined to see 
the dissolution of academic tenure in particular and the award provisions generally and to 
drive negotiations to the level of the enterprise.  The NTEU’s backup plan was to seek to 
codify remaining conditions through Local Framework Agreements and then as its least 
preferred method, Enterprise Agreements.  The NTEU National Executive’s explicit strategy 
therefore was to:  
“preserve existing conditions of academic employment by incorporating those 
conditions into an award or awards which does not undermine existing conditions or 
existing awards and award standards.  Conditions not incorporated into the award 
are to be codified by certified [enterprise] agreement.”  
(NTEU NE Minutes 8/9 April, 1994)  
Negotiations for the National Framework Agreement commenced immediately following the 
Second Tier Dispute in November 1993.  Mass meetings of FAUSA and UACA Councils 
outlined clear principles for NTEU negotiators which incorporated demands from the 
Second Tier Dispute: 
• The Enterprise be defined as the whole institution 
• Existing award standards form the minimum base for enterprise negotiations 
• Release time for union negotiators be guaranteed 
• Guaranteed right of involvement of professional industrial staff in local negotiations 
80 
 
• Enterprise bargaining not be used to reduce job security, including tenure levels 
• Restrictions on double counting of productivity gains be confined to those 
productivity gains already made as a result of existing agreements. 
(NTEU NE Minutes 15 December 1993) 
The AHEIA, with its desire to disband the award protections and push negotiations to the 
local level, were intransigent at the national level, refusing to commit to protection of award 
conditions, job security, union rights or even that the “enterprise should be defined as the 
whole institution”.  By the end of 1993, NTEU negotiators interpreted the situation as 
intractable; to shift the AHEIA would require a sustained national industrial campaign 
(McCulloch 23 December 1993).   However, to sign the unsatisfactory Framework 
Agreement committed the NTEU to winning the remaining provisions site-by-site at the 
institution level during Enterprise Bargaining (McCulloch 23 December 1993).  At the end of 
1993, the National Executive was divided on whether to sign the NFA.  A clear majority 
endorsed the signing, following membership endorsement, but a significant minority were 
opposed (McCulloch 23 December 1993).  In line with the democratic protocols established 
during the Second Tier Dispute it was decided that a decision not be made until a full face-
to-face National Executive meeting in early 1994.  The National Executive instructed 
branches to organise meetings with the membership in February 1994 (McCulloch 23 
December 1993).  
 
Maintaining national discipline at this time was a challenge.  The National Executive had 
prohibited branches from striking Local Framework Agreements until after the signing of the 
National Framework Agreement (NTEU NE Minutes 15 December 1993).    However, 
frustrated with the poor outcomes and slow pace of negotiations (which also stalled the 
associated local pay rises), two branches, James Cook University and University of Western 
Australia, attempted to break ranks to sign their own LFAs before the National Framework 
had been finalised.  Of course, in a climate where the AHEIA preferred the signing of LFAs 
over NFAs any breaks in the ranks acted to enhance the AHEIA’s argument (McCulloch 23 
December 1993).  The National Executive did not approve the Local Agreements, but 
apparently took the content of the local agreements back to the AHEIA.  Over the Christmas 
break 1993, some concessions were achieved at the national negotiations, with the AHEIA 
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agreeing to more positive wording for union recognition, some agreement on counting of 
productivity in Agreement (as per UWA Local Agreement) and some commitment to salaries 
(Zetlin 27 January 1994). 
   
However, the AHEIA refused to give any commitment to preserve current award conditions 
or any commitment to defining the “enterprise” as the “whole of the institution” 
(McCulloch 1 February 1994).  In early 1994, the NTEU reluctantly signed a substandard 
NFA.  Meanwhile, negotiations over the Second Tier dispute had also reached an impasse.  
As avenues for victories at the national level closed up, enterprise bargaining became the 
place where the NTEU would have to defend the sector and attempt to maintain national 
standards.  
 
Several major innovations emerged out of the NTEU’s navigation of “round one” of 
enterprise bargaining: a strategy for maintaining a national pattern for negotiations, the 
emergence of a team of National Industrial Officers and a process for codifying and 
distributing industrial advice throughout the NTEU and the recommendation for a Single 
Bargaining Unit at each institution.  Each will be discussed in detail below. 
 
Maintaining a national pattern 
Round one of enterprise bargaining was in fact a hybrid system with national agreements 
limiting the parameters for negotiations at the local level: wages were fixed by national 
negotiation directly with the federal government with a further 2% salary rise to be 
negotiated at the institution level.  The NFA set a national standard for academic conditions 
which were reflected in Institutional (Local) Framework Agreements (NTEU NE Minutes 8/9 
April, 1994).  The demands of enterprise bargaining had also already been set by national 
negotiations.  In line with its explicit strategy of maintaining current conditions (both 
certified award conditions and actual conditions, codified or otherwise, for academic staff) 
on the campuses, the NTEU’s primary objective in round one of enterprise bargaining was to 
preserve, campus by campus, the conditions which were falling through the cracks in 
negotiations at the national level.  The 2% component of the wage rise was set intentionally 
low by the NTEU with the goal of maintaining national unity: those institutions which could 
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win higher outcomes were to be held down in solidarity with institutions where negotiations 
were more difficult (McCulloch 14 July 1994: 3).  Keeping the institution’s wage 
commitments low also upheld the NTEU’s policy agenda that university wages were a 
Commonwealth government responsibility (McCulloch 14 July 1994: 4).   
 
The desire to maintain a national standard encouraged a highly centralised approach during 
the first round.  Almost all campuses commenced formal negotiations together in October 
1994 and “model clauses” were drafted nationally and were to be served in a synchronised 
fashion at local institutions (NTEU NE Minutes 8/9 April, 1994).  The National Executive 
developed very strict guidelines on timing, content (what was and was not up for 
negotiation) and even the sequence of clauses lodged with management at the local level 
(NTEU NE Minutes 8/9 April, 1994), limiting the discretion (and therefore margin for error) 
for negotiators as well as allowing the National Executive to maintain a national pattern 
across the sector.  In preparation for subsequent rounds of enterprise bargaining, all 
agreements were to conclude on a common date: 31 December 1995 (McCulloch 14 July 
1994: 4).  The first national model clauses to be served to institutional managements was a 
request for “detailed financial information and other data relevant to enterprise bargaining” 
(NTEU NE Minutes 8/9 April, 1994).  Responsibility for ensuring adherence to these strict 
parameters largely fell to paid industrial officers employed in the Divisions who conducted 
much of the actual bargaining.  Branch based representatives were also free to develop local 
claims above the minimum standards set at the NTEU national level.  This was particularly 
important for academic staff as there were no “comprehensive conditions code” and 
therefore no “codified floor to allow a judgement to be made on the no disadvantage test 
and no safety net of minimum standards as envisaged by the AIRC” (NTEU Industrial Matters 
Committee Minutes 17/18 March 1994).   
 
To ensure that all campus agreements met the standard set by National Executive and that 
no agreement undermined current conditions a rigorous approval process was established.  
Branch executives with the support of their division secretary were required to supply a 
written report outlining how the agreement impacted on existing awards and conditions 
which was to be presented to a general meeting of members (McCulloch 14 July 1994).  
Finally, each enterprise agreement would be closely scrutinised by national officers and 
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feedback from the members meeting were to be presented to the National Executive for 
their consideration (McCulloch 14 July 1994).  All enterprise agreements must be endorsed 
by the National Executive before local negotiators could sign the agreement (McCulloch 14 
July 1994).  In essence, the National Executive attempted to substitute itself for the AIRC 
and maintain a national system despite the fracturing of both the sector and the industrial 
relations legislation. 
 
However, even with a co-ordinated strategy at the national level, high levels of expertise 
were required at the local level.  Maintaining national unity required ensuring all branches 
and divisions had the expertise and the information needed to “hold the line” at the 
enterprise level.  Furthermore, as well as achieving national goals, local negotiators were 
required to consult extensively with their memberships and were free to develop local 
claims in consultation with their local memberships above the minimum standards set at the 
NTEU national level.  They were particularly encouraged to scoop up local (non-certified) 
actual conditions of academics either formally struck with Vice Chancellors or very 
vulnerable “custom and practice” arrangements and write them into a certified enterprise 
agreement (McCulloch 14 July 1994).   This also allowed stronger branches to win better 
standards which other institutions could adopt in subsequent bargaining rounds (McCulloch 
14 July 1994: 4).   
 
In this new context, training staff and activists at the local level became a conscious, explicit 
priority of the National Executive.  Staff and activists in the branches and divisions had 
expressed concern at their limited experience in negotiations of this kind (NTEU NE Minutes 
8/9 April, 1994).  A three day National Industrial Staff Development and Training 
Programme and a National Planning Conference for elected officials at National, Division 
and Branch level were convened covering all aspects of NTEU policy and enterprise 
bargaining negotiations (NTEU NE Minutes 12/13 August 1994).  A document entitled 
“Enterprise Bargaining Strategy: Higher Education” was presented by Grahame McCulloch 
for discussion at the National Planning Conference, 28-30 June 1994 (McCulloch 14 July 
1994).  The strategy was refined and then more broadly distributed for comment 
(McCulloch 14 July 1994).   
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Linda Gale, from the National Industrial Unit, reported to National Executive the difficulties 
experienced by national, branch and division industrial officers in accessing reliable 
information and raised serious concerns about the flow of information among the layers of 
the union (NTEU NE Minutes 1 July 1994).  The National Executive responded by establishing 
an Information Flow Working Party to both investigate the problem and develop 
recommendations (NTEU NE Minutes 1 July 1994).  The recommendations of the 
Information Flow Working Party included: “memo identifiers”: clarification of who memos 
were to be distributed to, dates, and sequence identifiers, uniform document formats, 
updated membership lists, timely distribution of national executive minutes, better record 
keeping, clearer timelines (NTEU NE Minutes 12/13 August 1994).  Ensuring that reliable 
advice was available to the branches and divisions demanded codification and timely 
distribution of information.  This was an explicit priority ratified at National Executive: “that 
the distribution of written advice to branches and division be maintained as the primary 
information service on enterprise bargaining” (Industrial Report to the NE 18/19 February). 
 
National Industrial Unit 
In 1994 a highly skilled team of industrial officers rose to prominence in the national office.  
The National Industrial Unit was a product of amalgamation and drew together experienced 
industrial officers from the constituent organisations: four from FAUSA, two from UACA and 
one from ACUSA.  The National Industrial Unit’s primary objective at this time, in line with 
the NTEU’s explicit strategic goal of maintaining national uniformity and protecting all 
current conditions, was to interrogate the various awards, agreements and legislation, 
scouring for loopholes and anticipating their implication at a time when both the sector and 
the industrial relations legislation were in flux.   
 
The National Industrial Unit was also responsible for keeping industrial officers in the branch 
and division up to date.  The National Industrial Unit kept the broader organisation informed 
of National Executive decisions as well as decisions coming out of the AIRC or disseminating 
developments from individual branches or divisions to the broader organisation to maintain 
national unity.  The National Industrial Unit maintained connections with industrial officers 
by phone and in person, but they were also responsible for producing “industrial memos”.  
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In line with directives from the Information Flow Working Party these memos were 
meticulously sequentially numbered updates.  In the branches and divisions, industrial staff 
were expected to maintain a folder of these memos in sequence to ensure that they had the 
most up-to-date information in writing.  This flow of information was vital for industrial 
officers during enterprise bargaining negotiations.  Reading the NTEU’s archive of the 
industrial memos of 1994 (sequentially numbered from 1/94 to 114/94) indicate both the 
complexity of the issues generated by negotiations during this turbulent time as well as the 
pace of events with at times twice weekly updates addressing a vast range of issues 
including: award restructuring, coverage rights, unfair dismissals, retirement provisions, 
probation, general staff award negotiations, intellectual property rights and casual, contract 
and fractional staff conditions among many others.   
 
The information flow was not one way.  The National Industrial Officers also regularly issued 
calls for detailed information only available at branch or division level, such as an urgent call 
for information regarding tenure ratios at each institution, for a report to an AIRC hearing 
on tenure (NTEU Industrial Memo 30 March 1994).  This information was used to win a 
ruling in the AIRC that several universities had not met their obligations under the 1991 
Award Restructuring Agreement that 30% Level A academics have tenure (Weatherhead 
and Matheson, Industrial Memo 2 June 1994).   
 
The major contribution made at the National Planning Conference was the bargaining 
agenda and model clauses which relied on the input of branches, division and national 
officers to ensure the strategy reflected the views of the broader membership (Crampton, R 
Industrial Memo 7 June 1994).  Lastly, the National Industrial Unit produced the first 
“Enterprise Bargaining Kit” which was presented at the National Industrial Staff 
Development and Training Programme and a National Planning Conference, refined and 
then distributed to the branches and divisions.  The Kit was developed to attempt to codify 
the skills and knowledge required to negotiate enterprise bargaining at each campus, 
covering: the history of awards and the introduction of enterprise bargaining, what should 
and should not be negotiated, information and process issues, “the bargaining unit”, 
negotiating substantive Enterprise Agreements in accordance with national and local 
enterprise bargaining framework agreements (Industrial Report to the NE 12/13 August 
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1994).   
 
Industrial Matters Committee 
Most of the key initiatives of the enterprise bargaining strategy during round one were 
recommendations arising from the Industrial Matters Committee.  The Industrial Matters 
Committee (originally a UACA/FCA institution) was adopted by the NTEU in 1994.  It 
convened for two days and met four times a year.  The Industrial Matters Committed acted 
as a sub-committee to the National Executive to focus on industrial issues.  It was a small 
committee comprised of ten elected officers from the National Secretariat, National 
Executive as well as from branches and divisions.  The National Industrial Unit also attended 
these meetings.  The National Industrial Unit provided reports on all industrial issues to the 
Industrial Matters Committee to form the framework for discussion on the committee.  
Strategies developed in committee were then codified by the Industrial Unit and proposed 
to the National Executive for ratification, amendment or rejection and these decisions were 
then transmitted via the Industrial Unit out to campuses and divisions via “industrial 
memos”.   
 
One of the most significant innovations in the first round of bargaining for the future of 
enterprise bargaining was the recommendation of the Industrial Matters Committee for a 
Single Bargaining Unit (NTEU NE Minutes 8/9 April, 1994) of academics and general staff at 
each campus.  The introduction of enterprise bargaining not only located the employment 
contract for academics at the institution level but also drew non-academic (general) staff 
away from a variety of state based awards (and their related state-based unions) and united 
them with academic staff into the same negotiations at the local level.  The 
recommendation for a Single Bargaining Unit came from Ted Murphy (UACA), the Secretary 
of the Victorian Division.  The NTEU in Victoria had coverage of general staff, having 
amalgamated with VCUSA, which included general staff members.  Whilst this 
recommendation had obvious benefits for the Victorian Division, in order for a minority 
position to be adopted, there must be others within the organisation to act as receptors.  
Once again those who were grounded in the traditional trade union approach formed an 
alliance.  The same individuals, Grahame McCulloch in particular, who had argued for the 
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incorporation of VCUSA into the NTEU (against significant opposition from some FAUSA 
representatives) during amalgamation (O'Brien 2003: 43) readily accepted the Single 
Bargaining Unit suggestion as a way to further entrench the growing involvement of general 
staff in the NTEU’s future.  Incorporating general staff opened up a vista of recruitment 
across the sector and also bolstered the trade union approach over FAUSA’s “staff 
association” model.  For key players at this time, a longer-term goal for the NTEU was the 
formation of an industry union with coverage of academic and general staff under the one 
agreement at all campuses.   
 
Summary 
The rest of this chapter returns to the discussion so far to analyse the learning process in the 
early years of the NTEU leading up to the introduction of enterprise bargaining.  Firstly, this 
discussion will analyse the steep learning curve that the newly formed National Executive 
travelled as it quickly learned to work together whilst leading the national Second Tier 
Dispute.  Secondly, the newly formed National Industrial Unit will be analysed to explore 
how this unit built the capacity to adapt to the major changes in the industrial relations 
legislation.  The chapter will then discuss how information and “know how” was transmitted 
in the NTEU and then look at the sources of innovation that enabled it to adapt to changes 
in the external environment.  This discussion will draw on the observations of both trade 
union strategy and knowledge management literature to guide this investigation.   
 
Learning to work together  
To build an understanding of the early years of the NTEU during amalgamation it is helpful 
to return to the trade union strategy discussion in chapter two of this thesis.  Pocock’s 
competence and culture (Pocock 2000: 21) and Hyman’s efficacy (Hyman 1997: 311) have 
drawn attention to the “inner life” of the union.  As Pocock argues developing strategy and 
successfully implementing it is not a linear process (2000:10); regardless of the merits of 
strategies established ultimately their success or otherwise depends on the organisation’s 
ability to implement them.  The amalgamation of the NTEU as with any union was a major 
undertaking involving the reallocation of resources, finances, office space, human resources 
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as well as delicate negotiations about where in the organisation power would reside.  The 
successful implementation of the NTEU’s strategy for campaigning around the Second Tier 
Dispute depended on the organisation’s ability to quickly form itself into a workable 
organisation.   
 
“Becoming a member” (Brown and Duguid 1991: 48) of the National Executive community 
of practice in these early days involved each individual trying to learn each other’s languages 
and outlooks and to build a shared understanding of the context in which they were 
operating and the most appropriate way to respond.  The question of ideology is relevant 
here as the NTEU grappled with its new identity: was the NTEU a staff association in line 
with FAUSA’s tradition or a union in line with the union constituents or could it successfully 
operate as a hybrid of the two?  The tension between the staff association and unionate 
approaches underpin many of the conflicts at this time and this debate will perhaps never 
be fully resolved.  For the majority of FAUSA academics, including their National Executive 
representatives, the Second Tier Dispute was the first time they had ever taken industrial 
action representing a major challenge to its traditional goals and assumptions.  Although the 
FAUSA staff association model was dominant at this stage in the NTEU’s development 
(O'Brien 2003: 42) the conflict around the decision to call off the industrial action points to 
the emergent ties that were being forged among those with a traditional trade union 
approach within the NTEU.  UACA representatives, Grahame McCulloch and Ted Murphy, 
reflecting their shared language and experience were able to form an alliance to oppose 
FAUSA’s actions.  On balance, despite the internal conflicts over democratic decision making 
and strategy and the pressures imposed by the Dispute, it is likely that the unifying impacts 
of a common enemy and a common goal outweighed the fracturing pressures of the 
amalgamation process.  Also possible is that the forward momentum of the dispute enabled 
the organisation to continue to make progress despite internal conflicts and obstacles.  This 
period will be revisited in chapter ten to analyse the development of this community of 
practice from a network perspective. 
 
Building industrial expertise  
To understand how the National Industrial Unit built the capacity to cope with the dramatic 
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changes to both the political economy and industrial relations legislation it is helpful to 
return to the activity theory literature discussed in chapter three.  In one regard the unit 
was a homogenous group in that they were all industrial officers in another regard it is a 
heterogeneous group comprised of individuals drawn from very different cultures in their 
constituent organisations.  FAUSA industrial officers with their base in the traditional 
university sector likely had a very different understanding of their roles than those from 
ACUSA and UACA with extensive experience in industrial legislation and in negotiating state 
based awards in the former college sector.  However, navigating Dawkin’s newly formed 
unified national system required an understanding of both the university and college 
environments and an appreciation of both the collegiate and industrial approaches to 
employment relations.  “Becoming a member” of this community of practice (Brown and 
Duguid 1991: 48) may have been helped by the shared language of their occupation 
regarding awards and industrial law and clauses and legislation.  Meanwhile, the “creative 
abrasion” (Leonard and Sensiper 1998: 118) of different experiences coming together may 
also have been a benefit in an environment demanding radical innovation and new ways of 
operating to respond to the turbulent environment.   
 
To follow the recommendations of activity theorists, the key to understanding what 
knowledge is required to perform a role and how it is generated and transmitted is to focus 
on practice (Brown and Duguid, 2001: 200).  Using Frenkel et al’s three dimension of a work 
role: the predominant form of knowledge, the relative levels of creativity and type and level 
of skill (1995: 781) model to examine the types of knowledge required to perform the role 
of industrial officer at this time.  Whilst the national industrial officer's role assumed high 
levels of explicit, theoretical knowledge in industrial law and an involved understanding of 
the complex award system, it also required a level of contextual knowledge to understand 
the application of this abstract knowledge to the particular demands of the evolving sector.  
The role demanded a high level of creativity to navigate heuristic or open ended problems 
and to predict their future implications.  Finally, the skill level required was high levels of 
intellective skills to synthesise information from many sources and anticipate their 
implications for the sector.   
 
Enlisting Ellstrom's levels of learning taxonomy where the distinction is made between 
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"adaptive learning" involving routine or "reproductive" work and the higher level of 
"developmental learning" engaging active knowledge-based problem solving and 
hypothesising, testing and experimentation (2001: 423), the National Industrial Unit at this 
time enlisted largely the higher development modes.  The National Industrial Unit was 
responsible for the national strategic direction of the industrial wing of the NTEU.  Operating 
in a recently formed organisation and with a changing industrial relations and political 
economy in higher education, there was very little established practice for this unit to work 
with.  Ellstrom's highest level, "creative learning", where the learner must define the 
problem from first principles and to attempt to make explicit that which is perhaps only 
partially understood so that assumptions can be tested and experimentation can take place 
(Ellstrom 2001: 424) would appear to be at a premium for the National Industrial Unit at this 
time.  Whilst the individuals within this group brought high level of expertise from their 
constituent organisations but in turn as a group still higher levels of these skills were 
generated building up a repository of expertise and understanding of the industrial 
legislation and how it applied to a constantly evolving higher education sector.  Key figures 
to emerge out of this climate are current National Industrial Officers, Ken McAlpine (ACUSA) 
and Eleanor Floyd (UACA) and the current Victorian Division senior industrial officer, Linda 
Gale (UACA).   
 
Another major role of the National Industrial Unit was to keep the industrial network of the 
NTEU informed via industrial memos and reports.  In knowledge management terms, 
important information was codified by the National Industrial Officers and transmitted 
between the National Executive and Industrial Officers and elected representatives 
throughout the NTEU.  A community of practice therefore developed, not only in the 
immediate National Industrial Unit but with a network of practitioners throughout the 
organisation in regular contact with each other.  In line with Brown and Duguid’s suggestion 
that successful transfer of knowledge depends on the extent to which practices are similar 
(2001: 207) it is likely that although the individuals in this network were from various 
campuses and constituent organisations, the shared language of industrial legislation 
enabled the flow of information among them.  Furthermore, the clauses and award rulings 
were by their nature easily codified and disseminated in the way that embodied “know 
how” is not.  The recommendations of the Information Flow Working party established a 
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system for distributing and storing this codified data. 
 
How was information and “know how” transmitted in the NTEU? 
In knowledge management terms, two distinct though linked processes for the transmission 
of knowledge throughout the organisation.  The first process was through codification which 
was largely undertaken by the National Industrial Unit.  The second process was more 
complex, the sharing of embodied “know how” of individuals engaged in the formulation of 
strategy at the National Executive who were also responsible for implementing this strategy 
in the branches and divisions.  Acting as boundary spanners these individuals learned from 
the experience of other National Executive or Industrial Matters Committee members and 
fed this “know how” into their activities at the branch and division level.  In reverse, the 
experience and “know how” developed via working in the branch and division communities 
to implement national strategy also became embodied in these individuals and fed back into 
the committees at the national level.  Presumably the success or otherwise of the strategic 
decisions made at the national level depended on the reliability and relevance of the 
information being provided.   
 
In line with Tushman and Scanlon’s observations, the successful transmission of information 
from the external world to the internal organisation rests largely on the capability of the 
individual boundary spanner, their ability to interpret and translate the external and internal 
languages as well as the necessary status and connections internally to disseminate their 
observations (1981: 290-2).  The unusual structure of the newly formed NTEU may have 
acted to enhance the status of elected branch and division representatives on National 
Executive.  As O’Brien has pointed out in his study of the early years of the NTEU, branch 
leaderships in line with FAUSA traditions were both empowered and experienced a certain 
entitlement to defend their branch based interests within the national union structure 
which was further enhanced with the location of negotiations at the branch level under 
enterprise bargaining (O'Brien 1999: 83).  Similarly, Division representatives in line with the 
UACA and ACUSA tradition were also accustomed to a level of status and were also more 
accustomed to the industrial relations framework being introduced to the university sector 
than their FAUSA colleagues.  As, O’Brien points out any exercise of central power therefore 
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from the national leadership involved a process of “complicated negotiation” among the 
various layers of leadership in the NTEU (O'Brien 1999: 83).  This dynamic was reflected in 
the deliberations of the National Executive itself as individuals bolstered by the status of 
their position contributed their opinions. 
 
How were new ideas generated? 
The impetus to develop new ideas and indeed to form a union in the first place, was 
overwhelmingly driven by the demands of the external environment.  Within the NTEU, the 
heterogeneity of the amalgamation of different approaches and traditions was both a 
source of conflict but also likely enabled it to adapt.  The combination of FAUSA’s detailed 
understanding of the traditional university sector and the industrial expertise of the trade 
union constituents (of UACA and other trade unions from the college sector) enabled the 
NTEU to navigate both the changes to the political economy of the university sector as well 
as the dramatic changes to the industrial framework.  Further, the “creative abrasion” 
(Leonard and Sensiper 1998: 118) generated by this heterogeneous group is the likely 
source of the radical innovation and flexibility necessary for the NTEU to adapt to the 
demands of a very turbulent environment.   
 
As O'Brien has observed the formation of the NTEU involved the amalgamation of disparate 
organisations with attachments to a variety of decision making processes and structural 
forms (O'Brien 1999: 83).  However, building on O'Brien's observations these residual 
processes and structures must serve a purpose in order to survive in the new environment; 
there had to be something for these different layers to do in order to maintain their 
relevance.  The hybrid nature of industrial relations at the time of the NTEU’s formation 
ensured the relevance of leadership at both the national and branch level.  The National 
leadership and industrial team stamped their authority on the NTEU in steering the 
organisation at a national level through very turbulent times for the sector and in industrial 
relations.  Key players, Grahame McCulloch, Ted Murphy and Ken McAlpine (among others) 
came to prominence in this period.  With the introduction of enterprise bargaining, the new 
regulatory environment favoured branch negotiations which entrenched the power of local 
leaders.  The enduring importance of the National secretariat, national executive and 
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national industrial officers can be attributed to the new role the national office took on in 
co-ordinating and monitoring and the activities in the branches during enterprise bargaining 
to ensure the implementation of national NTEU policy as ratified each year by the supreme 
governing body of the NTEU, National Council (established in 1994).  The Divisions 
meanwhile took on primarily an administrative role at the state level.  In later rounds they 
went on to become important knowledge sharing hubs for elected representatives and 
industrial officers. 
 
Another source of innovation was the combination of branch-based “know how” of elected 
officers and the industrial expertise of the National Industrial Unit.  Again, in line with 
Leonard and Sensiper’s observations that the “creative abrasion” caused when a 
heterogeneous group focussed on the one issue generates new ideas (Leonard and Sensiper 
1998: 118) the industrial expertise of the Industrial Unit combined with political expertise 
and tacit understanding of the university sector of elected representatives from branches 
and divisions in the Industrial Matters Committee appears to have been particularly potent.  
Most of the key innovations in the NTEU’s enterprise bargaining strategy came out of the 
Industrial Matters Committee where individuals from different occupational perspectives 
were focused specifically on the industrial issues of award restructuring and the 
introduction of enterprise bargaining.  
  
Conclusion 
This chapter has used the archived minutes and memos of the NTEU to analyse its formative 
years and its first exposure to the enterprise bargaining framework.  The NTEU was a child 
of the Dawkins revolution.  The first major challenge for the NTEU was learning to work 
together as the amalgamation of a range of unions and associations brought with it 
individuals and groups with a range of ideologies and traditions.  Attempts to forge new 
relationships whilst steering a national campaign to defeat amendments to the Second Tier 
award placed the newly formed National Executive under considerable pressure.  This 
situation was both a source of conflict but equally a source of innovation as the combination 
of approaches focussed on the issue at hand generated new approaches.  Whilst the newly 
formed NTEU may have been divided on many tactical issues, the shared conviction among 
key players that the best way to defend academic and general staff wages and conditions 
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was through a national award system greatly enhanced the national unity of the NTEU.  
These early years also saw the formation of the National Industrial Unit, which was the 
engine room for the industrial advice needed by the national organisation to cope with the 
dramatic changes to the industrial legislation.  Also to emerge out of the National Industrial 
Unit at this time was an efficient system for codifying and disseminating industrial advice 
throughout the organisation.  Finally, the unusual structure of the NTEU that emerged from 
amalgamation generated an interesting dynamic where empowered branch presidents 
acted as boundary spanners between the branches and the national leadership.  This dual 
leadership appears to have played an important role in enabling the NTEU to cope with the 
hybrid nature of the industrial relations legislation at the time.   
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Chapter Seven  
The Coalition Government and  
round two of enterprise bargaining 
 
 
On 2 March 1996, John Howard led the Liberal Party in a landslide victory in the federal 
election and formed a coalition with the National Party led by Tim Fischer.  After 13 years of 
Labor government, the Coalition’s victory changed everything for the NTEU.  The Coalition’s 
Workplace Relations Bill fundamentally altered the industrial relations environment whilst a 
5% federal budget cut to higher education was the forerunner for dramatic changes to the 
political economy of the sector.  Attempts to implement the provisions of round one of 
enterprise bargaining, specifically the NTEU’s wages strategy, were severely compromised 
by the Coalition victory.  The NTEU found itself fighting on three different fronts: attempting 
to implement its wages strategy, building a campaign to defend public funding to the sector 
and combating the Workplace Relations Act.  These three issues were entwined and 
underpin the NTEU’s strategic decision making for round two of enterprise bargaining.   
 
This chapter aims to identify the major innovations for round two and their origins as well as 
conducting an assessment of the extent to which the lessons learned during the NTEU’s 
formation and round one of enterprise bargaining affected the NTEU’s decision-making 
processes.  Using the archived minutes and memos of the national office of the NTEU from 
the end of 1995 up to National Council 1996, this chapter picks up where the previous 
chapter left off and once again aims to trace the origins of the explicit, implicit and 
emergent strategies adopted and to identify key individuals and communities of practice 
engaged in this process to analyse how the NTEU navigated another turbulent period in its 
history.  The first half of this chapter charts chronologically the NTEU’s response to the 
Coalition government which underpinned policy making for round two of enterprise 
bargaining.  The second half of this chapter enlists the observations of the trade union 
strategy and knowledge management literature to analyse the strategic decision making 
process and the individuals involved in the formulation of enterprise bargaining strategy for 
round two. 
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 From round one to round two 
Much of 1995 was spent negotiating with the federal government in an attempt to 
implement the NTEU’s wages strategy.  As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
introduction of enterprise bargaining to higher education was achieved in instalments.  The 
first round of enterprise bargaining was a hybrid system with wages fixed by national 
negotiations directly with the federal government.  In line with its belief that wages were 
the responsibility of the Commonwealth government, the NTEU determined that it would 
campaign for an 8% national wage increase in 1995 (and a further 7% in 1996 for a total of 
15%) via the federal government and would pursue just 2% wage rises at the institution 
level.  However, once again the NTEU was swimming against the tide.  Whilst the 2% 
component was easily negotiated via enterprise bargaining, negotiations with the federal 
government for the 15% component hit a road block.   
 
The NTEU’s difficulties were threefold: the continued aggression of the AHEIA, the 
commonwealth government’s refusal to fully index the wage rises and co-ordination 
difficulties with the five other unions (mostly general staff unions) which shared coverage of 
university staff (NTEU NE Minutes 17&18 November, 1995).   These difficulties were 
compounded by the pending federal elections (NTEU NE minutes 17&18 November, 1995).  
In an attempt to end the fractious disputes among the unions, the ACTU convened a “Higher 
Education Round Table” involving the AMWU, CPSU and NTEU regarding the appropriate 
wage indexation for the sector.  The ACTU weakened the NTEU’s claim and settled on a 
figure of 8%.  The National Executive of the NTEU reluctantly agreed to the 8% figure to be 
fully funded by the Commonwealth but resolved to pursue the outstanding 7% rise through 
an industrial campaign to commence mid-1996 (NTEU NE Minutes 17&18 November, 1995).  
However, following negotiations with the ACTU, the Minister for Employment, Education 
and Training, Simon Crean, made a final offer of just 5.6%.  The NTEU once again reluctantly 
agreed but shortly after withdrew support when it transpired that the 5.6% would not be 
indexed by the federal government but financed by way of a loan to the institutions (NTEU 
Industrial Matters Committee Minutes 12/13 March, 1996).   
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Meanwhile, characteristically the National Industrial Unit used its established strategy of 
scouring for legal or industrial loopholes to find a way to win the NTEU wages strategy via a 
uniform national award in the Commission.  The prospects for this strategy were becoming 
flimsy.  A National Industrial Unit briefing paper explored the possibility of seeking an award 
variation as a “special case” to lock the government into the wages negotiation process 
(O'Sullivan 26-27 April, 1996).  Under a fairly obscure provision of the Third Safety Net 
Adjustment and Section 150A Review, October 1995 (or the “October decision”): “2.1 (b) (ii) 
Where the parties remain in disagreement and the Commission considers there is no 
prospect of agreement being reached” the matter may be referred to the President who 
may then take it to the full bench of the Commission for consideration as a special case 
(O'Sullivan 26-27 April, 1996).  However, even if the NTEU got that far and managed (against 
hope) to get a positive outcome only the NTEU and the universities as parties to the award 
would be bound by the Commission’s decision (O'Sullivan 26-27 April, 1996).  The 
Commonwealth government would not be compelled to provide increased funding even if it 
was drawn into the dispute (O'Sullivan 26-27 April, 1996).  The National Industrial Unit 
briefing paper finished by indicating that it would pursue the “special case” strategy and two 
other options: an “award variation to give effect to an Enterprise Agreement” (where a 
successful enterprise bargaining outcome at one institution could be written into an award 
and therefore generalised to the sector as a whole) and a “multi-employer enterprise 
agreement” (where the sector as a whole or significant parts of it sign up to the one 
enterprise agreement) (O'Sullivan 26-27 April, 1996).  In the July meeting of the IMC the 
“special case” strategy was abandoned (NTEU Industrial Matters Committee Minutes 29/30 
July 1996) however the “award variation” and “multi-employer enterprise agreement” 
strategies survived and were part of an important debate at National Council around 
enterprise bargaining strategy and the implications of the Coalition’s Workplace Relations 
Act which will be picked up later in this chapter.   
 
In short, by the time the Coalition government won office, the NTEU had successfully 
implemented its round one strategy for securing employment conditions for the sector but 
the wages component of the strategy had stalled.  In line with the hybrid nature of the 
legislation at the time, employment conditions had been negotiated during round one of 
enterprise bargaining and were also supported by comprehensive award conditions at the 
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federal level.  Whilst enterprise agreements overrode award conditions, where the 
agreement was silent on an issue, the award prevailed.  The NTEU was still securing 
significant gains at the award level in this way.  However, the battle to secure a federal 
government funded wage rise for the sector set the scene for the NTEU’s first major battle 
with the Coalition government. 
 
The Coalition government 
The election of the Coalition government forced the NTEU to regroup for the formulation of 
a new strategy.  How did the NTEU adapt to this new terrain?  The Industrial Matters 
Committee (IMC) met less than a fortnight after the Coalition’s victory and recommended to 
National Executive immediate negotiations with the new minister for Employment, 
Education Training and Youth Affairs, Senator Amanda Vanstone, and that an industrial 
campaign be scheduled if and when the NTEU’s wages demands were not met (NTEU 
Industrial Matters Committee Minutes 12/13 March, 1996).  Following discussion with 
Minister Vanstone, it became clear to the NTEU that the federal government planned to 
renege on its pre-election promise to provide supplementation for wage rises in the sector 
(McCulloch 18 April 1996).  In response, the IMC recommended a national industrial 
campaign.  This proposal was discussed at a National Executive teleconference on 26 March 
1996.  
 
The National executive teleconference on 26 March 1996 made significant amendments to 
the IMC’s recommendations.  The original recommendation from the IMC (supported by the 
National Secretariat) was for a week of strike action in the last week of May involving ‘rolling 
48 hour stoppages’ (NTEU Industrial Memo No 1 26 March 1996).  However, an email 
correspondence (dated 22 March 1996) from Mike Donaldson (NSW Division Secretary) and 
Ros Bohringer (NSW Division representative and Sydney University branch committee 
member) to the National Executive argued against this proposal.  Feeding information 
directly from the branch-based stop work meetings, the NSW Division email reported that 
while the branches strongly reinforced the 15% wage demand there was not yet significant 
support for strike action (email to NTEU NE teleconf Minutes 26 March 1996).  The email 
argued that the IMC’s recommended rolling 48 hour strike “was too extreme and would be 
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voted down by a majority of branches around the country” and that the NTEU needed to 
build the branches’ confidence towards action with a slow escalation from milder bans and 
stop works towards full scale industrial action (email to NTEU NE teleconf Minutes 26 March 
1996).  This opinion was apparently shared by other participants on the NTEU National 
Executive as reference to a 48 hour strike was removed from the final motion.  The NSW 
Division email also recommended a national strategy that was flexible enough to allow 
branches “that want to go far to do it while encouraging every branch to join in to the limit 
of their capacities” (email to NTEU NE teleconf Minutes 26 March 1996).  In essence the 
email argued that whilst the National Executive should be empowered to give broad 
strategic direction at the national level, decision making on the intricacies of how this would 
be enacted must be left to leaders at the Branch and Division level.  It is likely that the NSW 
Division email once again reflected the opinions of other National Executive participants as 
the wording of the final motion “in light of feedback from Divisions and Branches since the 
IMC meeting” authorised the “immediate imposition of selective bans where desired by 
individual Branches and Divisions subject to approval by the National Officers” (NTEU 
Industrial Memo No 2 26 March 1996).   
 
The NTEU’s campaign strategy involved reaching out to the broader higher education 
community to bolster support for its wages claim.  Had the NTEU attempted to build a 
campaign with the limited demand of higher wages, in a sector already enjoying relatively 
high wages to other industries, they would be easily isolated.  The NSW Division email 
argued for a two-pronged approach: industrial action to be accompanied by a “love our 
sector” campaign urging “alliance and coalition building in the sector (AVCC, students, other 
union, alumni) aimed at influencing public opinion by generating publicity (news, paid ads, 
radio interviews)” in defence of higher education as a whole (email to NTEU NE teleconf 
Minutes 26 March 1996).  This recommendation was also adopted and the NTEU initiated 
the Education Alliance which was the umbrella organisation for the broader campaign, 
uniting the NTEU, Australian Vice-Chancellor’s Committee (AVCC), Council of Australian 
Postgraduates Association (CAPA), National Union of Students, the University Alumni and 
smaller professional academic associations into a common cause to defend the higher 
education sector from the Coalition’s policies (NTEU NE Minutes 7 June 1996).  The NTEU’s 
“Pay Up Now” wages campaign involved an “open letter to the Community” which 
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positioned the NTEU’s wages claim within the broader demand for greater commonwealth 
government funding for higher education (NTEU flyer 16 May, 1996). 
 
As part of its alliance building, the NTEU also drafted a “bilateral agreement with the AVCC” 
(NTEU NE Minutes 7 June 1996).  This strategy involved forming a pact with the AVCC in a 
co-ordinated approach to the federal government’s forthcoming budget announcement 
(McCulloch 18 April 1996).  The agreement, “Towards a Statement of Common AVCC/NTEU 
Goals and Work for 1996 and into 1997” acknowledged areas where the NTEU and the AVCC 
had common interests (NTEU NE Minutes 7 June 1996).  It committed the NTEU and AVCC to 
support for an alliance of students, academics, unions and other bodies, and where 
appropriate to work together to influence the government and public opinion (NTEU NE 
Minutes 7 June 1996).    The delicate negotiations involved in maintaining support from the 
AVCC was also written into the National Executive’s final motion for the May week of 
industrial action.  Conscious of the political sensitivities among Vice Chancellors and 
government officials developed during its lobbying campaign, the National Secretariat made 
its own amendments to the initial IMC recommendation regarding the need for selective 
use of bans within the context of the broader NTEU strategy,  
 
“the selective and limited use of immediate bans can assist in strengthening NTEU’s 
negotiating position with DETYA, the Minister and the AVCC but it is noted that ... 
wholesale or widespread bans at this stage would undermine NTEU’s capacity to 
gain AVCC support as well as impeding progress in establishing a negotiating 
framework with the new Government”    
(NTEU Industrial Memo No 1 26 March 1996).   
In summary, the final agreed strategy for the NTEU May campaign involved building a broad 
consensus of support via the Education Alliance and a bilateral agreement with the AVCC as 
well as a week of industrial action with the details to be determined at the branch level but 
may involve strikes and bans.  However, all branch based bans were to be ratified by the 
National Secretariat to ensure that they strengthened rather than undermined national 
negotiations with the Minister, DEETYA and the AVCC (NTEU Industrial Memo No 2 26 
March 1996).  
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 The strategy in action 
Coming out of the various meetings and mobilizations around the country the NTEU settled 
on a 24 hour strike day on 30 May.  Compliance for the strike day was over 90% and 
industrial action during the week included bans on teaching and on the preparation and 
submission of exam results and bans on international student applications (NTEU National 
Council papers 3-5 October, 1996).  As per the recommendation of NSW Division in March, 
industrial action was conducted on the basis of capacity with weaker branches limiting their 
activity to united action with the stronger branches.  The NTEU also reported significant 
increases in membership during the campaign that indicates support from their immediate 
constituency was high.  The Education Alliance issued a joint press release and conducted a 
media conference on 28 May (NTEU NE Minutes 7 June 1996) to build support for the 30 
May strike day and National Day of Action.   The campaign was also supported by most Vice 
Chancellors and in Queensland, Vice Chancellors spoke at the lunchtime rallies (NTEU 
National Council papers 3-5 October, 1996).  There were high turnouts of staff and students 
for the protest rallies around the country (totalling over 35,000 participants) and high levels 
of media coverage (NTEU NE Minutes 7 June 1996).  The impact of the Higher Education 
Alliance campaign was also noticeable in public opinion.  An AGB-McNair poll taken after the 
national strike showed that 89% respondents opposed cuts to higher education and 87% 
were against increasing students’ contribution to study (NTEU National Council papers 3-5 
October, 1996).  A Newspoll survey published in the Higher Education supplement of the 
Australian (21 August, 1996) indicated that 67% of people were opposed to the cuts to 
university grants, 52% felt strongly about the level of funding for higher education and 63% 
opposed increases to HECS (The Australian, 21 August 1996).  Only 18% supported cutting 
university funds and 55% of Coalition supporters were opposed to the funding cuts (The 
Australian, 21 August 1996).   
 
Following the May week of action, the NSW NTEU Division put together a written proposal 
to National Executive for a continuation of the high profile campaign including a series of 
recommendations for further meetings, bans and media attracting events (NTEU NE 
Minutes 7 June 1996).   The National Executive resolved to conduct another National Day 
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Action on 7 August including a stop-work rally in all capital cities and the possibility of 24 
hour strikes where there was support in branches and divisions, a community campaign in 
regional campuses and continued work with the Higher Education Alliance (NTEU NE 
Minutes 7 June 1996).    
 
The 7 August National Day of Action rallies were well supported with ongoing co-operation 
with student organisations and continued support from the AVCC which sponsored a half-
page advertisement in The Australian (NTEU National Council papers 3-5 October, 1996).  
However, bans and strikes were sparse, concentrated in key institutions in NSW, the ACT 
and Brisbane (NTEU National Council papers 3-5 October, 1996) and reports from all 
divisions at the IMC just prior to the action indicated that the campaign was starting to wind 
down (NTEU Industrial Matters Committee Minutes 29/30 July 1996).  Then on 9 August 
1996, Amanda Vanstone announced that government funding to universities would be cut 
by 5% over three years (1997-99) (NTEU briefing paper).  As part of this budget 
announcement, the government made it clear that it would “not be providing across-the-
board supplementation for salary increases” although it would consider proposals “for one-
off reform packages for individual institutions where major workplace practice 
breakthroughs at the enterprise level can be secured” (briefing paper tabled NTEU NE 
Minutes 23-24 August, 1996).  That is, the federal government would assist universities to 
meet the cost of redundancies (Wells, Higher Education Supplement The Australian).  The 
wages component of the federal government’s indexation was 1.3% for 1996 and 1997 a 
major shortfall on the NTEU’s hoped-for 15% (briefing paper tabled NTEU NE Minutes 23-24 
August, 1996).  There was no further avenue for pursuing a centralised wage increase.  The 
NTEU wages strategy had been destroyed.  Meanwhile, many institutions were reaching the 
expiry date for their “round one” enterprise agreements and pressure was mounting to 
commence the next round of bargaining (Industrial Report to the NE 23/24 August 1996).  
The future for the NTEU lay in securing pay rises via enterprise bargaining.   
 
The Workplace Relations Act 
Whilst the sector was tackling the Coalition’s policies on higher education, the introduction 
of the Workplace Relations Act was another factor which directed the NTEU away from the 
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hybrid mix of institution-based agreements supported by comprehensive awards and 
centralised wages towards full enterprise bargaining.  The Workplace Relations Act confined 
awards to “minimum standards in 19 areas where any issues that lay outside of these 19 
areas could only be incorporated into certified agreement or Australian Workplace 
Agreements” (Wells and Ryan).  All “paid rates awards” were therefore to be converted to 
“minimum rates awards” and no further “paid rates awards” would be ratified (Wells and 
Ryan).  The Act also introduced Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs) or individual, 
stand alone, non union agreements which override all other awards and agreements and 
were required to meet a minimum standard which would no longer be determined by the 
AIRC but by the law courts (Wells and Ryan).  Certified Agreements were no longer required 
to meet a “no disadvantage test” against an award and only required to meet the scant 
requirements as per an AWA (Wells and Ryan).   
 
In response to the introduction of the Workplace Relations Act, an emergent group within 
the NTEU, the “Survival Committee”, acted as a catalyst for change.  The NSW Division was 
well ahead of the rest of the organisation in realising the fundamental threat the Workplace 
Relations Act represented to the future of the NTEU.  As the name of the committee implies 
the Survival Committee was formed in the recognition of “the increasingly hostile industrial 
environment” the NTEU was operating in.  The Committee produced a paper which argued 
for urgent action to protect the NTEU (NTEU NSW Division Survival Committee paper 12 
June 1996).  The paper was tabled at the National Executive on 23 and 24 August 1996 
alongside an IMC discussion paper on the same issue.  The difference in tone and content of 
the two documents demonstrates a stark difference in outlook.  For example, the Survival 
Committee paper argued for urgent action to educate members and to build resistance to 
AWAs (NTEU NSW Division Survival Committee paper 12 June 1996).  By comparison, the 
IMC paper wondered if the NTEU should “assist members to negotiate AWAs” and whether 
it should “distinguish between members forced onto AWA’s and those that choose to be 
covered by an individual agreement” and “what fee level should be charged (to staff on 
AWAs)?” (NTEU NE minutes 23 September, 2003).   
 
Whilst the Survival Committee saw that the Workplace Relations Act represented the 
fundamental demise of the award system, the IMC attempted to only slightly modify the 
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National Industrial Unit’s entrenched strategy to preserve a national award system by proxy.  
The IMC’s determination to prevent the breaking up of the national award led to an 
interesting debate regarding one of the Survival Committee’s key recommendations.  The 
Survival Committee argued that conditions listed as “non allowable matters” in all higher 
education awards must be immediately transferred from awards to certified agreements via 
enterprise bargaining (NTEU NSW Division Survival Committee paper 12 June 1996).   
However, the IMC was divided on this recommendation and delegates expressed concern 
about “linking the codification of award conditions with the next round enterprise 
bargaining which will involve wage negotiations” (Industrial Report to the NE 23/24 August 
1996).  The major concern centred around the breakup of the national award; that 
individual institutions would seek to vary the award, or “trade off” award conditions for 
payrises, and therefore undermine the national standard (IMC discussion paper: 
implications of workplace relations bill).  In line with the work coming out of the National 
Industrial Unit, the IMC gutted the Survival Committee document’s recommendation and 
converted it to a list of three options: 
 
• The modification of award clauses to comply with Allowable Award Matters 
requirements 
• Likely success of arguing “incidental” to the award 
• Viability of gaining multi-employer agreements 
(IMC discussion paper: implications of workplace relations bill) 
In retrospect, the IMC’s attempted strategy of resisting the Coalition’s aggressive anti-union 
legislation by modifying awards so that comprehensive award conditions might somehow be 
accepted as “allowable matters” or slipped under the radar as “incidental” to the award 
seem naive today given what is known now about the impacts of the Workplace Relations 
Act.  But the NTEU was navigating its way in unchartered territory and like many 
organisations in a time of high change it reverted back to strategies that had worked well for 
it in the past.  Similarly, the prospect of convincing Vice Chancellors to unite to formulate a 
nationally agreed “multi-employer agreement” at the behest of the NTEU might seem 
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unimaginable given the competitive nature of the sector today.  However, the NTEU at this 
time did have significant support with the AVCC as the “bilateral agreement” and Education 
Alliance around the wages campaign demonstrated.  Also, at this time prospects for co-
operation among Vice Chancellors was much higher as the competitive relationship among 
institutions had not yet developed.  The IMC’s approach therefore had strengths and 
weaknesses.  The strength of the approach was in recognising the direction the Coalition 
was moving in and the corrosive and divisive impacts carving the sector up into enterprises 
would have over time on wages and conditions across the sector.  The weakness of the 
position was that it was “all or nothing”; either the entire suite of award conditions would 
be written uniformly across the sector or not at all.  The Survival Document argued that to 
pursue this line risked having the award stripped back before the NTEU had a chance to 
preserve award provisions via certified enterprise agreements.   
 
As with the NTEU’s relatively late entry to enterprise bargaining, the NTEU had the 
advantage of being able to learn from the experience of other unions with the introduction 
of the Workplace Relations Act.  The Survival Committee’s sense of urgency was based on 
the experience of other unions operating under conservative governments.  The paper 
outlined the experience of unions in New Zealand under the neoconservatives and Jeff 
Kennett in Victoria as examples of the likely tactics the Coalition would adopt, such as the 
tactic of destroying the financial security of unions by stopping voluntary deduction of union 
fees from salaries (NTEU NSW Division Survival Committee paper 12 June 1996).  The dire 
statistics coming from New Zealand were cited as part of the argument for urgent action.  
New Zealand saw drops in union members by 20-70% in just three years and erosion of 
conditions with the replacement of awards with individual contracts (NTEU NSW Division 
Survival Committee paper 12 June 1996).  The paper warned of similar threats to the NTEU 
including: potential membership loss, risk of fragmentation of branches, undermining of 
award wages and conditions, undermining of union in favour of “bargaining agents” and a 
decline in the ability of unions to use the AIRC and right of entry/access for union officials to 
workplaces (NTEU NSW Division Survival Committee paper 12 June 1996).  The Survival 
Committee also had the benefit of learning from successful strategies of other unions and 
recommended defensive action such as civic contracts with employers for the deduction of 
fees and encouraging members to use alternative methods of paying their dues and the 
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development of fighting funds (NTEU NSW Division Survival Committee paper 12 June 
1996).   
 
National Council 1996  
The supreme governing body of the NTEU, National Council, met on 3-5 October, 1996.  It 
was at National Council that the future strategy of the NTEU was debated and adopted.  By 
the time of National Council, three important events had occurred:  the NTEU’s round one 
wages strategy had collapsed, the NTEU had waged a popular though unsuccessful 
campaign to defend commonwealth government funding for the sector and the Workplace 
Relations Act had been introduced.  There were significant differences of opinion among the 
leadership at all levels of the NTEU as to the implication of these three interrelated factors 
particularly as it related to round two of enterprise bargaining.  These differences were 
debated on the floor of Council and the voted outcomes became national policy. 
 
In the debate regarding the implications of the Workplace Relations Act, the NSW Division 
once again took up the battle for its Survival Document recommendations.  This time, the 
document was broken down into individual clauses and was debated clause by clause on the 
floor of National Council.  Paul Whiting and Ken McNab both from Sydney University (in the 
NSW Division) successfully argued for the reinstatement of clauses relating to writing award 
conditions into certified agreements and to insist that the National Office brief branches and 
divisions with advice on pursuing “non allowable matters” as priority claims in certified 
enterprise agreements (NTEU National Council Paper, 1996).  Adrian Ryan’s (NSW Division 
representative) motion is also instructive of the core of the debate: “Council determines 
that action be taken as an urgent priority to ensure that the interests of NTEU members are 
best protected and advanced within the context of the new industrial legislation” (emphasis 
added, NTEU National Council papers 3-5 October, 1996).  The NTEU could no longer afford 
to base its industrial relations policy on outmoded award based arrangements.  Ros 
Bohringer from Sydney University argued for a motion “recognising the importance of a 
reliable and independent method for payment of union fees” which recommended a 
systematic shift of members’ dues to direct debit (NTEU National Council papers 3-5 
October, 1996).  NSW Division’s key recommendations received support by the majority of 
delegates at National Council and therefore became national policy.  
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 In the debate regarding strategy for round two of enterprise bargaining, the NSW Division 
directed the National Executive to move quickly to nominate 10-12 potential leading sites to 
be selected based on a series of criteria: strategic position within the sector, union density 
and capacity and willingness of its membership to take significant industrial action in pursuit 
of the claim, wealthier institutions with the easier capacity to afford the claim and ability to 
open bargaining period early (NTEU National Council papers 3-5 October, 1996).  The second 
motion urged that those leading sites open negotiations immediately and to initiate action 
in pursuit of the claim and that fighting fund money be available to support these leading 
sites (NTEU National Council papers 3-5 October, 1996).  Further that at the beginning of 
November National Executive was to “identify the four best sites” and to immediately 
initiate an industrial campaign at these sites (NTEU National Council papers 3-5 October, 
1996).  These motions were also supported by a majority at Council and became national 
policy.   
 
The agreed strategy for round two therefore was to send the leading sites into battle to get 
whatever they could as quickly as they could and that these outcomes would form the basis 
for bargaining negotiations at the remaining sites.  The pressure was now on branch 
leaderships, and particularly those in the designated leading sites, to attempt to recoup the 
wages lost from the failed round one wages strategy as well as to attempt to secure a new 
round of wage rises at the branch level through enterprise  bargaining.  Further, with the 
demise of the award system, branches had the additional challenge of attempting to scoop 
up all remaining award conditions and write them into enterprise agreements.  Full 
enterprise bargaining under the Coalition government was new terrain for the NTEU.  What 
strategies did the NTEU adopt to secure wages and conditions in the sector and resist the 
fracturing impacts of enterprise bargaining?  This issue will be picked up in the following 
chapter which will chart the implementation of the leading sites strategy for round two.  But 
first the discussion so far in this chapter will be revisited to analyse the learning process the 
NTEU underwent to cope with the Coalition government and to formulate enterprise 
bargaining strategy for round two.  The remainder of this chapter draws on the observations 
of the trade union strategy and knowledge management literature to analyse this learning 
process. 
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 Summary 
The rest of this chapter returns to the discussion so far to analyse the learning process the 
NTEU underwent during the period from the end of 1995 up to National Council 1996.  This 
chapter will first look at the strategies the NTEU adopted to mobilize support for its 
campaign against the Coalition government.  The chapter will then move to discuss the 
strategic decision making for round two of enterprise bargaining.  Strategic decision making 
for round two involved drawing on the lessons learned from its experience in round one.  
However, it also involved “unlearning” some aspects of its approach and to adopt new 
strategies to cope with the dramatic changes introduced by the Coalition government.  This 
discussion will analyse how the NTEU coped with abandoning practices of the past to allow 
for new approaches.  It will also identify the sources of innovation for the NTEU at this time 
that enabled it to adapt and finally how information and “know how” were transmitted in 
the NTEU.  This discussion will draw on the observations of both trade union strategy and 
knowledge management literature to guide this investigation.   
 
NTEU strategies for mobilising support 
To understand the events in the build up to the political and industrial action led by the 
NTEU in the last week of May 1996, it is helpful to return to the trade union strategy 
discussion in chapter two.  Murray and Levesque’s “power resources” model described the 
relationship between “internal solidarity”, “external solidarity” and the development of a 
“proactive agenda” that has the support of both the (internal) membership and (external) 
supporters and broader community (Levesque and Murray 2002: 46; Fairbrother, Williams 
et al. 2007: 35).  Building on this model, Pocock referred to “mobilizing and organizing 
power” which included the capacity of a union to mobilize its membership in pursuit of its 
goals (2000: 20).  The discussion in chapter two concluded with the observation that 
effective lines of communication among the various layers of the union is essential for 
effective union strategy as it enables access to the knowledge needed to respond to the 
specific conditions of the external environment as well as facilitating the development of an 
autonomous agenda that has the democratic legitimacy necessary to inspire members and 
supporters into action.  In analysing the events leading up to the May industrial action  there 
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is evidence of the role that clear lines of communication and democracy in decision making 
(and the exchange of “know how” involved in this process) played in developing the NTEU’s 
campaign strategy.   
 
In contrast to the tightly controlled, highly centralised process of negotiation in round one 
of enterprise bargaining, the NTEU was forced to adopt a more flexible approach.  The 
NTEU’s campaign strategy although relying on national co-ordination also required much 
greater input from the membership and local leaders and therefore the flexibility for 
independent strategy making at the branch and division level.  At the national level, the May 
industrial action is a good example of the role of branch and division representatives played 
as boundary spanners in the formulation of effective national strategy.  The email 
correspondence (dated 22 March 1996) from Mike Donaldson (NSW Division Secretary) and 
Ros Bohringer (NSW Division representative and Sydney University branch committee 
member) to the National Executive is an interesting artefact of the kind of tacit information 
that was provided to National Executive via its elected representatives and the impact it had 
on policy formulation.  As Hoe pointed out in the discussion of knowledge management 
literature, “boundary spanners” operate as  receptors for conditions in the external world 
(2006: 9).  Bohringer and Donaldson’s email reported directly from branch-based stop work 
meetings in the NSW Division they reflected both the “mood” of the membership as well as 
their perceived willingness to engage in industrial action.  This information was vital to 
prevent the national office pursuing its “rolling 48 hour stoppages” without the requisite 
support among the membership.  The final motion argued for a flexible approach which 
enabled branches to determine the level of action they would engage in.  Therefore, two 
things were happening in this National Executive exchange: the first is that information was 
being fed directly from the branches and divisions to the National Executive and impacting 
on its strategic direction and secondly that power of decision making on industrial action 
was being shifted away from the National Office down to branches and divisions and in turn 
the membership themselves via mass meetings at the branch level.  Members therefore, 
whilst experiencing only indirect input in the national strategy via their elected 
representatives, were given a direct say in the level of industrial action they were willing to 
take within those parameters.  
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The high levels of support for the week of action in May shows how the input from branch 
and division participants on the National Executive enabled the NTEU’s nationally co-
ordinated campaign to connect with the NTEU membership and supporters as well as the 
broader community.  From an internal solidarity perspective, there is evidence that the tacit 
understanding of the “mood” and “timing” for the strike being fed from the Division and 
Branch representatives to the National Executive had been accurate.  Further that the policy 
of enabling members in branches and divisions to determine their own level of action had 
been effective.  Allowing members to have direct involvement in decision making at the 
branch level about the form and timing of their industrial action appears to have garnered 
the democratic legitimacy required to secure significant support for the campaign.  In the 
end, an emergent strategy arose from the debates at the branch and division level settling 
on a national 24 hour strike on 30 May.  From an external solidarity perspective, the 
Education Alliance increased the viability of the campaign by connecting with the broader 
community.  It is notable that this “love our sector” approach also came from 
recommendations of branch and division representatives.  This public sentiment built up via 
the Education Alliance was a powerful resource for the NTEU to draw on lending credibility 
to its claims. 
 
The May industrial action also involved mobilising another form of “know how” via the 
National Research Unit.  The National Research Unit which had been in place since the 
formation of the NTEU, for the first time played a direct role in the NTEU’s industrial 
campaign activities.  Like the National Industrial Unit, the National Research Unit, was a 
small unit with focused expertise.  It was responsible for dissecting government policy and 
compiling detailed reports on their impacts on issues such as: student staff ratios, student 
demographics, academic tenure and research funding.  The NTEU strategy of forming an 
alliance with the broader tertiary education community required a detailed analysis which 
combined  the federal budget cuts  impacts on wages and conditions with the broader 
concern for the its impacts on the sector as a whole.  This analysis was provided by the 
National Research Unit.  In the lead up to the May action the unit developed a “Background 
Information” booklet and other educational campaign materials for members.  They also 
wrote regular NTEU opinion pieces for The Australian Higher Education supplement.  The 
National Research Unit’s research also informed the Secretariat’s negotiations with the 
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AVCC, DEETYA and the Minister during the campaign.   
 
Strategic decision making for round two of enterprise bargaining 
The rest of this chapter is devoted to a discussion about strategic decision making for round 
two of enterprise bargaining.  An analysis of round two of enterprise bargaining is of course 
complicated by the fact that round one came before it.  This discussion will therefore 
require an investigation of the extent to which lessons learned from round one impacted on 
the strategic decision making for round two.  The NTEU’s enterprise bargaining strategy for 
round two included tactics from the first round as well as new innovations.  As with round 
one, the desire to maintain a national standard was central to the strategy.  National Council 
1996 therefore entrenched the protocols developed out of the 1994 planning conference 
and the 1995 National Council: all Agreements must meet a minimum standard on salary, 
conditions of employment, protection of award conditions and duration of the Agreement 
and be in line with NTEU policy (determined by National Council) to the satisfaction of the 
National Executive (NTEU National Council papers 3-5 October, 1996).  As with the first 
round, the NTEU strategy attempted to maintain national unity by lining up the expiration 
dates (December 1998) so that the whole sector would commence the third round of 
enterprise bargaining at the same time (NTEU National Council papers 3-5 October, 1996).   
 
However, alongside these already established strategies there were two key innovations in 
the NTEU’s enterprise bargaining strategy for round two.  Firstly, the implementation of a 
full enterprise bargaining model which included negotiating wages at the enterprise level 
and the rolling over of all current award conditions into certified agreements and secondly 
the abandonment of the highly co-ordinated approach where each branch released 
nationally crafted “model clauses” and advanced through the negotiation in a synchronised 
fashion in favour of the leading sites strategy.  In both cases, the NSW Division played a 
leading role in developing the new approaches as well as influencing the rest of the 
organisation to adopt them.  In comparison, the NTEU National Secretariat, IMC and 
National Executive were slow to relinquish the old strategy and to adapt to the new, harsher 
industrial relations environment and actively resisted the NSW Divisions recommendations.  
Consequently there was a shift from the IMC as the key site of innovation to the NSW 
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Division office.  Why was the national leadership slow to adopt the new approach?  Why 
was the NSW Division ahead of the rest of the organisation?  Each question will be 
addressed in turn. 
 
How might the relative conservatism of the national leadership of the NTEU be explained?  
At the heart of the issue were two opposing responses to the decentralising pressures of the 
new industrial relations environment.  The first response, embodied by the national 
leadership was to maintain national unity.  National unity was vital to maintain parity in 
wages and conditions across the sector and indeed necessary to hold the still fledgling NTEU 
together.  This lesson had become entrenched in the NTEU national leadership coming out 
of its strategic approach to the first round of enterprise bargaining.  However, the second 
response, was the recognition of the need to decentralise in order to adequately adapt to 
the new industrial relations environment, namely the need to empower leaders at the 
branch level to secure vulnerable award wages and conditions via enterprise bargaining.  
This second response was embodied in the individuals around the branches and divisions 
and particularly the NSW Division.   
 
The pressure to maintain national unity in the face of the decentralising impacts of 
enterprise bargaining was the major reason for the national leadership’s reluctance to 
accept the new strategies.  The tension between an old effective strategy and a leap of faith 
towards a strategy which required the relinquishing of control to a patchwork of fledgling 
branch leaderships across the country underpins the reluctance of the national office to let 
go.  Further, the pressure to decentralise was coming overwhelmingly from Sydney 
University, one of the strongest NTEU branches at one of the wealthiest institutions in the 
sector.  Allowing Sydney University to push forward alone (and likely win) risked breaking 
national unity with Sydney University NTEU members pushing too far ahead of the rest of 
the pack.   
 
The position to maintain national unity and therefore to hold onto processes in the past was 
embodied among influential players on the national leadership in the IMC.  Whilst there was 
no change to the involvement of the National Industrial Unit between 1994 and 1996, in 
comparison to its innovative role in round one there is some evidence of path dependency 
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in the National Industrial Unit.  Of the five members of the National Industrial Unit in 1996, 
four had been in the unit during round one.  In round one, the National Industrial Unit’s 
capacity to wage a convincing defence of the award system was a source of innovation, 
however, in the new industrial relations environment this same talent made it resistant to 
new approaches.  In response to the apparent failure of the wages strategy and even the 
introduction of the Workplace Relations Act, the Industrial Unit continued along its 
established approach of scouring for legal loopholes in the new regulations to preserve the 
old award system: higher education as a “special case” to the award, attempts to modify the 
award to slip it under the “Allowable Award Matters” requirements, “incidental to the 
award” provisions” and “multi-employer agreements”.  The Industrial Unit in round two was 
a strong intellectual link to the past acting to give weight to the National Executive and 
IMC’s resistance to change.   
 
The second question is: why was the NSW Division relatively ahead of the rest of the 
organisation?  In comparison to the national office, the NSW Division and a small group 
around Sydney University was the site of innovation and acted as the catalyst for change 
within the NTEU.  One explanation is the NSW Division’s relatively weak ties to the national 
office.  Of the eight elected representatives on NSW Division Executive in 1996, three had 
been on the original National Executive: Adrian Ryan, Ros Bohringer and Mike Donaldson 
and none had been members of the original IMC.  In 1996, the same three original National 
Executive members were the link between the NSW Division and the national office:  Adrian 
Ryan was on both the IMC and National Executive and Ros Bohringer and Mike Donaldson 
were both on the National Executive.  Another part of the explanation may be the Division’s 
strong links to conditions in the branches and therefore the internal and external NTEU 
community and environment.  This is especially true regarding the strongest branch in the 
Division, Sydney University.  The network around the NSW Division shows significant ties 
between those who played a leading role in driving change and Sydney University.  Of the 
five NSW Division Executive members who attended National Council, four had significant 
ties to Sydney University.  
 
Another example of the NSW Division’s impact on the strategic direction of the NTEU was 
the Survival Committee.  The Survival Committee Discussion paper developed by an ad hoc 
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Survival Committee was readily adopted by the NSW Division.  The Survival Committee and 
its advocates in the NSW Division then acted as a ginger group within the NTEU pushing by 
any mechanism available to alert the national organisation of the dangers and to provoke it 
into defensive action.  The document went via NSW Division Representative and two 
Industrial Officers first went to the IMC where it received minimal support.  The document 
then went directly to the National Executive via the NSW Division representatives to 
National Executive where it experienced a similar fate.  National Executive drafted a very 
different motion to be taken to National Council which included only some of the Survival 
Committee’s recommendations in a diluted form.  Undeterred, the NSW Division tabled the 
Survival Committee document once again at National Council.  At National Council the 
Division used the document to lobby delegates.  The NSW Division representative broke the 
document’s recommendations down into individual clauses from the floor of Council argued 
clause by clause until each of the recommendations were finally adopted as national policy. 
 
Why did the Survival Document receive a more positive reception at National Council 
compared to the Industrial Matters Committee and National Executive?  There are several 
possible explanations.  Firstly, once again is the issue of path dependency and “group think”; 
the leading members of the National Executive and IMC had been intensely engaged in 
strategy making under the Labor government and there was a lag in their collective ability to 
break out of their habitual approach to industrial relations.  Further, that this old guard 
were also more aware of the enormous risks involved in adopting the new approach.  By 
comparison, participants at National Council had a range of experiences at Branch and 
Division level and many Councillors would have been new to the NTEU’s processes and 
therefore had lower levels of attachment to past strategies.  Secondly, the closer 
relationship of ordinary Councillors to the membership and broader higher education 
community may have heightened their responsiveness to the external environment.  
Thirdly, it may be a question of timing.  By the time of National Council, the full impact of 
Vanstone’s intransigence on the budget coupled with Peter Reith’s aggressive pursuit of the 
Workplace Relations Act operated as a shock breaking the organisation with the past and 
alerting delegates to the need for a new approach.  In chapter ten of this thesis, this period 
will be revisited to conduct a network analysis of the challenges the NTEU faced in adapting 
to dramatic changes in the external environment. 
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 How were new ideas generated?  
New ideas in the NTEU were overwhelmingly reactive to the pressures of the external 
environment; they were driven by the need to adapt to the Coalition government’s budget 
cuts to the sector and aggressive industrial relations legislation.  Therefore, those who had 
the least ties to the past and the closest ties to the external environment appear to have 
been the major sources of innovation in the NTEU in 1996: the NSW Division with close ties 
to Sydney University.  Those who were most receptive to innovation were those who also 
had a limited attachment to the past and likely greater appreciation of the external 
environment: ordinary delegates at National Council.  In round one, National Council 
actually met after the enterprise bargaining strategy had been formulated.  By comparison, 
National Council 1996 was the site where strategic decisions were made.  Whilst it was not 
the site of major innovation, incremental adjustments resulting from the discussion on the 
floor of Council were also written into national policy.  In understanding how innovation 
occurs it is important to acknowledge the resistance encountered and the underlying 
reasons for this resistance.  Some elements of past strategies had to be retained and others 
had to be unlearned for the organisation to move forward causing a tension between 
various layers of the NTEU.    
 
Another important source of new ideas came from outside of the organisation.  The Survival 
Committee borrowed from the experience of other trade unions and from academic sources 
which documented the impact of neo-conservative politics.  Returning to the analysis of 
social network theory in chapter four, this might be an example of what Granoveter calls the 
“strength of weak ties” (1974: 54 quoted in Scott 200: 35).  One “weak tie” is Suzanne 
Jamieson who was a member of the NSW Division Executive and the “Survival Committee” 
but did not have a role on the national leadership nor attended National Council.  An 
academic in the field of Industrial Relations and specialising in Industrial Law, Jamieson was 
the likely source of much of the Survival Committee’s analysis.  The NTEU’s leading sites 
strategy was another strategy that was learned from the broader trade union community.  
The leading sites strategy emulated the “hot shops” strategy adopted by the union 
movement under the old award system.  Under the old arbitral-based system, unions such 
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as those in the metal-working, construction and maritime industries (among others) would 
concentrate their efforts on industrially militant and strategically well-placed sites (Peetz, 
Pocock et al. 2007: 152).  Victories at these sites could then be generalized across the sector 
via the award system and the strong arbitral power of industrial relations tribunals (Peetz, 
Pocock et al. 2007: 152).  As with round one, the leading sites strategy relied on the internal 
processes of the NTEU to essentially substitute itself for the once powerful AIRC to both 
generalize victories and to maintain a national benchmark despite the fracturing of both the 
sector and the industrial relations legislation. 
 
How was knowledge transmitted? 
As with round one, there were two distinct though linked processes for the transmission of 
knowledge throughout the organisation.  The first process was via the embodied “know 
how” of individuals engaged in the formulation of strategy and the second process is via 
codification.  In round one, this process was highly centralised on the IMC and National 
Executive, however, as shown in round two strategic decision-making was much more 
dispersed, occurring on the IMC and National Executive but also at the Division level and at 
National Council involving a wide layer of the membership.   
 
The shift in negotiations from the national centre to divisions and increasingly to branch 
leaderships demanded an increase in the skills and understanding of new layers of leaders in 
the union.  An important element to National Council was its combination of policy 
development with education.  A series of workshops covered: the NTEU wages strategy, the 
Industrial Relations Act and Market Education (NTEU National Council papers 3-5 October, 
1996).  Delegates were in no way cushioned from the complexity of the political and 
industrial situation.  For example, participants in the Wages Strategy Workshop were given a 
briefing paper prepared by the National Industrial Unit which summarised the wages 
campaign, and put the National Executive Wages Strategy for discussion (NTEU National 
Council papers 3-5 October, 1996).  Focus questions for this workshop were the same as 
those discussed at the Industrial Matters Committee and National Executive and 
participants were encouraged to openly debate them out (NTEU National Council papers 3-5 
October, 1996).  Delegates therefore got the benefit of formal training and debate in small 
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workshops and then reinforced by more exciting, larger scale debate on the floor of Council.   
 
Codification 
The codification process for round two built on the processes from round one.  As with 
round one, the National Industrial Unit produced Industrial Reports which went to both the 
IMC and the National Executive and also produced Industrial Memos which went to all 
elected officials and industrial staff throughout the organisation.  Again, in reverse, 
information from the broader organisation, particularly branch and division industrial staff, 
was funnelled through the National Industrial Unit and transmitted to the IMC and National 
Executive.  The greater reliance on branch and Division leaders and members was also 
reflected in the codification process.  An example is the campaign materials produced by the 
National Research Unit to educate members in support of the campaign strategy.  In the 
lead up to the May action a Bulletin went out to all rank and file members and a campaign 
kit was developed and circulated to all leaders in the branches and Divisions.  Another 
example is the codification of the strategic decisions of National Council into the Enterprise 
bargaining kit.  The second Enterprise Bargaining kit 1996/97 was produced by the National 
Industrial Unit.  It built on the first Enterprise Bargaining kit and included sections entitled:  
preparing for Enterprise Bargaining, consultation, industrial action, understanding university 
funding, the bargaining agenda (which included NTEU compulsory claims, options claims 
and responding to employer’s claims).  As per the first round, additional information was 
progressively added to the Kit during the round.  Another interesting addition to the 
codification process is the emergence of a position paper, the Survival Committee 
document, which reflected the opinion of a ginger group within the NTEU.  The Survival 
Committee document appears to have started out as a discussion paper.  However, as it 
encountered successive rounds of opposition at the national level, the role of the document 
changed from one of discussion to a manifesto to organise around.  As it was clear that the 
whole document was too much for National Council to digest at once, the NSW Division 
broke the document down into motions addressing each of the key issues which were 
debated on the floor of Council.  The Survival Committee document was a “living” 
document; it combined codification with the embodied “know how” of activists to form a 
scaffold for dialogue between the NSW Division and the rest of the organisation.  
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 Conclusion 
This chapter has used the archived minutes and memos of the national office of the NTEU to 
chart the NTEU’s navigation of the new and turbulent environment brought about by the 
victory of the Coalition government in 1996.  The process of identifying the origins of the 
implicit, explicit and emergent strategies adopted by the NTEU during this period has taken 
this research in unexpected directions.  The assumption that national strategy would 
continue to be generated by the same national bodies, the National Executive, National 
Industrial Unit and the Industrial Matters Committee, as per round one were challenged 
with the introduction of key figures in the NSW Division as major players in the national 
discussion.  An uneven process of adaptation to change is apparent in the NTEU: a tightly 
knit network in the national office formed the framework upon which the older strategies, 
both effective and those growing obsolete, were maintained whilst the break out groups of 
the NSW Division and National Council were where innovations were made and adopted.  
The major drivers of these innovations were the challenges of the external environment.  In 
this environment the membership and leaders, at both the branch and division level, acted 
as receptors for the external environment and were the first to respond.  Through the 
process of democratic discussion and debate, both in the branches and at National Council, 
the impacts of the external environment were ultimately able to shape the strategic 
direction of the NTEU.   
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Chapter Eight  
The leading sites strategy and  
round three of enterprise bargaining 
 
At National Council 1996, the NTEU had been forced to concede that further 
commonwealth funded wage rises was no longer an option under the Coalition government 
and that the only way to secure further wage rises was at the institution level under a full 
enterprise bargaining model.  The NTEU adopted a leading sites strategy which involved 
sending their strongest branches in first to win the best outcome they could as quickly as 
possible to form a high benchmark for negotiations at the remaining sites.  Securing both 
wage rises and conditions at the branch level under the Liberal government’s Workplace 
Relations Act was new terrain for the NTEU and the onus of this effort fell largely to the local 
leaderships at the designated leading sites.  This new environment created two broad 
challenges for the NTEU.  Firstly, was the challenge of creating the NTEU’s strategic capacity 
at the branch level and the secondly was the challenge to maintain national unity and 
cohesion against the decentralising pressure of the full enterprise bargaining model.  The 
lessons learned while addressing these two key challenges in round two of enterprise 
bargaining formed the foundation for the NTEU’s strategic decision making for round three.   
 
This chapter aims to identify the major innovations for round three and their origins.  As 
demonstrated in the two previous chapters, the NTEU’s strategy is cumulative.  Some 
strategies developed from previous rounds and campaigns were maintained while others 
were relinquished at the same time as new ideas were being folded into the mix.  Therefore 
studying round three involves assessing the extent to which the lessons learned during the 
NTEU’s formation and previous rounds of enterprise bargaining affected the NTEU’s 
decision-making processes as well as investigating the formation of new strategies.  Using 
the archived minutes and memos of the national office of the NTEU from the end of 
National Council 1996 up to National Council 1998 which ratified the bargaining strategy for 
round three, this chapter once again aims to trace the origins of the explicit, implicit and 
emergent strategies adopted.  It also aims to identify key individuals and communities of 
practice engaged in this process to analyse how the NTEU navigated another turbulent 
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period in its history.  The first half of this chapter charts chronologically the NTEU’s attempts 
to implement the policy decisions of round two and then the NTEU’s assessment of this 
strategy which underpinned policy making for round three.  The second half of this chapter 
enlists the observations of the trade union strategy and knowledge management literature 
to analyse the strategic decision making process and the individuals involved in the 
formulation of enterprise bargaining strategy for round three. 
 
From round two to round three 
As instructed by National Council 1996 the National Executive moved quickly to implement 
the leading sites strategy.  A National Executive teleconference one week after Council 
selected the NTEU’s leading sites : University of Western Australia, University of South 
Australia, Australian National University, University of Canberra, Southern Cross University, 
Sydney University and Queensland University Technology (NTEU EB Memo 15 October, 
1996; O'Brien 1999: 86).  The meeting also decided that sites would be added or removed 
from this list subject to the progress of their negotiations (NTEU EB Memo 15 October, 
1996).  The University of New South Wales, Griffith and Wollongong Universities were later 
added to the list on this basis (O'Brien 1999: 86).  These sites immediately commenced 
negotiations.  Representatives from the leading sites and divisions met on 31 October 1996 
(NTEU EB Memo 15 October, 1996) to strategise and the Enterprise Bargaining Kit 
1996/1997 was also distributed in late 1996 (NTEU EB Memo 18 November 1996). 
 
The first half of 1997 therefore was devoted to campaigning for enterprise agreements at 
the leading sites.  By late February many of the leading sites and even some non-designated 
leading sites were reportedly close to settlement (NTEU NE minutes 27&28 February, 1997).  
O’Brien has written about the obstacles encountered at the two leading sites in the ACT 
Division: Australian National University and University of Canberra (O'Brien 1999: 87) 
offering a helpful indication of the kinds of pressures encountered at the branch level in this 
new environment.  One major challenge for the NTEU was learning to co-operate with other 
unions, mostly general staff unions, at the branch level.  Whilst the NTEU automatically 
gained coverage rights of general staff in Victoria and the ACT during amalgamation, 
negotiations over coverage rights for general staff in the rest of the sector was a major 
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complicating factor during round two and subsequent rounds.  The NTEU became embroiled 
in a protracted demarcation tussle, particularly with the PSA/CPSU, which impacted on 
members at the branch level.  Therefore, union membership of general staff at many 
universities was divided between the NTEU and other general staff unions.  Drawing 
negotiations down to the branch level brought the NTEU increasingly into conflict with these 
other unions (O'Brien 1999: 87).  At both the University of Canberra and ANU, general staff 
negotiations threatened to undermine the NTEU’s wage claim and split the NTEU’s ranks 
(O'Brien 1999).  At ANU, the general staff union attempted to endorse an agreement that 
was acceptable to them but which compromised the NTEU’s nationally agreed outcomes for 
academics (O'Brien 1999: 87).  Grahame McCulloch directly intervened in negotiations 
convincing management to conduct further discussions on academic provisions in the 
agreement  (O'Brien 1999: 87).  However, management was able to capitalise on this 
situation to force  a concession on academic redundancy (O'Brien 1999: 87).  One 
modification to national strategy to come out of this situation was O’Brien’s 
recommendation for a flat rate component to wage outcomes designed to appease unions 
with coverage of general staff on the lower classification levels, such as maintenance and 
cleaning staff (O'Brien 1999: 87).  Similar problems of co-ordination with general staff 
unions on campuses all around the country also intensified the NTEU’s resolve to become 
the dominant union in the sector for general staff.   
 
Another challenge for local NTEU leaders was coping with increasingly aggressive local 
managements who were working in an environment of government funding cuts and some 
of whom were emboldened by the government’s industrial relations legislation.  An early 
example of local management’s aggressive tactics was at Monash University (not a leading 
site) where management proposed a Faculty by Faculty bargaining framework (NTEU NE 
teleconf minutes 3 April, 1997) breaking the “enterprise” into 13 and allow for 13 different 
outcomes (Industrial Report to the NE 13&14 June 1997).  Meanwhile, as O’Brien points out 
ANU showed the risks of the full enterprise bargaining model with local management 
seeking to undermine award conditions in exchange for pay rises (O'Brien 1999: 87).  The 
potential risk for the leading sites strategy was that in its haste to quickly set national wage 
standards the NTEU would be forced to agree to the modification of important award 
conditions at the local level (O'Brien 1999: 87).   The Industrial Report to the National 
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Executive in April explained that progress at the leading sites had been much slower than 
expected since the report to the February National Executive (NTEU NE minutes 11&12 
April, 1997).  It argued that reaching agreement quickly at the leading sites had to be a 
priority as the slow pace at these sites was making it difficult to hold back less favourable 
agreements, such as Newcastle and Wollongong (NTEU NE minutes 11&12 April, 1997).  It 
was against this backdrop that the National Executive endorsed the ANU agreement.  Whilst 
the ANU agreement was broadly compliant with the NTEU Council policy and had been hard 
won through industrial action at the branch level, the concession on academic redundancy 
was a dangerous precedent (O'Brien 1999: 87-8).  As O’Brien points out, there are two ways 
of reading the National Executive acceptance of the ANU agreement: either it was a 
pragmatic shift in national policy to secure a good wage rise fast at the cost of local 
conditions or it was a “flexible ‘dynamic emergent’ strategy”, a strategic loosening of 
national policy at the behest of empowering the membership at the branch level (O'Brien 
1999: 88).  Either way, arguably it was the ANU precedent that enabled concessions on 
academic redundancy at Griffith and UNSW campuses (O'Brien 1999: 88-9). 
 
The leading sites strategy hit a more serious snare at Melbourne University.  At the NTEU 
National Executive 26 March 1997, it was reported that the National Office had intervened 
at Melbourne University to prevent a provision that allowed for a section of its wage 
outcome to be contingent on agreed productivity targets (NTEU NE minutes 26 March, 
1997).  This provision was perhaps the most deeply controversial issue to confront the NTEU 
to that time.  The situation was compounded by a perceived conservatism in the Victorian 
Division which had cautioned National Council 1996 against pursuing high wages at the risk 
of job losses in a climate of government funding cuts (O'Brien 1999: 90).  The strong FAUSA 
tradition at Melbourne University along with the strength of the Victorian Division made 
both segments of the union resistant to national authority (O'Brien 1999: 91).  The NTEU 
was sharply divided on whether the National Executive should endorse the Melbourne 
University agreement.  There were two key issues at work here.  The first issue was about 
the relative rights of the branch as a semi-autonomous institution (in the FAUSA tradition) 
versus the obligations of the branch to hold the line on nationally determined policy.  The 
second issue was about strategy with those opposed to accepting the agreement arguing for 
an industrial campaign to defeat management’s proposal.  Each issue will be addressed in 
123 
 
turn. 
 
Firstly, the National Executive engaged in a heated debate about the relative rights of the 
branch versus its obligations to adhere to national policy.  A series of position papers and 
motions were tabled at the 26 March National Executive.  A strongly worded letter from 
Adrian Ryan, the NSW Division secretary, argued that the branch had a responsibility to 
uphold the policy determined by National Council.  He argued that NSW Division would 
regard approving the Melbourne agreement as a “... destructive breach of faith by National 
Executive...” and that if National Council policy “could be ignored then we have lost all 
semblance of being a national union (Ryan letter tabled at NTEU NE minutes 26 March, 
1997).  The letter pointed out that the current wage round was a catch up round for lost 
wages from round one reminding National Executive of the rationale for its original policy 
decision.  Meanwhile, the Queensland Division unanimously carried a motion against signing 
the agreement arguing that the national implications must take precedence over the branch 
(NTEU NE minutes 26 March, 1997).  Correspondence from the ACT division and Northern 
Territory division also endorsed this view (NTEU NE minutes 26 March, 1997).  Bill Ford from 
the Western Australian Division put a more conciliatory line, that: “the role of the National 
Executive is not to second-guess branches and/or divisions on the specific outcomes... 
except to the extent that those outcomes would be in clear breach of Council policy” (Bill 
Ford letter tabled at NTEU NE minutes 26 March, 1997).  He argued therefore that National 
Executive had a responsibility to ensure there is a reasonable basis for the branch’s decision 
and that members have been reasonably informed of the deficiencies of the proposed 
agreement (Bill Ford letter tabled at NTEU NE minutes 26 March, 1997). He put the two 
positions starkly, for National Executive to  “demonstrate indifference to or reckless 
disregard for the long-term damage we might cause at that site, would be as grossly 
irresponsible as were we to mindlessly proceed to approve the agreement regardless of the 
problems it might cause elsewhere”  (Bill Ford letter tabled at NTEU NE minutes 26 March, 
1997).   
 
A motion put by NSW Division that the National Executive to not endorse the agreement 
and that instructed the NTEU to convince Melbourne University members not to sign the 
agreement was narrowly lost 25/21 (*votes are proportionally assigned) (NTEU NE minutes 
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26 March, 1997).  A compromise motion instructing the Melbourne Branch and Victorian 
Division point out to members the deficiencies of the draft agreement and its potential 
impacts on other branches was carried unanimously at National Executive (NTEU NE 
minutes 26 March, 1997). Another motion authorising Grahame McCulloch to sign the 
proposed agreement if requested to do so by the branch and division was narrowly carried 
27/19 (NTEU NE minutes 26 March, 1997).   
 
The second issue was the question of industrial strategy.  Adrian Ryan argued that the 
agreement set a dangerous precedent for managements at other branches (Ryan letter 
tabled at NTEU NE minutes 26 March, 1997) and therefore fundamentally undermined the 
leading sites strategy.  Bill Ford from Western Australia again argued a more conciliatory line 
that the National Executive should attempt to “quarantine” contingency pay from other 
branches (Bill Ford letter tabled at NTEU NE minutes 26 March, 1997).  Adrian Ryan argued 
that it was “wildly optimistic” to argue that contingency pay could be quarantined (Ryan 
letter tabled at NTEU NE minutes 26 March, 1997).  A tabled email from Amanda Breen 
argued that the NTEU risked losing one of its “most powerful negotiating tools” which was 
the ability to say we cannot accept this agreement because it breaches national NTEU policy 
(NTEU NE minutes 26 March, 1997).  The “quarantine” point however, was adopted by the 
National Secretariat and the Victorian Division and is reflected in the motion carried at 
National Executive that “all efforts must be made to contain the potential flow-on of this 
agreement” (NTEU NE minutes 26 March, 1997).  One of the key criteria for the selection of 
leading sites was their union density and capacity and willingness of its membership to take 
significant industrial action in pursuit of the claim (NTEU National Council papers 3-5 
October, 1996).  Adrian Ryan picked up this point by comparing NSW’s and Victoria’s 
strategic approach: where all branches in NSW had engaged in face to face meetings of 
members and conducted an effective industrial campaign, there was no evidence that 
Melbourne University was “able or willing to organise one” (Ryan letter tabled at NTEU NE 
minutes 26 March, 1997).  John O’Brien and Mike Donaldson also argued strongly for an 
industrial campaign and put a motion “that the national office devote considerable staffing 
and financial resources in a federally led campaign against the University of Melbourne draft 
agreement” (NTEU NE minutes 26 March, 1997).  This motion was lost (NTEU NE minutes 26 
March, 1997).   
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 The National Executive therefore opted to attempt to convince the Melbourne University 
membership to not endorse the agreement, however, in the event that the branch 
proceeded to accept the agreement Grahame McCulloch was empowered to endorse it on 
behalf of the National Executive (NTEU NE minutes 26 March, 1997).  Grahame McCulloch 
was once again sent into the front lines to address a meeting of members (NTEU NE teleconf 
minutes 3 April, 1997).  After hearing the arguments against accepting the agreement, the 
membership at Melbourne University decided to defer endorsement of the agreement 
(NTEU NE teleconf minutes 3 April, 1997).  However, in the end Melbourne University 
members voted narrowly 137/120 in favour of accepting the agreement (NTEU NE minutes 
11&12 April, 1997).  Although not a designated leading site, Melbourne University’s 
agreement to a substandard agreement just as weaker branches were commencing was a 
significant challenge to the national strategy (NTEU NE minutes 26 March, 1997).  However, 
had the National Executive not endorsed the Melbourne University agreement, the NTEU 
would have not been party to the agreement and therefore locked out of further 
negotiations at the branch level? 
 
Another major challenge for the NTEU during round two was the introduction of the 
Workplace Relations Act.  The Workplace Relations Act 1996 enabled employers to by-pass 
the unions in negotiations by allowing for the balloting of non-union agreements directly 
with staff and the provision of Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs) (O'Brien 1999: 89).  
Employers attempted both approaches at the University of Southern Queensland (USQ) 
(O'Brien 1999: 89).  At the outset of negotiations, management announced its intention to 
seek a non-union agreement directly with staff (O'Brien 1999: 89).  When opposition from 
local unions failed to shift management position, Grahame McCulloch intervened (O'Brien 
1999: 89).  The negotiations were accompanied by a union campaign including mass 
meetings inspiring a series of provocative emails from the Vice Chancellor to all staff  
(O'Brien 1999: 89).  It was therefore a major victory when management was persuaded to 
commence negotiations for a union agreement (O'Brien 1999: 89).  Once the local situation 
had stabilised, Grahame McCulloch withdrew to enable the branch leadership to continue 
negotiations (O'Brien 1999: 89).  However, a couple of months later an executive memo 
from Grahame McCulloch to the National Executive explained that the local branch and 
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state divisions had been close to accepting the agreement when it was discovered by 
National Office staff that management had made provision for AWAs for senior executive 
staff and had told local negotiators that Grahame had agreed to this provision (McCulloch 
30 May 1997).  No such agreement had been made (McCulloch 30 May 1997).  In response, 
the Vice Chancellor and Grahame McCulloch addressed a general meeting of USQ staff and 
negotiations were reopened (McCulloch 30 May 1997).  However, a memo from the Vice 
Chancellor to all staff blamed the debacle on the NTEU (McCulloch 30 May 1997) and 
demanded the NTEU accept the agreement before 2 June or it would be put directly to staff 
(O'Brien 1999: 90).   
 
It was reported to National Executive that the NTEU was unlikely to win a staff ballot 
(O'Brien 1999: 90).  Although the NTEU successfully negotiated a watered down version of 
the AWA clause (McCulloch 30 May 1997) the Executive was nonetheless forced by 
circumstances to accept an agreement that breached national policy especially on the 
question of individual contracts (O'Brien 1999: 89).  At the National Executive 
teleconference on 2 June held to ratify the USQ agreement, John O’Brien expressed his 
concern about considering sensitive political and industrial issues, such as the USQ 
agreement by teleconference  (NTEU NE teleconf minutes 2 June, 1997).  Adrian Ryan also 
argued that the breakdown in communication between the National, Division and local 
levels of the union that led to the acceptance of an AWA provision in agreement must be 
addressed (NTEU NE teleconf minutes 2 June, 1997).   The USQ branch was relatively weak 
with a patchwork of unions exposing the fact that the capacity of national intervention in 
the new decentralised, enterprise bargaining environment was beholden to strength on the 
ground (O'Brien 1999).  USQ was another example of the tension enterprise bargaining 
created between national strategic imperatives and the local branch (O'Brien 1999). 
 
The NTEU reviews progress in preparation for round three 
A face to face National Executive on 13&14 June 1997 reviewed the NTEU’s progress and 
discussed the need for improvements in time for round three (NTEU NE minutes 13&14 
June 1997).  By this time all leading sites had reached agreement and many non-leading 
sites were also near finalisation of their agreements (Industrial Report to the NE 13&14 June 
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1997).  The NTEU did not achieve its 15% goal but did manage to secure more than 11% at 
all leading sites and had achieved its aim of no reduction in national award conditions 
except for some minor adjustments to redundancy clauses and AWAs had also not been 
accepted at any campus (Industrial Report to the NE 13&14 June 1997).  The major outliers 
were Melbourne University and USQ.  Melbourne University had accepted performance 
contracts for senior executives (which were considered unacceptably similar to AWAs) and 
contingency pay (Industrial Report to the NE 13&14 June 1997).  Meanwhile, at USQ the 
NTEU had successfully defeated management’s proposed non-union agreement (NTEU NE 
minutes 11&12 April, 1997) but had been forced to accept a major concession which 
potentially opened the door to AWAs (O'Brien 1999: 89).     
 
The National Executive discussed the levels of involvement of the National Office in local 
negotiations (NTEU NE minutes 13&14 June 1997).  At the heart of this debate was the need 
to find a balance between branch sovereignty and therefore local membership engagement 
and democracy on the one hand and the integrity of national decision making which 
required branches to “hold the line” on the other.  One recognised difficulty was ensuring 
the required expertise among local representatives both in local negotiations and in their 
understanding of the NTEU’s strategies and policies.  The National Executive resolved to 
train Branch representatives in negotiation technique and to developing guidelines for 
national interventions in local branch bargaining and responsibilities at each level of the 
union (NTEU NE minutes 13&14 June 1997).  A resolution from the ACT Division indicated 
their concern at the communication difficulties experienced between National, Division and 
Branch levels leading to the National Executive having little option but to endorse 
substandard agreements (NTEU NE minutes 13&14 June 1997).  It resolved that Executive 
will “not discuss endorsing, nor endorse, any agreements” unless all relevant information 
was provided to National Executive preferably including the draft agreement in full (NTEU 
NE minutes 13&14 June 1997).  This resolution was carried unanimously as was a motion to 
organise a seminar of all branch negotiators in those branches yet to finalise negotiations 
(NTEU NE minutes 13&14 June 1997).   
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National Council 1997 
Enterprise Bargaining strategy was among the major agenda items at National Council which 
met in early October, 1997.  The lessons learnt from the leading sites’ efforts to implement 
round two enterprise bargaining were a major feature in the discussions regarding strategy 
for round three of enterprise bargaining.  NSW and the ACT Division played leading roles in 
arguing for change to the NTEU’s approach to avoid future mishaps like those at Melbourne 
University and USQ.  The NSW Division tabled a substantial position paper “Bargaining in 
Universities” and the ACT Division tabled a series of motions relating to bargaining strategy 
(NTEU National Council papers 2-4 October, 1997).   
 
The most significant recommendation was the proposal for a national bargaining forum 
which came from the NSW Division (NTEU National Council papers 2-4 October, 1997).  The 
rationale for this, in light of the experiences of round two, was the explicit goal of drawing 
those involved in local negotiations closer to the establishment of bargaining policy at the 
national level (NTEU National Council papers 2-4 October, 1997).  Council adopted the 
proposal and reaffirmed its belief that successful bargaining strategy required a 
combination of local workplace and division organisation and national coordination (NTEU 
National Council papers 2-4 October, 1997).  National Council would continue to set policy 
parameters and priority issues and National Executive would continue to oversee its 
implementation, but the finer detail of the NTEU’s agenda and processes would be 
determined at the Enterprise Bargaining conference (NTEU National Council papers 2-4 
October, 1997).  It was agreed that the Enterprise Bargaining conference would be 
responsible for making recommendations on the content of agreements: minimum salary 
outcomes, items which should be in all agreements, items which the union should not 
accept and periods of expiry of agreements (NTEU National Council papers 2-4 October, 
1997).  Enterprise Bargaining conference would also discuss process: bargaining protocols, 
local Enterprise Bargaining campaigns,  co-ordinated industrial action amongst institutions  
and developing a method to ensure direct rank and file endorsement of the bargaining 
strategy (NTEU National Council papers 2-4 October, 1997).  Following the very acrimonious 
discussions around Melbourne University, how can the unanimous uptake of Adrian Ryan’s 
suggestion for an Enterprise Bargaining Conference be explained?  It is possible that both 
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camps accepted this proposal though for different reasons.  The NSW, Queensland and ACT 
divisions understood the need for branch activism and greater involvement of branch 
leaders in formulating national strategy, while the Victorian and Western Australian 
divisions saw it as an opportunity for autonomous branches to limit the excessive demands 
that more militant national policy might place on their less industrial branches. 
 
The NSW Division also recommended the establishment of national reference groups to 
consider priority issues for the next round (NTEU National Council papers 2-4 October, 
1997).  The reference groups were to gather information from around the country about 
current practice including direct discussion with affected staff and use this information to 
develop NTEU policy (NTEU National Council papers 2-4 October, 1997).  This proposal was 
also adopted by Council (NTEU National Council papers 2-4 October, 1997).  A series of 
other recommendations relating to round three enterprise bargaining were also adopted.  A 
recommendation entitled “Strengthening Workplace Structures” from the NSW Division 
echoed concerns raised at the time of the Melbourne University controversy.  It insisted 
that in preparation for round three, branches implement recruitment campaigns and 
enhance delegate structures, build relationships with other unions, strategically assess areas 
of risk and low density and educate members on the importance of collective strength and 
the dangers of AWAs (NTEU National Council papers 2-4 October, 1997).  This 
recommendation was adopted in full by Council.  This motion recognised that as the 
employment contract focussed on the branch “enterprise” the success of bargaining largely 
rested on the ability of local unions to take independent action.  Therefore maintaining 
national unity required local strength both in numbers and in levels of consciousness so that 
branches could “hold the line” on their campus.  National Council also adopted the ACT’s 
recommendation to ensure that each agreement must be supplied in full and approved by 
the Branch Committee, the Division Secretary and the National Executive before being 
submitted to members for approval (NTEU National Council papers 2-4 October, 1997).  This 
was designed to avoid the embarrassing slip-ups at Melbourne University and USQ and also 
to avoid putting the National Executive in a position of having to oppose agreements after 
the decision to accept it had been made by a meeting of members at the branch level.   
 
With the full implementation of Enterprise Bargaining and the demise of the award system 
130 
 
in higher education, the NTEU also had to rewrite its overarching policy statement on 
bargaining in the sector.  In this discussion the ACT Division made the philosophical point 
that although the industrial framework had moved on that the NTEU still hold the belief that 
enterprise bargaining was an inappropriate means of regulating employment conditions and 
that the NTEU seek to reunify wages and conditions across the sector (NTEU National 
Council papers 2-4 October, 1997).  This statement was also accepted by Council therefore 
reaffirming the NTEU’s commitment to maintaining national unity in wages and conditions 
despite the decentralisation of the employment relations environment and that wherever 
appropriate the award standards should continue to form the basis from which agreements 
are built and no conditions are allowed to fall below them (NTEU National Council papers 2-
4 October, 1997).  An important addition to this statement was that all agreements should 
have adequate dispute settling procedures which retain the Commission’s power to 
arbitrate on industrial disputes (NTEU National Council papers 2-4 October, 1997) in 
recognition of attempts to dissolve the arbitration powers of the Commission under the 
Workplace Relations Act.   
 
National Bargaining Conference 
National Bargaining Conference met on 15/16 June, 1998 and was the major source of the 
NTEU’s strategy for round three.  In accordance with Council directives it involved: the lead 
negotiator and the branch president of each institution, Division secretaries and industrial 
staff responsible for bargaining support, a representative from WAC and the Casuals 
network and all national executive members (NTEU National Council papers 2-4 October, 
1997).  The conference began with reports from the various Enterprise Bargaining reference 
groups that had also been endorsed by Council (NTEU 1998 Bargaining Conference papers 
15&16 June 1998).  Individual reference groups discussed salaries, superannuation, 
casualisation, academic and general staff workloads and modes of employment (NTEU 1998 
Bargaining Conference papers 15&16 June 1998).  Each group tabled clauses to be added to 
the NTEU’s log of claims.  A policy document listing a series of enterprise bargaining claims 
from the NTEU National Women’s Conference was also tabled (NTEU 1998 Bargaining 
Conference papers 15&16 June 1998).  The Bargaining conference then broke into 
workshops to discuss the recommended clauses and to amend them where necessary 
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(NTEU 1998 Bargaining Conference papers 15&16 June 1998).  Other workshops during the 
conference discussed union protocols and processes and union and management tactics 
(NTEU 1998 Bargaining Conference papers 15&16 June 1998). The outcomes of these 
workshops were reported back to the whole conference the following day and the National 
Bargaining Conference Resolution was drafted accompanied by a draft Log of Claims for 
round three (NTEU 1998 Bargaining Conference papers 15&16 June 1998).    
 
The outcome of the conference was a comprehensive Log of Claims, NTEU protocols and 
some recommendations on the best way to pursue the strategy at the branch level.  The Log 
of Claims outlined its 19% salary claim over three years (7% 1999; 6% 2000; 6% 2001), the 
expiry date of July 2002 (with the intention of maintaining national cohesion as well as 
parity of pay rises) and a list of mandatory outcomes and recommended outcomes that 
were based on the reference group recommendations (NTEU 1998 Bargaining Conference 
papers 15&16 June 1998).  The resolution also contained a list of “prohibited matters”, 
including: AWAs, pay rises contingent on performance or other targets and trade-offs of 
superannuation or award conditions (NTEU 1998 Bargaining Conference papers 15&16 June 
1998).  The resolution also instructed the National Executive to tighten up its processes to 
monitor branch activity during bargaining and for the final approval of agreements (NTEU 
1998 Bargaining Conference papers 15&16 June 1998).  Learning from the difficulties 
encountered in round two, this workshop also recommended that all negotiations include 
an industrial officer, that NTEU communicates its approval processes to both the 
membership and management at the outset and that branches and divisions must notify the 
National Office of controversial issues at the earliest possible time (NTEU 1998 Bargaining 
Conference papers 15&16 June 1998).   
 
Leading sites seminar 
Immediately following the bargaining seminar, the National Executive called a seminar of 
lead negotiators from the leading sites to determine a floor price on bargaining, to review 
the log of claims and to develop principles and guidelines for bargaining (NTEU NE minutes 
14&15 August, 1997).  The initial leading sites seminar made small adjustments to the Log of 
Claims and discussed the level of ambit in the 19% salary claim (NTEU leading sites seminar 
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16 September, 1998).   The leading sites committee determined that a floor price would be 
fixed after 8 or 9 agreements had been reached (NTEU leading sites meeting 27July 1999).  
In October 1998 the leading sites meeting supported Grahame McCulloch’s recommended  
12% floor price for round three of enterprise bargaining (NTEU leading sites meeting 27July 
1999).  Expiry dates were also discussed.  Grahame McCulloch reported on the need for 
leading sites to pursue longer agreement and to stick to the initial 2002 expiry date (NTEU 
leading sites meeting 27July 1999).  If agreements could stretch into late 2002, the NTEU 
would be reopening negotiations under a Labor government if they won the next federal 
election (NTEU leading sites meeting 27July 1999).  It was also important to get agreements 
in place before more aggressive amendments to the Workplace Relations Act took effect 
(NTEU leading sites meeting 27July 1999).  Lastly, longer agreements would enable the 
lagging sites to catch up before bargaining for the next round commenced (NTEU leading 
sites meeting 27July 1999).   By mid 1999, most of the leading sites were in the thick of 
negotiations for round three of enterprise bargaining with many engaged in industrial action 
which included bans, stoppages and protests (NTEU leading sites meeting 27July 1999).  The 
following chapter of this thesis will analyse the challenges encountered in implementing the 
strategy for round three and the formulation of bargaining strategy for round four.  
However, firstly this chapter will review the strategic decision making process that 
underpinned the actions described in this chapter so far. 
 
Summary 
The rest of this chapter returns to the discussion so far to analyse the learning process 
involved in the strategic decision making for round three of enterprise bargaining.  
Immediately following the implementation of the leading sites strategy with the completion 
of round two, key activists within the NTEU drew out the lessons from the experience and 
identified key gaps in the NTEU’s capabilities that needed to be addressed in the lead up to 
round three of bargaining.  Firstly, there was the need to learn the importance of adhering 
to National policy to maintain unified wages and conditions across the sector.  Secondly, and 
related to the first was the need to maintain national cohesion as a union despite the 
decentralizing impacts of full enterprise bargaining.  Finally, and most importantly, was the 
need to increase the leadership and membership capacity in the branches to uphold the 
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national standard on wages and conditions.  This discussion will address each of these issues 
in turn drawing on the observations of both trade union strategy and knowledge 
management literature to guide this investigation.  The chapter will then analyse the 
sources of innovation for the NTEU as it adapted to changes in the external environment.   
 
Maintaining unified wages and conditions in the sector 
Coming out of the difficulties encountered at both USQ, but especially the University of 
Melbourne, the NTEU adopted a series of measures to ensure greater compliance with 
national policy adopted at National Council.  One issue that was fairly easily resolved was 
the decision to tighten up the NTEU processes to avoid the embarrassing slip-up that 
occurred at USQ where members had endorsed an agreement before it had been fully 
checked by the National Industrial Unit.  In future all agreements would be required to be 
fully checked by three layers of the union before it could be taken to the membership.  
However, the more substantial issue was to shore up the commitment of local leaders and 
members to the claims of the NTEU.  The solution to this was to draw many more individuals 
into the process of developing the claims through the enterprise bargaining forum and by 
setting up enterprise bargaining reference groups.  There were several advantages to this 
approach.  From a union strategy perspective, the goals and strategies would have 
legitimacy with a much wider catchment of the membership and particularly with those 
who would be responsible for leading their local branches in implementing them.  Secondly, 
from a knowledge management perspective, the NTEU got the benefit of industrial 
expertise from NTEU staff combined with the “know how” and local knowledge of branch 
leaders and members in devising its strategies and goals.   
 
The EB reference groups were designed to develop policy for round three enterprise 
bargaining on key strategic issues (NTEU National Council papers 2-4 October, 1997) 
salaries, superannuation, casualisation, academic and general staff workloads and modes of 
employment (NTEU 1998 Bargaining Conference papers 15&16 June 1998).  The reference 
groups were to gather information from around the country about current practice 
including direct discussion with affected staff and use this information to develop NTEU 
policy (NTEU National Council papers 2-4 October, 1997).  As per previous rounds it would 
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appear that the combination of industrial advice from the National Industrial Unit and the 
less tangible “know how” of individuals from various branches acting as boundary spanners 
for the conditions in their respective campuses was the model used to arrive at decisions.  
According to the report written by participants in the casualisation group, Ken McAlpine and 
Chris Holley provided a draft set of recommendations as well as the various documents 
related to the “Non-Continuing Employment Case” (NTEU award claim with the AIRC) and 
the better clauses for EB Agreements from rounds one and two (report tabled NTEU 1998 
Bargaining Conference papers 15&16 June 1998).  These documents were discussed and 
amended by the group which was composed of both experienced and less experienced 
activists.  The results were presented in the opening forum of the EB Conference and a 
report was tabled.  This appears to be how all of the reference groups were conducted.  The 
salaries reference group did not arrive at a final figure on salaries (this was arrived at by the 
Leading Sites meeting in October, 1998) but provided a list of issues that should be taken 
into account when arriving at a figure.  Some of the reference groups were more robust 
than others.  It appears that the Special Studies Provisions (SSP) reference group collapsed 
and no report was provided.  However, among the papers for this group is a long personal 
email from one participant which outlines the issues encountered with SSP at Macquarie 
Uni, including the flaws in the current EB provisions and the way these were being exploited 
by local Heads and the impacts of course delivery and workloads on access to SSP.  It is 
therefore likely that staff in the national office did most of the work in drafting the claims 
but the email offers an artefact of the kinds of knowledge from quite peripheral NTEU 
members that the reference groups tapped into when it pulled in broader sections of the 
membership. 
 
Maintaining national cohesion 
The second lesson the NTEU needed to learn was to maintain national unity and cohesion 
despite the pressures of decentralisation.  Although no clear procedure was adopted, the 
need to improve communication among the various layers of the union was identified as a 
priority in preparation for round three.  The ongoing pressure to maintain national unity 
against the decentralising impacts of enterprise bargaining largely fell on Grahame 
McCulloch’s shoulders.  As shown in the examples of Melbourne University and USQ, 
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McCulloch had been required to intervene at the local level to support the leadership at the 
branch level so that the national pattern could be upheld.  McCulloch’s capacity to hold the 
organisation together rested on his experience as the foremost broker in the amalgamation 
that formed the NTEU and his ongoing central participation in all of the national debates 
around bargaining strategy since that time.  This pressure required and in turn developed 
very high levels of expertise in negotiation and a high level of understanding of the internal 
machinations of the NTEU and their origins. 
 
Building leadership capacity at the branch level 
Implementing the leading sites strategy required increasing the NTEU’s strategic capacity at 
the branch level.  With the full impact of enterprise bargaining and the deregulation of the 
sector, each campus had its own specific challenges requiring responsiveness at the branch 
level.  As discussed in chapter two devoted to union strategy, the capacity of a union to 
effectively respond to its environment relies on two related processes: firstly developing an 
understanding of external threats and opportunities and secondly adapting union strategy 
and the organisation to best fit this context.  The question was asked in that chapter, how 
effective was the NTEU in making strategic use of the external environment?  Using the 
poker metaphor, Ganz pointed out that chance may determine the outcome of any one 
hand, or even a game, but ultimately some players are more likely to win than others (2000: 
1008).  It is a question of strategic capacity (Ganz 2000: 1008).   Three key factors for a 
union’s strategic capacity were identified: the ability of union leaders, the engagement and 
contribution of union memberships and lastly the relationship between the two.  This 
framework can be used to compare the fortunes of the leading sites versus those of 
Melbourne University, Southern Cross University and the lagging sites.  In support of the 
observations of Voss and Sherman’s “knowledge, vision and sense of urgency” (2003: 65) 
and Hyman’s “skill, sensitivity and imagination” (1997: 311) much seemed to depend on the 
strategic capacity of local union leaderships.  Seasoned union advocates such as John 
O’Brien and Adrian Ryan were central figures in both formulating and implementing strategy 
in the branches in their divisions as well playing a leading role in recognising and articulating 
the challenges encountered to educate the rest of the organisation via discussion papers 
and motions at National Council 1997.  This requires very high levels of expertise.  John 
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O’Brien’s report on the challenges encountered at ANU involving both an aggressive 
employer and hostile competitor unions to deliver one of the first successful agreements 
(disregarding the concession on academic redundancy) is an indication if the kind of 
strategic ability required at the leading sites.  
 
Returning to the discussion in chapter three of this thesis, activity theory argues that the 
most effective way to understand what kinds of “know how” the NTEU required is to focus 
on practice.  Frenkel et al’s three dimensions of forms of knowledge required in a role 
included predominant form of knowledge and the relative levels of creativity, type and level 
of skill required (Frenkel, Korczynski et al. 1995: 781).  In measuring the predominant form 
of knowledge required, it is likely that the role relied on high levels of Frenkel’ contextual 
knowledge more than abstract knowledge (Frenkel, Korczynski et al. 1995: 779).  There is 
very little abstract bodies of theoretical knowledge that could assist a local leader, 
overwhelmingly it was the strategic application of “know how” (instincts, hunches, 
relationships, information) being drawn from many sources that was of primary importance.  
This in turn required high levels of Frenkel’s creativity as the local leadership confronted 
primarily heuristic or open ended problems requiring the development of original responses 
from first principles.  (Frenkel, Korczynski et al. 1995: 779).  Finally applying Frenkel’s 
category of type and level of skills (1995: 780) obviously low levels of action centred 
(physical) skills were required but high levels of intellective and social skills were enlisted as 
local leaders synthetised information and developed relationships with a range of 
individuals engaged in the bargaining process.  Applying Ellstrom’s “work-integrated 
learning” framework (2001: 421)is helpful to interpret the kind of learning required for local 
leaders.  Work requiring high levels of creativity requires the highest level of developmental 
learning in Ellstrom’s taxonomy (Ellstrom 2001: 423).  Understanding the kinds of skills 
required to perform the role of local leader during enterprise bargaining assists this study in 
understanding how these skills can best be developed and disseminated in the NTEU. 
 
As the activity theory literature indicates, creative, intellective, contextual “know how” is 
very difficult to codify and therefore disseminate.  As activity theory indicates knowledge 
creation and knowledge sharing are inherently a group activity (Teece, Pisano et al. 1997: 
15; Leonard and Sensiper 1998: 115) and arguably best achieved in face to face group 
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discussion, both formal and informal.  Know how is “mediated” via discussion within 
communities (Blackler 1995: 1039-40).  Individuals with similar backgrounds or occupations, 
facing a similar problem share stories to bring coherence to their experience (Brown and 
Duguid 1991: 45).  The embodied know how of more experienced activists which cannot be 
codified and disseminated can only be transmitted in dialogue.  Therefore the best way to 
try to generate more “know how” was to encourage as much interpersonal interactions and 
group discussion among people sharing similar goals and experiences as possible.  The 
efforts to draw more individuals into discussion via the EB conference and EB reference 
groups was a helpful initiative in this regard.  Understanding how “know how” is best 
transmitted, helps explain the less successful attempt of codifying “know how”.  It was 
interesting to watch the fortunes of Adrian Ryan’s step by step prescription on how to 
deliver an effective industrial campaign at the branch level (NTEU 1998 Bargaining 
Conference papers 15&16 June 1998).  The recommendation was not adopted either at 
National Council or at Enterprise Bargaining conference.  Trying to codify “know how”, the 
myriad of instincts and reactions of embodied knowledge that figures such as himself and 
John O’Brien have developed through many campaigns, was possibly futile.   
 
Similarly, it is hard to measure the success of the Enterprise Bargaining kits.  Whilst the 
National Industrial Unit’s industrial memos could effectively codify clauses and legal 
decisions, less easy to disseminate is the “know how” needed on the ground to shore up the 
membership support necessary to pursue these clauses.  The enterprise bargaining kit 
included model clauses and form letters and sections of legislation relating to bargaining 
which were probably successfully transmitted.  However, similar to Ryan’s prescriptive 
advice, the Enterprise Bargaining kit also contained a comprehensive list of processes and 
procedures and even checklists on how to conduct enterprise bargaining campaigns and 
negotiations.  It also includes sections such as: “building support”, “communicate” and 
“activate delegate networks”.  It was likely a useful checklist for those who had already 
learned in practice how to build the support needed to conduct an enterprise bargaining 
campaign.  The kit may also have been a helpful way of codifying and storing lessons that 
had been learned in practice.  However, as discussed above, the high levels of complex 
embodied skills needed to lead a branch could only be learned in practice and with the 
support of others. 
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 Building the capacity of the membership 
Leadership strategy is pointless without the engagement of the membership willing to act in 
support of it.  Fundamental to the leading sites strategy was selecting campuses with both 
high levels of union membership and a proven willingness to act in pursuit of the national 
strategy.  This in turn relied on a strong relationship between the local leadership and its 
membership.  The insistence by Adrian Ryan that the branch meet to elect its local 
negotiators and on local negotiators keeping the membership informed shows that this 
point was explicitly understood by some but not all in the NTEU.  At the heart of the debate 
between Adrian Ryan and John O’Brien on the one side and representatives of the Victorian 
Division on the other over contingency pay at Melbourne University was an appreciation of 
the need to inspire the local membership to act in order to hold the line on national 
strategy.  In line with Ganz’s observation about strategic capacity (Ganz 2000: 1008), Adrian 
Ryan drew the direct comparison between the fortunes of Melbourne University and other 
campuses in NSW and the ACT.  In his letter in opposition to the Melbourne University 
agreement, he pointed out that contingency pay had been a feature of early management 
offers at every campus  in the NSW Division but had been defeated by industrial action 
(NTEU NE minutes 26 March, 1997).  Those in support of the Melbourne University 
agreement had argued that other unions on the campus endorsed the agreement, but this 
had also been true at both campuses in the ACT who managed to negotiate with those 
unions and went in to win superior agreements (NTEU NE minutes 26 March, 1997).  Those 
in support of the Melbourne University agreement had also argued that the reason 
Melbourne University was forced to accept a substandard agreement was because it had 
only 30% membership density (NTEU NE minutes 26 March, 1997).  Again Ryan was able to 
show that other weaker branches had managed to win better outcomes (NTEU NE minutes 
26 March, 1997).   In chapter ten, this time will be revisited to conduct a network analysis of 
the difficulties encountered by the NTEU in sharing the “know how” required to build 
leadership and membership capacity at the branch level.  
 
At the same time, Adrian Ryan’s motions identified the need for recruitment drives and 
education campaigns amongst the membership which indicated his conscious 
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understanding of the importance of union capacity at the branch level in this new 
environment.  The difficulties at USQ were largely due to very weak forces on the ground 
with a patchwork of unions and an inexperienced local leadership.  Whilst the management 
at USQ aggressively pursued the options offered by the Workplace Relations Act, 
managements were equally aggressive elsewhere, but stronger campuses were able to 
resist these attempts and even turn this aggression to their advantage.   
 
The unionate worldview 
The issue of ideology is also significant here.  Chapter three discussed how Lubit’s “know 
how” or way of seeing the world and of approaching problems (2001: 166) when applied to 
the NTEU necessarily entailed a philosophical or political element.  Although not explicitly 
stated in the debate, the battlelines between the ACT, Queensland and NSW Divisions and 
the Victorian Division over Melbourne University’s agreement had an ideological 
component.  On the ACT, Queensland and NSW Division side was a commitment to the 
democratic collectivism and industrial militancy of a unionate outlook.  It was also 
characterised by an appreciation of the importance of national unity and of union discipline 
in carrying out the democratic wishes of the majority as ratified by National Council.  
Similarly, ACT and NSW Divisions rejected the Victorian Division’s acceptance of 
management’s claims that wage rises would necessarily cost jobs at National Council 1996.  
By comparison, the Victorian Division and particularly the leadership at Melbourne 
University had a more conservative approach in line with the FAUSA tradition at that 
branch.  The argument for “branch autonomy” was in effect an ideological rejection of 
industrial militancy.  Melbourne University was reluctant to call industrial action and 
appears to have not shared the ideology of democratic decision making that is central to the 
union ideology.  In line with Brown and Duguid’s “sticks” and “leaks” in knowledge sharing 
the success of sharing “know how” is dependent on the extent to which participants at both 
ends have had similar experiences and therefore are “speaking the same language” (2001: 
207).  This fundamental ideological divide made communication and knowledge sharing 
fraught at the national level of the NTEU, with two broad camps forming: NSW, Queensland 
and ACT divisions versus the Victorian and Western Australian divisions.   
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Innovation driven by the external environment 
One major source of innovation for round three was at the point of implementation of the 
leading sites strategy among the more experienced activists.  Activists from NSW and the 
ACT were the first to encounter difficulties directly in their own branches and were also 
forefront in identifying the potential perils in the Melbourne University and USQ 
agreements.  The recommendation for an enterprise bargaining conference and the 
reference groups which shaped the strategic decision making for round three all came from 
leading site representatives in NSW and the ACT.  Smaller incremental changes to protocols 
and processes, such as the flat rate pay rises to shore up the support of general staff or the 
requirement that industrial officers be present at all negotiations, were also 
recommendations coming from the leading sites who were learning from their mistakes.  It 
is perhaps instructive that it wasn’t until the commencement of bargaining that the leading 
sites meetings really came into their own with new ideas and experiences being shared as 
the external environment demanded it.  The leading sites strategy by its nature involved 
capitalising on the learned experience of local leaders in the strongest branches in the 
country.  The leading sites activists feeding their experience back into the organisation were 
a source of innovation and learning for the rest of the union.  One lesson learned from 
round two and carried over to round three was the approach of sending the leading sites in 
to battle for the best pay outcome possible which would then be used to assess the floor 
price for the rest of the sector.  Round three bargaining therefore commenced without a 
clear floor price for wages or a uniform expiry date.  It was the leading sites meeting that 
decided that these two core elements could only be determined by gauging the success of 
the forerunner sites. 
 
One explanation for the NTEU’s capacity to innovate and adapt to change at this time may 
be its ability to reorganise itself around the sites of innovation.  One interesting example of 
this is the fortunes of the Industrial Matters Committee (IMC).  Reviewing the discussion in 
chapter six, the IMC was the source of most of the innovations in round one.  However, as 
discussed in round two, the IMC had grown closed in and much more closely linked to the 
National Executive and had been slow to adjust to the new reality of enterprise bargaining.  
At National Council 1997 a recommendation from the IMC itself was that the IMC be 
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disbanded (NTEU National Council papers 2-4 October, 1997).  In round three, the leading 
sites meeting took the place of the IMC.  This pattern seems to reflect the steps along a 
process from national strategy making under centralised industrial relations environment 
down to branch and division under a hybrid arrangement and then down again to individual 
leading sites innovating at the branch level in response to full enterprise bargaining.  The 
unusual structure of the NTEU that emerged out of amalgamation with its branch based 
structure (in the FAUSA tradition) combined with division and national co-ordination (in the 
industrial trade union tradition of its constituent unions), may have underpinned the NTEU’s 
ability to adapt itself in this way. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has used the archived minutes and memos of the national office of the NTEU to 
chart the NTEU’s navigation of the introduction of full enterprise bargaining to the sector 
under a hostile Coalition government.  Despite the many pitfalls encountered in round two, 
no alternative approach to the leading sites strategy was entertained.  The content of round 
three enterprise bargaining strategy therefore involved incremental adjustments to the 
leading sites approach.  However, maintaining national unity against the decentralising 
pressure of full enterprise bargaining became a major challenge for the NTEU.  
Implementing the leading sites strategy unearthed latent conflicts within the NTEU and 
exposed gaps in the NTEU’s defences amongst the weaker branches.  In response, the major 
innovation in round three was the enterprise bargaining conference which was designed to 
shore up national unity around a key set of demands as well as to quickly build strategic 
capacity and commitment among the branch participants who would be required to 
implement the strategy.   
The process of identifying the origins of the implicit, explicit and emergent strategies 
adopted by the NTEU during this period appears to have continued along a trajectory.  As 
the industrial relations system moved from national down to the branch level under the full 
enterprise bargaining model, the focus of the NTEU’s committees has also drilled down to 
this level.  So that strategic decision making, innovation and learning are increasingly 
occurring at the branch level and therefore involving many more individuals.  The old, 
centralised source of innovation, the IMC, was replaced by those closest to the source of 
implementing the leading sites strategy, key activists in the leading sites.   
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Chapter Nine 
Round four of enterprise bargaining 
 
As the NTEU approached the commencement of round four of enterprise bargaining, the 
leading sites strategy was showing serious signs of strain.  With each round, the 
decentralising pressure of enterprise bargaining and the inequitable funding of universities 
under the impacts of deregulation made it increasingly difficult for the NTEU to maintain 
national unity and to deliver uniform outcomes.  As discussed in the previous chapter, as the 
industrial relations framework focused increasingly at the branch level, strategic discussion 
among NTEU representatives from the leading sites became the major source of innovation 
for the NTEU.  But the success of the leading sites strategy relied not just on the NTEU’s 
capacity at its strong sites but also on the ability of its weaker branches to capitalise on 
these gains and to implement them locally.  Round three was a very tough round in this 
regard.  Signs of the strategy’s weaknesses can be seen with the “lagging sites” languishing 
in protracted negotiations and achieving poor outcomes.  Part of the amelioration of this 
crisis came from an unexpected source: the aggressive intervention of the federal Liberal 
government into employment relations in the university sector.  The unifying, uplifting 
impacts of the NTEU’s popular and successful campaign to stop the Liberal government’s 
policies gave the NTEU a temporary reprieve. 
 
By the commencement of round four, the NTEU had accumulated many skills, experiences 
and approaches from which to inform its strategic decision making.  In fact, one difficulty for 
the NTEU appears to have been one of synthesis.  With the dispersal of the NTEU’s strategic 
focus out into the branches, with their range of institution-specific socio-economic 
environments, personalities and idiosyncrasies, how could the NTEU best make sense of 
itself and its environment in order to develop a unified national strategy?  There was also an 
apparent inability or perhaps unwillingness to test and assess the relative merits of 
particular strategies.  The NTEU’s inability to offer a thorough analysis of both the successes 
and failures encountered during round three left the union vulnerable as it entered into 
round four.  But no one could have anticipated the full impact of the Liberal government’s 
144 
 
Higher Education Workplace Relations Requirement (HEWRRs) which was designed in large 
part to stifle the NTEU.  Navigating the Liberal government’s industrial relations policies, 
which included direct intervention in local agreement making, required dramatic shifts in 
the NTEU’s strategy challenging the NTEU’s capacity at every level.  This chapter aims to 
identify the origins and nature of the strategies adopted to cope with both the threats and 
opportunities of the HEWRRs legislation and to secure enterprise agreements for round 
four.  The first half of this chapter charts chronologically the NTEU’s attempts to implement 
the policy decisions of round three and then the process of assessing the success of this 
strategy which underpinned policy making for round four.  The chapter will then look 
chronologically at the introduction of the HEWRRs legislation and the NTEU’s response.  The 
second half of this chapter is devoted to analysing the processes involved in the strategic 
decision making that took place in the formulation of round four enterprise bargaining 
strategy and the strategies adopted in the campaign to resist the HEWRRs legislation.   
 
From round three to round four 
Whilst the leading sites strategy under round three got off to a promising start, the NTEU 
could not sustain the momentum.  By mid-1999, most of the leading sites were in the thick 
of negotiations for round three with many engaged in industrial action which included bans, 
stoppages and protests (NTEU leading sites meeting 27July 1999).   Sydney University had 
moved quickly with its first 24 hour strike on Monday 1 March and further industrial action 
was foreshadowed for 17 March (NTEU leading sites meeting 3 March 1999).  UNSW also 
moved quite quickly and held a 48 hour strike on 1-2 March with further stoppages planned 
for 18 March (NTEU leading sites meeting 3 March 1999).  By June 1999, it was reported 
that Sydney University was close to agreement and UNSW intended to use Sydney 
University’s outcome to pursue a better offer (NTEU leading sites teleconference 25 June 
1999).   The leading sites committee also appeared to be operating well.  For example, in 
response to the reported claims by university managements that they could not afford the 
NTEU’s claims, the National Research Unit provided a comprehensive analysis of 
institutional finances which gave leading site branches all of the information they needed to 
argue the affordability of the NTEU’s claims (NTEU leading sites meeting 27July 1999).  This 
analysis was an important innovation and in many cases likely gave NTEU representatives a 
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greater understanding of the institution’s budget than that of their local managers.  It was 
also important for shoring up the support of the NTEU’s members and supporters.  At ANU, 
nine hundred staff attended a general meeting which used the data provided by the 
national office to combat ANU management’s document entitled “What the NTEU didn’t tell 
you” (NTEU leading sites meeting 27July 1999).  The NTEU challenged management to a 
debate but management declined (NTEU leading sites meeting 27July 1999).  UWA reported 
that the documents were useful for the “propaganda war” and forced the Deputy Vice-
Chancellor to acknowledge that reserves could be used in enterprise bargaining (NTEU 
leading sites meeting 27July 1999).  Meanwhile, in August 1999 the University of Sydney 
was the first campus to reach a round three Agreement (NTEU NE minutes 6-7 August, 
1999). 
 
However despite these isolated successes, by late 1999 a motion from the leading sites 
committee alerted the National Executive to the slow progress of negotiations at many of 
the leading sites (NTEU NE minutes 5 November, 1999).  A slow start to negotiations at the 
leading sites did not bode well for the other campuses.  A motion from the NSW Division 
Council which was put to National Council 1999 by Ros Bohringer and Adrian Ryan 
recommended a revision of the bargaining strategy adopted by National Council 1998 (NSW 
Division Council motion to National Council 1999).  In light of the slow progress of other 
sites, NSW Division recommended that a new set of expiry dates be adopted to enable 
campuses to take united industrial action in following rounds (NSW Division Council motion 
to National Council 1999).  The motion pointed out that twelve months into implementing 
round three bargaining strategy, NSW’s leading sites (UNSW, Sydney, Wollongong and SCU) 
had taken more industrial action than the entire NSW Division in the previous round and yet 
only one site, Sydney University, had achieved an outcome.  The Sydney University 
agreement exceeded expectations in terms of salaries and conditions with an expiry date of 
October 2002 (NSW Division Council motion to National Council 1999).  Therefore, one year 
on, Sydney University was the only site to have achieved the goals established at National 
Council 1998 (NSW Division Council motion to National Council 1999).  This outcome 
necessarily forced a rethink of the National Council 1998 bargaining strategy.  It was now no 
longer possible for sites to win the desired three year agreements and maintain the October 
2002 expiry date.   
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 National Council needed to make a choice: go for shorter agreements that expired at the 
same time as Sydney University (October 2002) or maintain the National Council 1998 
commitment to three year agreements and therefore set new expiry dates sometime in 
2003 (NSW Division Council motion to National Council 1999).  NSW Division argued that the 
advantage of lining all agreements up to October 2002 was that Sydney University (and 
other leading sites likely to get agreement soon) would not be forced to once again push out 
alone as front runners in the next round (NSW Division Council motion to National Council 
1999).  However, the very high outcomes achieved at Sydney University caused another 
complication.  Whilst the high outcomes raised the benchmark for other campuses in line 
with the leading sites strategy it also placed pressure on branches in poorer, less organised 
institutions to maintain parity.  To allow for later expiry dates might enable branches to win 
better outcomes in line with Sydney University’s agreement (NSW Division Council motion 
to National Council 1999).  NSW Division offered a third option which was to maintain the 
three year agreements and enable a dispersion of expiry dates into 2003 (NSW Division 
Council motion to National Council 1999).  Characteristically, Grahame McCulloch adopted 
this third compromise position and Ted Murphy seconded it.   
 
There was also a strategic element to the NSW Division motion.  The motion recommended 
that those campuses which had been negotiating for more than three months and had not 
yet secured an agreement should commence building towards bans on examination results 
and that National Executive should prepare a draft strategy for this action to be discussed at 
a leading sites meeting immediately after National Council (NSW Division Council motion to 
National Council 1999).  The motion also revived the same issues that Adrian Ryan had 
campaigned around in round two.  The motion recommended that National Executive 
prepare a report for National Council 2000 on enterprise bargaining campaigns, which 
covered: building solidarity, a review of industrial strategies and tactics and resources 
needed for prolonged campaigns, new forms of action and branch recruitment and building 
campaigns (NSW Division Council motion to National Council 1999).  The supporting 
statement also argued that priority must be given to “intense recruitment and training 
activities” in the branches prior to commencement of bargaining (NSW Division Council 
motion to National Council 1999).  This motion was carried by National Council 1999.   
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 In line with National Council’s directive, the leading sites committee met in November 1999 
and recommended the imposition of examination results bans (NTEU NE minutes 5 
November, 1999).   By the end of November, examination results bans were being imposed 
at University of Wollongong, Monash, UNSW, University of South Australia (USA) and ANU 
and many other campuses struck solidarity levies to support the action (NTEU NE minutes 
30 November, 1999).  However, the success of this strategy was mixed.  Whilst UNSW 
reached agreement at the end of December 1999 (NTEU NE minutes 20 December, 1999) 
the other campuses had made very little progress and the Christmas break was 
approaching.  Some campuses opted to lift their bans whilst others opted to maintain them 
over the break (NTEU NE minutes 10 December, 1999).  Activists reported that keeping up 
morale and attendance at members’ meetings had become difficult (NTEU leading sites 
meeting 7 February 2000).  National Assistant Secretary, Ted Murphy, reported that “there 
was a momentum problem across the board” (NTEU leading sites meeting 7 February 2000).  
In the context of round three, protracted industrial action could be read as a sign of NTEU 
weakness and not strength.  Wollongong University was a particularly troubled case (NTEU 
leading sites meeting 7 February 2000).  At the end of 1999 University of Wollongong 
management retaliated against the exam results bans by terminating the bargaining period 
(NTEU NE minutes 10 December, 1999).  The branch had made very little progress despite 
having already taken six days of strike action and then maintaining exam results bans well 
into 2000 (NTEU leading sites meeting 7 February 2000).  At many campuses hostile 
negotiations stretched well into 2000 and in some cases even into the following year.  
Meanwhile, bargaining had barely commenced at the lagging sites (NTEU NE minutes 18&19 
February 2000).  It was in this way that round three ground its way through producing 
uneven results. 
 
At National Council 2000 in September, there was some discussion about progress in the 
round.  NSW Division again put a motion.  This time NSW Division called for timelines to be 
drawn up to prepare for round four and for better strategic direction.  It also requested that 
National Council establish bargaining conferences, to finalise the round four log of claims by 
April 2002 and that a taskforce be established to consider alternative bargaining strategies 
for the next round (NSW Division Council motion to National Council 2000).  The taskforce 
148 
 
was to examine strategies, resourcing and training to achieve common outcomes across the 
sector and to develop a report to be presented to the 2001 National Council for 
endorsement (NSW Division Council motion to National Council 2000).  This motion was 
adopted by Council however the taskforce didn’t eventuate until after National Council 
2001.   
 
At National Council 2001, Ted Murphy, the newly appointed National Assistant Secretary, 
opened the Enterprise Bargaining session with a sober assessment of the NTEU’s 
achievements for round three (NTEU National Council papers 23-25 September, 2001).  
Whilst the majority of campuses had come to agreement by the end of 2000, at that time 
there were still four campuses which had not reached agreement (NTEU National Council 
papers 23-25 September, 2001).  Whilst the NTEU had achieved wage increases which 
averaged 12.5% in three year agreements, the fact that many agreements had taken so long 
to be achieved meant that in many cases in reality the wage rises amounted to 12.5% over 
four calendar years (NTEU National Council papers 23-25 September, 2001).  Whilst the 
NTEU’s pattern bargaining strategy had secured most claims at each institution, alongside 
these qualified successes was a long list of losses (NTEU National Council papers 23-25 
September, 2001).  Wage dispersion across the sector had risen to around 10%, some award 
conditions were being dissolved and at a layer of institutions management had secured 
closed and comprehensive agreements which insulated the institution from any further 
advances in award conditions (NTEU National Council papers 23-25 September, 2001).  
Some institutions had lost union resources such as time release for local union officers, 
office space and facilities (NTEU National Council papers 23-25 September, 2001).  At some 
institutions intellectual property rights had been eroded whilst at others the NTEU had 
failed to secure adequate caps on workloads which was compounded by its inability to gain 
centrally funded wage increases placing pressure on resources at the Faculty level (NTEU 
National Council papers 23-25 September, 2001).    
 
However, despite the extensive difficulties endured in round three, National Council did not 
develop any substantially new approaches.  Council reaffirmed its commitment to 
maintaining the leading sites strategy, including: maintaining the mandatory outcomes 
approach, ensuring a unified campaign across all branches and branches would commence 
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bargaining together even where this required delays for some branches (NTEU National 
Council papers 23-25 September, 2001).  As with previous rounds, Council also resolved to 
maintain the pattern for the following round by attempting to align the nominal expiry 
dates of the agreements across the sector (NTEU National Council papers 23-25 September, 
2001).   Council also acknowledged the tougher terrain generated by the continued decline 
in federal government funding and particularly the government’s unwillingness to 
supplement bargaining outcomes (NTEU National Council papers 23-25 September, 2001).   
 
The NTEU’s key diagnosis of round three’s difficulties was that it had failed to consult widely 
enough with the membership to ensure their commitment to the NTEU’s goals.  To address 
this, National Council resolved to conduct a wide-ranging discussion with the rank and file 
membership and all layers of the NTEU on key priorities for round four of enterprise 
bargaining and to conduct a national survey of all members to engage them in formulating 
the NTEU’s claims (NTEU National Council papers 23-25 September, 2001).  Council also 
resolved to start its discussion early to ensure maximum preparedness at all levels of the 
union.  The plan was to finalise the mandatory claims and settlement points in late 
September 2002 via a two day Bargaining Forum which would include Branch negotiators, 
industrial staff as well as National Councillors and Division officers (NTEU National Council 
papers 23-25 September, 2001).  With the tough experience of round three behind it, the 
NTEU resolved to be much better prepared for round four and to engage the membership in 
the process. 
 
The NTEU prepares for round four 
Coming out of National Council, therefore, the main goal of the NTEU was to consult as 
widely as possible with the membership to develop a log of claims that the membership 
would feel committed to pursuing during round four.  An Enterprise Bargaining Taskforce 
was developed to oversee this process (NTEU Enterprise Bargaining Taskforce teleconf 17 
December 2001).   The taskforce established the timelines for distributing the national 
survey and also developed a series of reference groups to develop claims that addressed a 
range of issues that affected the membership (NTEU Enterprise Bargaining Taskforce 
teleconf 17 December 2001).   The Enterprise Bargaining Taskforce recognised that one 
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weakness in the round was the poor results for general staff at institutions where the NTEU 
was not the dominant union (NTEU EB Memo 14 December 2001).  The taskforce therefore 
developed a series of reference groups devoted to recruiting general staff where the NTEU 
was not the dominant union and to developing enterprise bargaining claims that spoke 
directly to general staff in the sector (NTEU EB Memo 14 December 2001).   It was also 
determined that the NTEU would convene a national general staff forum in the first half of 
2002 (NTEU NE minutes 22 May, 2003).  
   
There were also two significant new claims that came from outside the Enterprise 
Bargaining Taskforce processes: a claim to address the increases in casualisation in the 
sector and another devoted to parental leave.  It had been reported to National Council that 
19% of academic staff and 12% of general staff were employed as casuals and that local 
managements were under pressure to replace continuing staff with casual labour with likely 
downward pressures on conditions in the sector (NTEU National Council papers 23-25 
September, 2001).  Dr Anne Junor, an industrial relations academic from UNSW, had 
conducted the first major review of casual labour as part of a research grant which was part-
sponsored by the NTEU (NTEU National Council papers 23-25 September, 2001).  Dr Junor’s 
research formed the foundation for the NTEU’s claims for casualisation including the 
proposal to use the Metal Industry case precedent to increase the casual loading from 20% 
to 25% (NTEU NSW Division Motions 17 August).  The second major claim was a maternity 
leave claim involving 14 weeks fully paid leave plus 38 weeks paid at 60% salary to be paid 
by a central university fund (NTEU EB Forum October 2002).  The NTEU’s radical maternity 
leave claim came from an unlikely source, the Australian Catholic University (Thompson 11 
December 2003).  During Enterprise Bargaining negotiations in 2001, the Australian Catholic 
University management had made a commitment to offer mothers full salary for 12 weeks 
and then 60% salary for 40 weeks, the equivalent of 36 weeks full-time pay (Thompson 11 
December 2003). The NTEU Women’s Action Committee refined this provision and then 
lobbied the NTEU to adopt this provision and make it a mandatory claim in round four of 
enterprise bargaining.   
 
In October 2002, the National Executive met the day before the National Enterprise 
Bargaining Forum to discuss the forum’s agenda (NTEU NE minutes 2 October 2002).   As 
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with previous rounds, it was the National Executive’s role to arrive at the salary claim.  The 
National Executive set the Salary Claim of 24% between 2003-2006 and determined the 
expiry date to be 30 June 2006 (NTEU EB Forum October 2002).   Also as with previous 
rounds, the floor price for salary increases would be set at a later date and dependent on 
the progress of the leading sites (NTEU EB Forum October 2002).  It was agreed at National 
Executive that part of the complications of round three was the long list of mandatory 
claims (NTEU NE minutes 2 October 2002).  It was therefore determined that the list of 
mandatory claims should be kept to a minimum and be supplemented with a less binding 
list of recommended priority claims (NTEU NE minutes 2 October 2002).  With claims 
coming from the national survey of members, the Enterprise Bargaining taskforce reference 
groups, the general staff conference, the Women’s Action Committee and the usual 
technical claims coming from National Industrial Unit, it had been difficult to prioritise and 
limit the demands.  The National Bargaining Forum came up with 20 mandatory items and 
another 16 recommended priority items for a log of claims (NTEU EB Forum October 2002).  
The National Bargaining Forum also developed a list of prohibited matters which included 
that there be no increase in management’s capacity to introduce AWAs (NTEU EB Forum 
October 2002).   
 
Therefore, despite the difficulties encountered in round three, the NTEU had raised the bar 
still higher for itself.  Armed with its long list of priorities, including a landmark claim for 12 
months paid maternity leave, the NTEU entered into round four negotiations.  The 
discussion part of this chapter will return to this period and attempt to explain the 
difficulties the NTEU encountered in framing its circumstances to enable it to set clear 
priorities leading in to round four.   
 
Round four enterprise bargaining commences 
Round four did not get off to a good start.  Central to the leading sites strategy was that the 
front-runner branches should lead the way and win strong outcomes that could be 
generalised through negotiations at other branches.  But what happens when the very first 
agreement to be reached is substandard?  UNSW management made an aggressive start to 
bargaining with a generous pay offer that was designed to break solidarity between 
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academic and general staff and to entice staff away from the NTEU’s campaign over 
conditions.  UNSW offered a 12% pay rise to academics staff with a bonus of $3000 to be 
repeated annually for the life of the agreement (NTEU NE minutes 21&22 February, 2003).  
General staff were also offered a generous pay rise but on different terms and a lower 
overall outcome.  In terms of conditions, the UNSW agreement was substandard on a series 
of important fronts: it did not meet the casual employment claims and despite an increase 
in the parental leave provisions from twelve to fourteen weeks paid maternity leave, 
including two weeks paid partner’s leave, the provisions fell well short of the NTEU’s 
ambitious maternity leave claim (NTEU NE minutes 2&3 May, 2003).  National Executive 
expressed concerns about the divisive impacts of the differential pay offer (NTEU NE 
minutes 27-28 June, 2003).  However, the other union for general staff at UNSW, the CPSU, 
had moved to agree to the offer based on a ballot of CPSU members which had shown that 
80% supported accepting it (NTEU NE minutes 22 May, 2003).   The low density of NTEU 
members among general staff at UNSW meant there was limited prospect of winning a “No” 
campaign against accepting the agreement or of winning a better offer (NTEU NE minutes 
22 May, 2003).  But a major concession to the CPSU risked having knock-on effects at other 
campuses which also shared general staff coverage with the CPSU which included leading 
site, Sydney University.  However, local negotiators reported on the intransigence of UNSW 
management and stressed the difficulties the branch would face to attempt to mobilise the 
membership given the staff’s overwhelming acceptance of the salary offer (NTEU NE 
minutes 27-28 June, 2003).  National Executive noted that although the agreement was not 
a strong one, overall the agreement met all but two of the mandatory settlement points and 
did not allow for the introduction of AWAs (NTEU NE minutes 27-28 June, 2003).  Not to sign 
the general staff agreement risked not being party to the agreement (NTEU NE minutes 27-
28 June, 2003).   Grahame McCulloch also warned that management would likely proceed 
with a non-union agreement for academics (NTEU NE minutes 27-28 June, 2003).  The 
National Executive therefore reluctantly endorsed the agreement (NTEU NE minutes 27-28 
June, 2003).   
 
What should the NTEU do now?  An Enterprise Bargaining Memo from the National 
Industrial Unit devoted to the issue of the parental leave claim argued for a defensive 
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strategy to rescue a clause that was in terminal trouble (NTEU EB Memo 22 May 2003).  
Following the substandard outcome at UNSW, the memo recommended that the NTEU 
identify those campuses most likely to get agreement to the parental leave claim and to 
make the claim an immediate priority (NTEU EB Memo 22 May 2003).  That is regardless of 
how close branches were to reaching overall agreement, they should move immediately to 
securing the parental leave claim if they thought they could get it (NTEU EB Memo 22 May 
2003).  An example of where this was possible was ANU which had opened negotiations 
offering 20 weeks fully paid maternity leave (NTEU EB Memo 22 May 2003).  Meanwhile, 
the best hope for revitalising the round four log of claims in its entirety was Sydney 
University.  Sydney University had made a strong start and by August 2003 was close to 
agreement having achieved an 18% salary increase plus sign-on bonus, the full range of 
mandatory settlement claims including the parental leave claim and the 25% loading for 
casual staff (NTEU NE minutes 7 July, 2003).  However, there was a major concern around 
management’s proposal to exclude from the Agreement general staff earning more than 
$102, 000 and academic staff earning in excess of $120, 000 (NTEU NE minutes 7 July, 2003).  
The main risk of this provision was that it could open the door for AWAs (NTEU NE minutes 
16 September, 2003).  Sydney University representatives returned to the negotiation table 
but were unable to defeat this provision and despite this limitation the agreement was 
endorsed by the National Executive but with nine voting against it (NTEU NE minutes 16 
September, 2003).  On the positive side, Sydney University had broken through with the 
maternity leave claim winning 36 weeks parental leave, comprising a minimum of 14 weeks 
fully paid maternity leave and the choice of a further 38 weeks at 60% pay or access to a 
funded return to work program (NTEU NE teleconf minutes 23 September, 2003).  Sydney 
University was therefore poised to win an agreement that would overshadow the losses at 
UNSW and put the leading sites strategy back on track when disaster struck.   
 
Higher Education Workplace Relations Requirements 
On 22 September, federal government ministers Brendan Nelson and Tony Abbott publicly 
announced the Higher Education Workplace Relations Requirements (HEWRRs) (NTEU NE 
teleconf minutes 23 September, 2003).  Despite the fact that the legislation had not yet 
been passed, Nelson and Abbott declared the legislation effective immediately (Guy 27 
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September 2003).  The HEWRRs were a central component of Brendan Nelson’s Backing 
Australia’s Future package.  Backing Australia’s Future enabled universities to impose 
additional HECS fees and to increase the number of full fee paying places from 25% to 50% 
and introduced the full fee paying loans scheme that put a cap of five years on 
commonwealth funding for students (NTEU NE minutes 7 July, 2003).  The policy also 
foreshadowed Voluntary Student Unionism (NTEU NE minutes 7 July, 2003).  Under the 
scheme, universities were required to enter into a funding agreement which gave the 
commonwealth unprecedented power of intervention into the life of the campuses, 
including the ability to specify the number of student places down to the discipline level 
(NTEU NE minutes 7 July, 2003).   
 
From an industrial relations perspective, HEWRRs tied increases in university 
Commonwealth Grants Scheme funding to compliance with a series of industrial relations 
requirements, including: 
 All certified agreements must contain a provision that enables the university to offer 
Australian Workplace Agreement (AWAs) 
 Any improvements to conditions or conditions that were in excess of community 
standards must be directly linked to productivity measures and in line with the 
business requirements of the University 
 Any agreement that attempted to limit casual employment would not be certified 
 Any agreement that provided for exclusive union representation on committees 
would not be certified 
 Universities could not fund full time union positions or provide union offices on 
campuses free of charge    (NTEU Industrial Bulletin 25 
September 2003) 
Universities that refused to implement these changes would lose out on their share of $404 
million of federal funding (Contractor 23 September, 2003).  The NTEU National Executive 
identified the Backing Australia’s Future proposed reforms as the “largest and most radical 
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restructuring of the university system since the Dawkins reforms of the late 1980s” (NTEU 
NE minutes 7 July, 2003).   
 
Taken as a whole, despite its combative intentions, the legislation in fact opened up an 
opportunity for the NTEU.  The timing of the announcement, intended to undermine the 
NTEU, in fact worked in its favour, allowing it to put its own demands at the centre of the 
campaign from the outset.  The government announcement had been made specifically to 
terminate the agreement at Sydney University to prevent it and other universities from 
insulating themselves from the proposed workplace changes by signing up local enterprise 
agreements (Contractor 27 September 2003).  However, it is unclear whether Abbott and 
Nelson had intended to pick a fight with the strongest branch in the sector and also one 
week before the NTEU meeting of National Council.  Sydney University branch activists 
responded by calling an emergency meeting of members.  The media attended the meeting 
where around 300 members voted for two lunchtime stop works building up to a 24-hour 
strike on 7 October (Dodd 22 September 2003).  Another issue regarding the timing of the 
announcement was that most campuses had already opened their bargaining periods and 
were therefore able to take protected industrial action.  When the media also attended 
NTEU National Council the following week 250 NTEU delegates voted unanimously for a 
national 24 hour strike (NTEU National Council papers 29 September - 1 October, 2003).   
 
The legislation itself also offended the most powerful organisation in the sector, the 
Australian Vice Chancellor’s Association (AVCC).  The NTEU and AVCC were able to 
temporarily overcome their differences to form a symbiotic relationship using the strengths 
of each organisation to maintain pressure on the government.  By emphasising the issues 
the NTEU had in common with the AVCC, such as increased government funding, quality 
education and university autonomy (NTEU NE minutes 28 September, 2003) the NTEU was 
able to gain further traction for its demands.  Meanwhile, the AVCC used the NTEU’s public 
protests, industrial action and media attention to keep their goals in the public domain.  
Whilst the Liberal government intended to antagonise the NTEU it could not have 
anticipated the scale of opposition to government interference from the AVCC.  The Vice 
Chancellors were near unanimous in their opposition to the threat to their autonomy and 
the increase in bureaucratic control from the government.  Particularly unattractive for Vice 
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Chancellors was the prospect of their Human Resources units tied up in negotiating many 
hundreds of AWAs, particularly when many academics could reasonably expect to gain 
significant pay rises in this manner (Contractor 27 September8 October 2003).  The money 
being offered by the government was also not enough to entice the wealthier institutions, 
specifically Melbourne University, Sydney University and ANU.  Most Vice Chancellors 
provided submissions and some appeared before the Senate Inquiry to oppose the 
legislation.  In fact, the only Vice Chancellor to openly support the legislation was Professor 
Rory Hume from UNSW (Guy and Noonan 27 September, 2003).  However, unfortunately for 
the government, UNSW was also the only university in the sector that could not participate 
in the HEWRR process as their agreement had already been reached.   
 
Defeating HEWRRs 
Ironically, the legislation might have been exactly what the NTEU needed to break free of 
the malaise it had experienced coming out of round three.  The legislation acted to unite the 
NTEU membership and its supporters and to give a clear, credible focus to its enterprise 
bargaining demands.  It ensured internal solidarity for the NTEU by drawing attention to 
difficulties in the sector that the NTEU had been campaigning around for years.  The 
discovery that regional universities and other campuses which catered for lower socio-
economic status students would be unfairly hit by the increases to HECS which would price 
their students out of the sector (Guy 27 September20 October 2003) enabled the NTEU to 
bridge the widening gulf between NTEU branches in the wealthy city based campuses and 
their cash-strapped regional counterparts.  The threat of AWAs also helped the NTEU to 
reach out to the seven other unions in the sector to maintain a united front as well as to 
shore up solidarity from the ACTU.  The publicity that surrounded all of these issues built up 
momentum for the NTEU’s National Strike Day on 16 October 2003.   
 
The national strike was a success for the NTEU.  The media estimated that 40,000 university 
staff had engaged in the action (Guy and Tomazin 27 September17 October 2003).  Whilst 
Sydney University reported 98% compliance for the strike and had around 300 people 
attending the pickets (The Advocate November 2003), the strike day raised every campus up 
including many lagging sites from round three.  The Age reported that Victorian University 
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of Technology, Australian Catholic University, La Trobe University and Ballarat University 
were “virtually shut down” (Martin and Dodd 24 September17 October 2003).  The threat of 
AWAs ensured united action with the CPSU and the Liquor Hospitality and Miscellaneous 
Workers Union (Contractor and Noonan 27 September, 2003) at the University of 
Wollongong,  the campus that had struggled through round three.  It was later reported that 
1044 members joined the NTEU in October 2003 (Guy 27 September14&15 November, 
2003).   The evening before the strike, 800 staff at ANU had attended a meeting to witness 
their Vice Chancellor sign a non-compliant Enterprise Agreement in defiance of the 
government’s legislation and foregoing the funding offer (Contractor 17 October 2003).  
Could this be the same ANU that only in round three had threatened a non-union ballot?  As 
an indication of the importance of the role of Vice Chancellor in the new university system 
(Marginson and Considine 2000: 74), ANU now had a new Vice Chancellor, Ian Chubb.  
Professor Ian Chubb, formerly the Vice Chancellor of Flinders University and one time chair 
of the Higher Education Council, was a powerful player in the politics of higher education.  
Chubb was on the AVCC negotiating team when it agreed to meet with the NTEU to develop 
a joint strategy for achieving a federal government funded salary rise against the Coalition’s 
funding cuts back in 1996 (NTEU Industrial Memo 18 April 1996).  The relationship was 
maintained and Ian Chubb had been an outspoken opponent of the federal government’s 
ongoing bureaucratic intervention in the intervening years.    
 
However, despite the day of protest, the bills passed unamended through the House of 
Representatives where the government had a clear majority (Guerrera and Tomazin 17 
October 2003).  However, the fate of the legislation hung in the Senate where the Liberal 
government did not have an outright majority.  To get the legislation through Senate, the 
government was relying on the support of all four independents who held the balance of 
power (Contractor 16 October 2003).  However, these senators had indicated that they 
could not endorse the package without significant amendments (Guerrera 8 November 
2003).  Meanwhile, the Senate Inquiry into the Backing Australia’s Future package had 
received 500 submissions with fewer than six in support of the package (Guerrera 8 
November 2003) and on 8 November 2003 announced that the legislation was so flawed 
that it should not be pursued (Guerrera 8 November 2003).  With just eight sitting days 
remaining in the parliamentary year, there was little time to debate or amend the package 
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(Guerrera 8 November 2003).  At the same time, the Vice Chancellors facing further 
industrial action on the campuses were pushing for the issue to be resolved before the end 
of the year (Guerrera 8 November 2003).  The likelihood that Nelson would have to back 
down was enough to allow the University of Sydney to resume negotiations towards 
agreement (Contractor 13 November 2003).  Other Universities also recommenced 
negotiations at this time (NTEU NE minutes 14&15 November, 2003).   
 
On the 27 November, the Sydney Morning Herald headline read “Nelson caves in on 
university demands”.  The paper reported that the higher education package had been 
“gutted” with Nelson agreeing to a raft of fundamental aspects of the package to get it 
through the Senate before the end of the year (Contractor 27 November 2003).  Among the 
many changes, the government had abandoned the workplace relations aspects of the 
package (Contractor 27 November 2003).  The final legislation removed the proposal to link 
$404 million in operating grants to the workplace relations reforms, under the legislation 
universities were still required to include a standard statement which enabled the offering 
of AWAs (NTEU NE minutes 9 December, 2003).  Following the government back down, 
Sydney University was able to pursue its enterprise agreement.  On 10 December, Sydney 
University’s agreement was finally certified and was the first to win the full maternity leave 
claim reported in the Sydney Morning Herald as the “mother of all deals”(Thompson 11 
December 2003).  With outcomes at both ANU and Sydney University, the NTEU was able to 
regain its footing for round four.  Further, the momentum generated during the campaign 
was enough to propel many of campuses, including those that had struggled during round 
three, towards securing round four agreements.  
 
Higher Education Workplace Relations Requirements (HEWRRs) Mark II 
By October 2004 the NTEU was in a fairly confident position: the HEWRRs legislation had 
been defeated and most enterprise agreements had been finalised.  However, the federal 
election on 9 October 2004 changed everything for the NTEU delivering a landslide victory 
for the Liberal party in the lower house and a conservative majority in the Senate.  The 
federal government moved immediately to re-introduce the HEWRRs legislation on the 
campuses (Guerrara and Rood 2004).  With the Liberals holding a majority in both houses 
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the new Higher Education Workplace Relations Requirements Bill was immediately ratified 
in the House of Representatives and then swept through the Senate as well (NTEU Media 
Briefing 2005).  The NTEU’s initial response was to attempt to revisit its successful 2003 
strategy of public protest and appealing to sympathetic Vice Chancellors.  However, whilst 
the NTEU held a series of successful rallies, the federal government had also learned lessons 
from the 2003 campaign.  To drive through its HEWRRs legislation it knew it must destroy 
the relationship between the AVCC and the unions.  Attempts to resist HEWRRS were 
therefore swiftly met with threats of legal and financial sanctions directed at both Vice 
Chancellors and the NTEU.   
 
The NTEU had little option but to proceed to negotiate HEWRR compliant agreements.  The 
National Industrial Unit enacted its timeworn strategy of developing model clauses to be 
negotiated at each campus.  The goal of these clauses was to emulate the form of the 
HEWRRs requirements whilst delivering minimal actual concessions to the legislation.  As 
with the leading sites strategy every win at an individual institution laid the foundation for 
winning it at other campuses.   
 
Attempting to secure HEWRR compliant agreements in this environment offered some 
opportunities for the NTEU.  What became immediately obvious was that the legislation 
having been rushed through and without parliamentary scrutiny contained many 
inconsistencies and flaws.  It had also been introduced so quickly that the federal 
department for higher education, the Department of Employment, Science and Training 
(DEST), had difficulty training its officers to develop a uniform interpretation of the 
legislation who were prone to providing different answers to the same question depending 
on who you spoke to.  Whilst the NTEU had a national industrial unit, university 
managements had no reliable national body to depend on.  In this environment the NTEU 
was able to control the flow of information and make significant gains.  Using its superior 
access to information, the National Industrial Unit used favourable outcomes at individual 
campuses to win similar gains elsewhere.  Of course favourable DEST rulings could be 
promoted whilst unfavourable ones could be dismissed by providing a DEST ruling that 
contradicted it made somewhere else in the sector.  In this way, by the end of October 
2005, almost all of the campuses had achieved HEWRR compliant agreements (NTEU NE 
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minutes 31 October, 2005).  However, despite the NTEU’s overall success in minimizing the 
damage (including protecting the full maternity leave entitlements on all campuses), the 
strategy was a defensive one and in some instances the NTEU had been forced to make 
concessions to achieve certification (NTEU NE minutes 11&12 November, 2005).   
 
Summary   
The rest of this chapter returns to the discussion so far to analyse the learning process 
involved in strategic decision making for round four of enterprise bargaining.  The effects 
that deregulation had on the sector and its impacts on the NTEU’s ability to adapt will be 
analysed.  The rest of the discussion will focus on the internal factors that influenced the 
NTEU.  There were a series of factors that impacted on the NTEU’s ability to develop 
effective trade union strategy.  Firstly, an incorrect or perhaps incomplete diagnosis of the 
difficulties it had encountered in round three lead to inappropriate strategies to address 
them.  The NTEU’s assessment that it had not consulted widely enough with the 
membership for round three of enterprise bargaining led to the development of the 
Enterprise Bargaining forum in preparation for round four which appear to have 
compounded its difficulties.  Secondly, and related to the first was the incapacity of the 
national leadership to effectively frame the NTEU’s circumstances to gain its strategic 
bearings.  Thirdly, as key activists in the NTEU withdrew, the NTEU lost its key repositories of 
strategic “know how” and some of its star boundary spanners who assisted in monitoring 
and interpreting the external environment.  Lastly, this chapter will look at how the lessons 
of the past were mobilized to enable the NTEU to regain its footing and effectively respond 
to the HEWRRs legislation.  This discussion will draw on the observations of both trade 
union strategy and knowledge management literature to guide this investigation.   
 
Before analysing the NTEU’s response to the HEWRRs legislation, this chapter will return to 
the NTEU’s deliberations coming out of round three which formed the framework for the 
NTEU’s approach to round four.  As has been shown, even before the intervention of the 
Liberal government, the NTEU was in trouble.  Round three had been a gruelling round for 
the NTEU.  The difficulty of ensuring uniform strategic capacity at the branch level and the 
need for national co-ordination and cohesion at the national level, which had challenged the 
161 
 
NTEU from the outset of enterprise bargaining, had reached crisis point by the end of round 
three.  The protracted disputes at many campuses required to secure agreements and the 
lagging sites falling further behind than in previous rounds threatened the leading sites 
strategy.  Despite this, the NTEU failed to adopt any substantially new strategies to address 
this crisis and in fact raised the bar still higher for itself entering round four with a long list 
of mandatory claims.  What had gone wrong? 
 
External factors impacting on the NTEU 
The first issue that needs to be addressed is the external environment.  By round three, the 
full impact of deregulation in the sector was evident.  As discussed in chapter five (devoted 
to the political economy of the sector) by 2001 the Sandstone and Redbrick campuses (the 
Group of Eight plus the University of Tasmania) accounted for more than 46% of the total 
operating revenue in the sector with the remaining 53% of operating revenue divided (very 
unevenly) among twenty-eight gumtree and universities of technology and new universities 
(de Zilwa 2005: 402-4).  This stratification of the sector led to a wide disparity of 
management approaches with some poorer institutions aggressively resisting the NTEU’s 
claims.  Vice Chancellors and their respective managements were also exerting ever more 
influence over their campuses (Marginson and Considine 2000: 74), meaning that, 
increasingly, campuses reflected the idiosyncrasies and political agendas of their local 
managements.  Local management strategy could have serious consequences for 
employment relations.  For example, ANU was at least as prosperous as Sydney University, 
but its management took a confrontational approach to the NTEU during round three which 
resulted in a lower outcome and only after a protracted industrial campaign.  As discussed in 
round four, the fortunes of ANU changed dramatically when Professor Ian Chubb became 
Vice Chancellor.  Therefore, from an industrial relations perspective, the sector could not be 
easily categorised or assessed.  How could the NTEU best make sense of its external 
environment to develop a uniform national strategy to respond to it?  This new 
environment put even greater strain on the tension between local autonomy and national 
strategy.  The terrain in most local branches was growing more hostile placing local 
leaderships under much greater pressure while the sector as a whole was becoming much 
more disaggregated making it difficult for the NTEU at the national level to develop effective 
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national policy.   
 
Further, it is likely that the stratification of the sector posed a fundamental threat to the 
leading sites strategy which was built on the premise that university managements would be 
compelled to match stronger outcomes achieved at the leading sites to compete for limited 
skilled labour in the sector.  What happens when a series of local managers decide that they 
simply cannot compete and opt to fall behind on wages and conditions?  Perhaps the ideal 
of unified national outcomes was no longer a possibility.  Whilst National Council 
acknowledged the impacts of the continued decline in federal government funding (NTEU 
National Council papers 23-25 September, 2001) it is unclear if it grasped the full 
implications of this at the branch level.  The NTEU’s resolution to lobby the ALP for 
improved funding and changes to the industrial relations framework (NTEU National Council 
papers 23-25 September, 2001) was an insufficient response to this complex situation.   
 
Internal factors impacting on the NTEU 
Whilst external factors of unevenness of funding and disaggregation of the sector can 
explain much of the NTEU’s difficulties, there were clearly significant internal factors at 
work.  In this section the period leading up to round four will be revisited to explain the 
difficulties the NTEU had in framing its situation and setting clear priorities.  Despite the 
NTEU National Executive’s stated desire to limit the number of items in its log of claims, the 
National Bargaining Forum developed 20 mandatory items and another 16 recommended 
priority items.  National Council determined that the key to the NTEU’s internal difficulties 
was that the membership had not been consulted widely enough in developing the NTEU’s 
log of claims for round three.  However, this diagnosis was problematic for several reasons.  
Firstly, in fact the NTEU had dedicated considerable resources to engaging with members in 
the lead up to round three via the Enterprise Bargaining Conference and the Enterprise 
Bargaining Reference Groups.  How would the next Enterprise Bargaining Forum be 
different?  At issue was whether the NTEU wanted a strategic discussion with a smaller 
group involving the local leaderships or whether it wanted a broad discussion to maximise 
membership engagement.  This issue played itself out on the floor of National Council.  The 
NSW Division argued that the main purpose of the Enterprise Bargaining Forum was the 
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need for a strategic discussion and participation should be limited to those directly engaged 
in branch negotiations (NTEU National Council papers 23-25 September, 2001).  However, 
NSW Division lost this debate.  The word “strategy” was removed from the final motion and 
the two day Bargaining Forum would include Branch negotiators, industrial staff as well as 
National Councillors and Division officers (NTEU National Council papers 23-25 September, 
2001).  Although for administrative reasons attendance at the EB Forum was later scaled 
down by the National Executive (NTEU EB Memo 20 May 2002), the purpose of the forum 
had not been clarified.  The outcome of the forum was the development of a long list of 
claims rather than a clear strategy on how these demands would be achieved.   
 
The second major problem for the call for greater consultation with the NTEU’s membership 
to develop its claims was that it subsumed the specific problem with the claims from round 
three; any number of specific failings of the round three claims could be encompassed 
within the perceived need for increased membership involvement.  Was it that the 
membership did not care about the claims enough to battle for them?  Or were the claims 
too difficult to win at all institutions?  Or were there too many claims as the National 
Executive indicated in the lead up to the National Bargaining Forum (NTEU NE minutes 2 
October 2002).  Lastly, was it a question of what they were campaigning for, or the strategy 
adopted to win them?  Perhaps due to the complexity of the sector the NTEU appeared 
unable to test and assess the relative merits of particular strategies.  How could the 
successes be explained?  What did Sydney University do “right” that Wollongong did 
“wrong”?  Or was it inappropriate to try to compare the fortunes of a wealthy Group of 
Eight institution against a poorer regional one?  Nor was it a simple question of “willingness 
to take industrial action in pursuit of goals” that was hotly debated on the National 
Executive in round two over Melbourne University’s non-compliant agreement.  In fact, in 
round three many of the weaker branches took much more industrial action than the 
stronger ones.  The strategy of engaging in protracted industrial action at weak campuses 
such as Wollongong must have had negative impacts on solidarity and morale within the 
branch.  But that lesson was not drawn.  Similarly, it should have been clear that the ban on 
examination results was a failed strategy and yet what little evidence there is of a discussion 
of its merits were inconclusive (NTEU leading sites meeting 7 February 2000).   A brief entry 
in the minutes of the leading sites meeting (7 February 2000) alludes to some challenges 
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with the strategy, including: ensuring sufficient membership uptake, coping with opposition 
from students and difficulties with timing and co-ordination.  However, the leading sites 
committee did not adopt a position.  There is also no record of a more formal review of the 
exam results bans strategy at National Council or the EB Forums, and therefore no clear 
national position was developed.  Interestingly, however, exam results bans were not 
proposed during discussion of round four.  Arguably, the strategy was buried before an 
autopsy could be performed. 
 
Difficulties framing its circumstances 
The NTEU’s strategy of opening the NTEU up to a broad free-ranging discussion to develop 
its claims without a clear framework or narrative to guide this process produced the long list 
of mandatory and recommended claims without a clear strategy of how to pursue them at 
the branch level.  In the trade union strategy discussion in chapter two, it was found that 
although membership participation is vital to successful union strategy, the membership in 
turn is beholden to its union representatives to frame their situation for them.  As Hyman 
points out, the membership of a union does not form one homogenous grouping but is 
made up of individuals with varying and even conflicting viewpoints (1989:150) and 
therefore membership representation is mediated by the leadership (Hyman 1997: 311).  
Union leaders must therefore collate, assess and prioritize the wishes of the membership 
within the context of the pressures of the external environment (Hyman 1997: 311) to build 
a cohesive strategy that the membership can support.  The NTEU’s surveys, reference 
groups and large forums produced a long list of demands which taken as a whole would be 
very difficult to achieve in the context (or contexts) the NTEU was operating in.  To develop 
effective union strategy the NTEU required mediated representation at two levels: the local 
branch level and at the national level.  At the local level, the role of branch leaderships was 
not just to reflect what the members would like to win but to develop an understanding of 
what the membership would be willing and able to do to pursue those goals and the 
likelihood of success.  At the national level, the role of the national leadership was to 
mediate the demands from local branches and frame these demands in a national strategy.  
In previous rounds, debate among branch leaderships could be a source of considerable 
tension and debate, but also one of clarification, innovation and learning.  The NTEU’s 
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surveys, reference groups and large forums were no substitute for this process.   
 
The archived survey instrument itself provides an artefact of the deficiencies of the NTEU’s 
approach at this time.  The survey instrument asked the individual member to identify which 
issues the NTEU should give highest priority to in the coming round from a list of eighteen 
issues, which included: salary increases, workloads and family-friendly provisions.  Members 
were encouraged to enter additional priority claims.  The survey yielded results from 300 
randomly selected academic and professional staff members from various institutions 
throughout the sector.  The results contained few surprises for those working in the sector.  
They also did not enable the NTEU to better understand the specific branch environments 
the members were working in and could not argue for a local or national strategy to pursue 
these goals.  This same problem was evident in the many forums, committees and reference 
groups convened to develop the NTEU’s claims.  These groups contributed to the long list of 
the NTEU’s claims but could not help build a greater understanding of the NTEU’s strategic 
situation.  This period will be revisited in chapter ten to analyse the impact of involving far 
greater numbers of members in the NTEU’s strategic decision-making from a network 
perspective. 
 
Whilst there were greater numbers of NTEU members engaged in enterprise bargaining 
discussions in rounds three and four, there was also high turnover of active members 
between the two rounds.  Of the 164 NTEU members who were actively engaged in 
formulating strategy for round three, 121 were not involved in round four.  The turnover 
was especially high among peripheral members who were involved in the large forums.  Of 
the 121 who withdrew between round three and round four, a little over 100 had only 
attended either National Council or participated in either the national Enterprise Bargaining 
forum and/or one of the Enterprise Bargaining reference groups.  On the converse side, of 
the 147 who participated in formulating strategy for round four, 104 had never been 
involved in enterprise bargaining at the national level in the NTEU before.  There are several 
possible explanations for this turnover.  One is that the large forums themselves were not 
conducive to building the close communities of practice over time necessary to share 
experience and build the “know how” needed to hold active members.  Attending a large 
conference for two days did not compensate for membership of a smaller, longer term 
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committee such as National Executive or the Industrial Matters Committee of the past.  
Another explanation is that the demoralising impacts of the difficult negotiations during 
round three burned many active members who had participated in the first forum.  As this is 
a study of strategy making at the national level, it is difficult to trace individual experiences 
or to measure how many of these participants remained active at the branch level of the 
organisation.  Meanwhile, turnover of peripheral members was compounded by turnover 
among the core national leadership.   
 
Key repositories of strategic “know how” in decline 
Whilst there was high turnover of peripheral members, the original wave of experienced 
NTEU members was also receding.  From among the remaining elected officers who did not 
continue from round three to round four, 12 were members who had been on the national 
leadership since amalgamation, including: former National Assistant Secretary, Kerry Lewis, 
former NSW Division Secretary, Adrian Ryan, former ACT Division Secretary, John O’Brien, 
and former Victorian Division President, Cathy Caruso.  These individuals had been key 
figures in the many debates during the previous rounds.  Of the remaining leaders at the 
national level in round four only the National Secretariat, Ted Murphy, Carolyn Allport and 
Grahame McCulloch, remained from amalgamation and the first round of bargaining.  Three 
of the round four national leaders had only joined the national leadership during round 
three.  Therefore, whilst the numbers of people participating in developing strategy had 
increased, the core leadership was contracting.  A smaller, less experienced cog was moving 
a larger and more unwieldy wheel.  It is likely that the very large forums acted to dilute the 
voice of a shrinking band of experienced activists.  It is likely that this receding tide of 
experienced members was also occurring among the leaderships of many branches.  Whilst 
it is likely most of the turnover was due to retirement, the sector and the employment 
relations framework had changed so dramatically that many of the original team may not 
have coped well with the transition.   
 
The turnover of experienced membership diminished the strategic capacity of the NTEU at 
both the branch and national level.  In his research into union strategy and union democracy 
in the NTEU, O’Brien discussed the central role of union activists in the ongoing translation 
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of members’ wishes into official union policy (O'Brien 1999: 80), where again as with 
Hyman’s observations representing the members’ interests is a process of active translation 
not one of passive reflection.  In fact, with its unusual branch based structure in the FAUSA 
tradition, O’Brien refers to the “complicated negotiations” when it came to attempts to 
exert central power that characterised the NTEU’s early years (O'Brien 1999).  In the 
discussion of round two, this thesis argued that one crucial factor in the fortunes of 
individual branches was the strategic capacity of the leaders and activists within the 
branches themselves.  O’Brien’s discussion of the obstacles encountered at the University of 
Canberra and ANU during round two provided helpful insight into the kind of strategic 
capacity required at the branch level, such as the ability to cope with aggressive 
management tactics that acted to exploit the divisions created by other unions on the 
campuses (O'Brien 1999: 87).  The strategic capacity or “know how” of leaders at the branch 
level was found to be made up of any number of skills and instincts, relationships, local 
knowledge and more formal forms of knowledge and are therefore impossible to codify and 
very difficult to disseminate.  The best way to learn these skills is in communities of practice.   
 
The loss of star boundary spanners 
At the national level, the loss of experienced representatives made it more difficult for the 
national organisation to make sense of the branch experience and to develop appropriate 
national strategy.  In particular, in losing John O’Brien and Adrian Ryan the NTEU lost two 
valuable boundary spanners.  In the knowledge management discussion in chapter two of 
this thesis, Tushman and Scanlon identified a “star” boundary spanner as one who has 
significant external connections as well as the respect and status, generally earned through 
perceived competence, internally to influence the organisation (1981: 290).  During round 
two, Adrian Ryan and John O’Brien acted as mediators between the experiences in the 
branch and the national organisation.  Acting as boundary spanners, they were particularly 
competent in both languages; the language of the community of practice in the branches 
and the language of the national organisation of the NTEU.  They therefore acted as brokers 
between the two communities.  They played leading roles both in formulating and 
implementing strategy in the branches and in helping to frame the NTEU’s strategic position 
to educate the organisation with discussion papers and motions at National Council 1997.  
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This loss of experience left the union with limited capacity to understand itself.  When it 
came to developing national strategy, the surveys and large forums were no substitute for 
this active and at times combative process of mediation among experienced activists which 
has the flexibility to incorporate demands and strategy and a myriad of instincts, hunches 
and experiences in the process.   
 
Mobilizing lessons from the past 
Whilst the NTEU appeared to be industrially weak at many branches coming out of round 
three, the HEWRRs legislation and the Backing Australia’s Future package played to the 
NTEU’s strengths.  Firstly, it enabled the NTEU to mobilise strategies it had learned from the 
past.  As with the funding cuts announced in 1996, the NTEU was once again drawn into 
direct conflict with the federal government in an attempt to secure its claims.  As the NTEU 
national leadership had learned back in 1996, its best hope was to build a broad coalition 
with other interests in the sector.  The NTEU had also learned of the importance of forging 
an alliance with the most powerful broker in the sector, the Australian Vice Chancellors’ 
Committee (AVCC) by focusing on issues that the two organisations had in common.  Key 
players in the National Office were repositories of accumulated know how which included 
relationships built over time and strategies harnessed through group discussion over many 
years.  Grahame McCulloch and Carolyn Allport were founding members of the NTEU and 
had been on the secretariat for four rounds of enterprise bargaining.  The role of Grahame 
McCulloch was particularly pivotal at this time.  Grahame McCulloch had built up very high 
level skills in negotiation and relationships with key players in the sector.  For example, he 
had regularly been called upon to rescue an ailing branch from intractable disputes often 
negotiating directly with local Vice Chancellors or senior managers to break a deadlock.  In 
this way, by round four McCulloch had developed the skills in negotiation required at this 
level but also forged a strong dialogue and in some cases an ongoing relationship with many 
Vice Chancellors and other key players in the sector.  It was through these ties that the 
NTEU was able to forge an alliance with the AVCC to defeat the HEWRRs legislation.   
 
Another important factor in the success of the campaign was the NTEU’s ability to build 
internal and external solidarity by developing inspirational goals.  This lesson had been 
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explicitly understood back in round two when the funding cuts announced by Minister 
Amanda Vanstone back in 1996 which jeopardised the NTEU’s federally funded pay rise.  As 
with round two, had the NTEU gone out on its own against the HEWRRs legislation and to 
achieve the narrow goal of higher wages and conditions it would have been easily isolated 
and crushed.  Carolyn Allport and Grahame McCulloch had been major players in round two 
informing their response to this new attack.  Therefore the NTEU’s lessons learned from 
round two, to appeal to the broader higher education community not just on straight 
industrial issues but on broader demands, had been successful.  As discussed in the  trade 
union strategy chapter of this thesis, researchers believe that in the current period unions 
should frame their goals to capture social and political goals rather than narrow economic 
concerns (Hyman 1997: 326-7; Fairbrother, Williams et al. 2007: 47).  That is, the union 
movement needs to inspire and not just respond.  However, inspiration requires a 
sophisticated understanding of its constituents and their goals and beliefs.  In formulating 
both its strategy and demands the National Secretariat demonstrated its affinity with the 
sector that had been built up over many years.  The NTEU’s expansive demands for 
university autonomy and quality education enabled it to claim the moral high ground and 
put the federal government on the back foot.  It was the Liberal government that looked 
petty and “industrial”.  Meanwhile, in comparison to the heavy slog of negotiating round 
three agreements with demoralised memberships against hostile local managers, the 
campaign against HEWRRs buoyed by positive, uplift demands made building local solidarity 
easy and inspired the involvement of branch activists.   
 
Maintaining unified wages and conditions in the sector 
Another vital factor for the NTEU’s successes in round four was its enduring commitment to 
the goal of maintaining nationally unified wages and conditions against the decentralising 
impacts of both the deregulation and enterprise bargaining.  Although it was the source of 
many, at times heated, debate the shared commitment to maintaining unified wages and 
conditions was the driving force behind the strategies the NTEU adopted to deliver and 
defend it.  By round four, the strategy adopted was a combination of the mandatory 
settlement points strategy (first adopted in round one and honed and enhanced over time) 
and the leading sites strategy (first adopted for round two of enterprise bargaining).  Whilst 
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earlier in this discussion the deficiencies of setting long lists of mandatory settlement points 
were outlined, the success of the HEWRRs campaign shows the positive aspect of the 
mandatory settlement approach.  The lesson that had become engrained in the NTEU of the 
importance of maintaining a national benchmark by insisting that local branches adhere to 
the mandatory settlement points ratified at National Council was a vital factor in achieving 
the universally high outcomes in round four.  One benefit of the mandatory settlement 
point process therefore was that whilst some sites did better than others, all sites achieved 
at least the agreed benchmark.   
 
The second benefit was its ability to distribute positive innovations throughout the 
organisation.  As long as activists could convince the national organisation (via the EB Forum 
and National Council) to endorse their claims as mandatory, their claims could gain the full 
weight of the NTEU’s resources once adopted.  One clear example of how effective this 
could be was the journey of the parental leave claim.  As discussed earlier, the original 
parental leave claim originated from management at the Australian Catholic University.  It 
was adopted by activists in the Women’s Action Coalition with the backing of the National 
President, Carolyn Allport, and the National Industrial Unit.  WAC member Cathy Rytmeister 
represented the motion at the EB Forum to ensure that it became a mandatory claim (NTEU 
EB Forum 2002 3&4 October 2002).  The discipline with which the NTEU pursued mandatory 
claims against any obstacles it encountered in branches ensured that the parental leave 
claim (which might otherwise have had only marginal chance of success) was achieved at 
every institution.  As discussed earlier in the chapter, when UNSW had been forced to 
accept a substandard outcome on parental leave, the National Industrial Unit, via Sarah 
Roberts who had also attended WAC, ensured to revive it.   
 
The third benefit to the NTEU’s commitment to nationally unified wages and conditions via 
the leading sites and mandatory settlement points strategy was the expertise it built over 
time to deliver it.  Key figures in the NTEU national office responsible for policing the 
mandatory claims were Grahame McCulloch, Ted Murphy, the National Assistant Secretary, 
and the National Industrial Unit led by Ken McAlpine.  Their combined skills in formulating 
mandatory claims and then in scouring agreements to ensure their compliance with these 
claims was central to the success of this approach.  The specific set of skills of Ken McAlpine 
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and the National Industrial Unit have already been discussed.  Suffice to say, by round four 
this unit had weathered many storms and developed very high levels of expertise.  Similarly, 
Ted Murphy, who took office towards the end of round three, had a similar skill set.  An 
indication of the kind of skills required was that Ted Murphy was also the NTEU’s expert on 
superannuation and became the deputy Chair of the national UniSuper board.  Nicknamed 
“Dr No” for his intransigent opposition to agreements that did not meet the mandatory 
settlement requirements, Ted Murphy was also vested with the political clout within the 
NTEU to accept or reject enterprise agreements.  Around this inner core of expertise was 
the network of industrial officers throughout the sector who received the model clauses and 
other codified data via the by now well-established distribution networks established by the 
National Industrial Unit.  Again, the successful transmission of “know how” from this inner 
core and the national organisation was the extent to which they were “speaking the same 
language” and the discursive capabilities of the boundary spanners involved.  It was this 
framework which formed the scaffold upon which many of the national industrial strategies 
were upheld.  As was shown with the defensive strategies adopted to cope with HEWRRs 
mark II, this expertise in the national office and the process for information flow throughout 
the national organisation that had been built over time, were very difficult for local 
managements or the federal government to emulate.  Ironically, once again, arguably even 
the federal government’s HEWRRs mark II legislation played to another “know how” strong 
hold within the NTEU.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has used the archived minutes and memos of the national office of the NTEU to 
chart the NTEU’s progress during round three of enterprise bargaining which formed the 
basis upon which the NTEU built its strategy for round four.  By the end of round three, gaps 
in the NTEU’s defences among the weaker branches in the sector was beginning to have 
profound impacts on the strategy.  As with the conclusion of round two, despite the many 
pitfalls encountered during the round, no serious alternative approaches to the leading sites 
strategy was entertained.  This may reflect path dependence in the NTEU or it may have 
been that in the hostile and disaggregated environment generated by funding cuts under 
the Liberal government the NTEU simply had very few options.  In either case, the key 
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weakness for the NTEU was the low level of debate at any level of the organisation about its 
strategic direction.  As it entered round four, the NTEU appeared to be at sea; drowning in 
its own extensive data without a clear framework to analyse this information or to gain its 
strategic bearings.  The main difficulty here appears to be a lack of the strategic capacity 
necessary to steer branches through enterprise bargaining at the branch level.  This problem 
was compounded by how very complex and hostile the circumstances had become for 
negotiating agreements in the branches.  The second difficulty was the loss of key boundary 
spanners who could interpret the experiences in the branch to feed them into the national 
strategic decision making process.  A disconnect was developing between the branches and 
national policy formulation and an ability for the national organisation to fully understand 
its circumstances.  Fortunately for the NTEU, the Liberal government’s HEWRRs legislation 
played to its strong-holds, two of its leading sites Sydney University and ANU, and as 
crucially the national office where the strategic “know how” built up over time could be 
mobilized to reunite the national organisation and gain the external solidarity needed to 
defeat the legislation.   
 
Marshall Ganz’s game of poker can be invoked to understand the NTEU’s predicament in 
navigating the HEWRRs campaign.  As with a game of poker, the union movement does not 
deal the cards but must play the hand it is dealt.  But it is a game where chance may 
determine the outcome of any one hand but some players are more likely to be winners 
than others (Ganz 2000: 1008).  In this instance, the NTEU having played a tough round was 
suddenly dealt a royal flush.  However, whilst good fortune was a factor, playing a good 
hand still requires considerable skill and the NTEU used the opportunity to effect.  To 
capitalize on the Liberal government’s provocative legislation the NTEU national leadership 
drew on a raft of skills, relationships and instincts learned over time to reunite its previously 
fractured union to build a national campaign that lifted even the weakest branches in the 
sector.  Another example of how skills learned over time could be mobilized to seize upon 
chance opportunities was the fortunes of the parental leave claim.  The national discipline 
and the skilled network built around the mandatory settlement point strategy were vital for 
distributing this innovation throughout the organisation.  Although the parental leave claim 
was a very ambitious claim for a weakened union coming out of round three, rather than 
being a burden the NTEU was able to frame it as part of its uplift campaign against the 
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Liberal government.  The NTEU’s inspiring initiative for dramatic improvements for working 
mothers helped to build internal and external solidarity for the NTEU’s goals.  Further, had 
the NTEU not gone for the maternity leave claim they would have missed an historic 
opportunity to win it.   
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Chapter Ten  
A network analysis of the  
NTEU 1993 to 2005 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse how the NTEU learned to navigate enterprise 
bargaining by looking at the structure of its decision making processes.  In chapter two of 
this thesis, three key elements required for the development of effective trade union 
strategy were identified: the strategic capacity of union leaders, the engagement and 
contribution of the membership and structures and processes that maximize the 
effectiveness of the relationship between the leadership and the membership.  In chapter 
four, this thesis returned to these three key elements using activity theory to build an 
understanding of how to analyse their development in the NTEU.  Activity theory has 
highlighted the fact that the “know how” required to lead can only be learned through 
experience and is inherently a collective process.  The research has encouraged a focus not 
on the particular talents of individuals but on groups of people interacting to solve the 
problems generated by the context in which they are operating: communities of practice.  
This chapter draws on social network theory to analyse communities of practice from a 
different perspective.  This chapter returns to the minutes and reports of the meetings 
devoted to enterprise bargaining strategy during the period 1993 to 2005.  However, this 
time the attendance lists of these meetings have been used to develop a network of the 
individuals and groups involved and how they interacted.  The purpose is to dissect which 
elements of the NTEU’s decision making structure enhanced and which might have inhibited 
the flow of “know how” and therefore the learning process in the NTEU. 
 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to briefly review the discussion of social network analysis 
in chapter four.  In chapter four, it was shown that the structure of a network can be 
established in such a way as to impede or to facilitate the effective flow of social capital (or 
resources) and also that certain individuals or groups within that structure will likely be 
privileged over others by virtue of their position within that structure (Burt 2001: 32).  The 
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unit of analysis in a social network is therefore not the individuals or groups themselves but 
their relationship to each other (Pope and Lewis 2008: 447).  Moreover, network analysis is 
not just concerned with the fact of the relationship but with the meaning that can be 
interpreted from that relationship or the attribute of that relationship (Borgatti and Everett 
1997: 243).  The network analysis conducted in this chapter, as with the qualitative aspect 
of this thesis, is concerned with “know how” (knowledge in all of its forms) and its role in 
strategic decision making.  Given that developing “know how” is inherently a collective 
activity; social network theory highlights the fact that there are structural implications for 
this group process.  It also enables a visual representation of this network.  This chapter, 
therefore, attempts to chart the way in which “know how” flowed within the NTEU.   
 
Two-mode networks 
This thesis has used the attendance lists of meetings devoted to enterprise bargaining 
strategy during the period 1993 to 2005 to develop a network of the individuals and groups 
involved.  From a network perspective these are called “two-mode” networks.  Breiger in his 
theory of the “duality of persons and groups” prefers the approach of “membership 
network analysis” over social network analysis (Breiger 1974: 183).  Where a typical social 
network analysis might survey respondents asking them to list up to twenty persons they 
regard as “significant” to construct a network (Marsden 2005: 12), Breiger is more 
interested in formal structures.  The key distinction here is that Breiger is interested not just 
in the social ties between individuals but how those individual social relations intersect with 
their formal affiliation to groups or organisations (Breiger 1974: 181).  That is, individuals 
form informal social relationships often within more formal structures and in turn these 
informal social relations often influence the nature or outcomes of the formal structures 
(Breiger 1974: 181; Hanneman and Riddle 2005).  For Breiger, there are not two distinct 
affiliations: social and formal but an intersection between the two (1974: 181).  For 
example, two people share an interest in football, attend the same club meeting and form a 
relationship which might have the dual relation of being both a friendship and an alliance 
that influences the outcome of the club’s decisions.  To fully understand how individuals 
interact using the archived meeting data of the NTEU requires studying the network data at 
two modes: the ties between individuals (one-mode) and the ties of individual’s attendance 
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at events (two-mode).   
 
This is a helpful observation for this study of the NTEU.  There are two key advantages to the 
two-mode approach.  Firstly, it has provided a theoretical framework to analyse formal role 
lists of the NTEU and not rely on self-nominated social tie data.  Secondly, it is an approach 
well suited to archival data.  The attendance lists of meetings in the past can be used to 
reconstruct the individuals, relationships and groups involved in decision making in the 
NTEU.  The advantage of formal, archival data is that it avoids several known threats to 
reliability and validity of collecting network data via interviews and surveys, such as issues of 
name recall and forgetting, bias towards high status actors and interviewer effects (Marsden 
2005: 13-16).  
 
Centrality, power and influence 
In the discussion so far about decision making in the NTEU, there have been various 
contests for influence over the organisation’s strategic direction.  How might the structure 
of the NTEU’s network have influenced this process?  As discussed in chapter four, network 
analysis is particularly interested in centrality, and its relationship to power and influence.  
There are three operational definitions of centrality and their relationship to power or 
influence: degree (ability to community directly with others), betweenness (ability to 
control or restrict the communication of others) and closeness (ability to reach large 
numbers of actors with minimal reliance on intermediaries) (Mizruchi and Potts 1998: 355).  
The relationship between centrality and power is complex.  Centrality is significant in 
assessing the influence of an actor but a direct relationship between centrality and power 
should not be assumed (Mizruchi and Potts 1998: 384).  This relationship is also mediated by 
the structure of the network (Mizruchi and Potts 1998: 384).  Whilst network theory would 
argue that the most central actor is the most powerful, power dependence theory predicts 
that it is those with intermediate centrality (the brokers among various individuals and 
groups) who will be the most powerful because the most central actor will be reliant on the 
intermediaries for influence over others (Mizruchi and Potts 1998: 356).  Figure 1 below 
shows that where the most central actor can only communicate with B, B can communicate 
with C and A and through A potentially influence many more (Mizruchi and Potts 1998: 356).  
177 
 
Therefore “betweenness” is potentially the most influential role (Mizruchi and Potts 1998: 
356).  However, where the most central actor is not reliant on intermediary B and has access 
to both B and A, then the most central actor C is the most influential (Mizruchi and Potts 
1998: 356).  Therefore the relative power of actors is dependent on the nature of the 
network.   
 
Cook et al. five-actor restricted access exchange network (reprinted in Mizruchi and Potts 1998: 356) 
In a series of studies, Mizruchi and Potts were able to show that in restricted access 
networks, the semi-peripherals were able to monopolize influence because of their ability to 
surround the central actor (Mizruchi and Potts 1998: 383).  Further, what if the semi-
peripheral actors are able to get together and thus bypass the central actor altogether 
(Mizruchi and Potts 1998: 384)?  However, Mizruchi and Potts were able to demonstrate 
that where there are competing subgroups, the central actor was shown to considerably 
strengthen their power by playing a mediating role among the leaders of the competing 
subgroups (1998: 384).  In their study of exchange networks, Cook et al identified a 
“decentralization” principle in which networks tend to operate around multiple points of 
power or “regional centres” within the network (Cook, Emerson et al. 1983: 302).  In these 
instances, the central actor’s power will be mediated by the extent that the central actor is 
reliant on the brokers at the interception of these power centres (Cook, Emerson et al. 
1983: 302).   
 
A semi-peripheral actor or broker may perform the role of “network entrepreneur” (Burt 
2001: 36).  A network entrepreneur is an individual who positions themselves within the 
network to be the broker who brings together otherwise disconnected contacts (Burt 2001: 
36).   This individual will likely enjoy privilege in this new arena as the sole contact for all of 
the individuals where the other individuals who are unfamiliar with each other might 
experience high levels of uncertainty (Burt 2001: 36).  The privileged broker might use this 
Figure 1 
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advantage to make strategic use of the information they choose to transmit (Burt 2001: 36).  
Structural holes (groups of otherwise unconnected individuals) generate opportunities for 
network entrepreneurs who use this privileged position to generate still more opportunities 
(Burt 2001: 36).  In this way, access to information and position within the network reinforce 
one another and can accumulate over time (Burt 2001: 36) to produce privileged individuals 
within a structure.  However, even this statement is not straightforward.  Whilst network 
entrepreneurs can often gain the upper hand, Burt points out there are also advantages to a 
closed networks (Burt 2001: 37).  Coleman has analysed the role of closed networks or 
closely knit groups in generating social capital (1988: 95; Burt 2001: 37).  There are elements 
of closed networks, such as reciprocal obligation and social expectation, social norms, trust 
and familiarity that are beneficial to closed networks (Burt 2001: 37).  Closed networks can 
establish norms and sanctions which can positively guide behaviour and discourage the 
abuses that might accompany network entrepreneurship (Burt 2001: 38).  The trust and 
familiarity of close relationships may also allow for the ready uptake of ideas within the 
closed network.  From this perspective, the more advantaged individual is one who is 
insulated by strong relationships which deliver them reliable sources of information and 
may give them the opportunity to encourage others to act in concert in the pursuit of 
shared goals or to sanction those who violate their norms (Burt 2001: 38).   
 
How might these observations assist an analysis of the flow of “know how” within the 
NTEU?  The remainder of this chapter is devoted to using the key concepts discussed above 
to analyse the NTEU’s network and how this might have impacted on its capacity to learn.  
This chapter returns now chronologically from round one through to round four, to analyse 
the key moments in enterprise bargaining learning process from a network perspective.  
This chapter will return to key moments in the four rounds of enterprise bargaining and 
analyse these moments from a network perspective.  The remainder of this chapter will 
focus on how network centrality, power and influence, the ability of individuals to increase 
their influence through diversification, the flow of new ideas and of network dependence 
and vulnerability might have impacted on the learning process in the NTEU.   This analysis 
will also be able to map the way in which the network has changed over time in response to 
the many challenges in the external and internal environment and how these changes in 
turn may have impacted on the learning process.  
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The NTEU network in the early years 
The observations of network analysts are particularly helpful for analysing the structure of 
the decision making process in the early days of the NTEU.  As O’Brien has pointed out, any 
exercise of central power from the national leadership at this time involved a process of 
“complicated negotiation” among the various layers of leadership in the NTEU (O'Brien 
1999: 83).  This statement can be analysed from a network perspective.  The most central 
broker in the early formation of the NTEU was clearly Grahame McCulloch.  McCulloch, the 
general secretary of UACA at the time, was the first to identify and publicly state the 
prospect of amalgamation between FAUSA and UACA (O'Brien 2003: 37).  He was then the 
most active network entrepreneur in the organisation, engaging in many intricate 
negotiations to draw together the patchwork of other academic staff associations and 
general staff trade unions to draw them into the organisation (O'Brien 2003: 43).   As the 
central broker of this arrangement he was able to claim one half of the most powerful role 
in the newly formed NTEU, general secretary (shared temporarily with Kerry Lewis from 
ACUSA).  However, in line with Cook et al’s  (1983) observations, at the national level any 
claim on centralised power at this time was constrained by peripheral actors who were 
concentrated in powerful regional centres.  The branch based autonomy in line with 
FAUSA’s model and the Division offices in line with UACA and the NSW wing of FAUSA 
(O'Brien 2003: 43) generated regional centres and empowered semi-peripheral actors who 
had considerable influence within the NTEU.  In the discussion of the NTEU amalgamation 
and negotiation of round one of enterprise bargaining in chapter six, there was evidence of 
these regional power centres flexing their muscle against centralised power.  South 
Australia caused considerable disruption during amalgamation (O'Brien 2003: 44) and James 
Cook University and University of Western Australia both defied national discipline to sign 
up to a Local Framework Agreement in the earliest days of enterprise bargaining (McCulloch 
23 December 1993). 
 
Sanctions and counter-sanctions 
Network entrepreneurship at this time could be swiftly sanctioned.  Reviewing the 
discussion from chapter six, on 12 November 1993 the newly formed National Executive 
faced its first controversial decision: a very important decision about whether to lift a 
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nationwide ban on exam results in line with a directive from the Commission (NTEU NE 
teleconf Minutes 12 November 1993).  This discussion can now be revisited using a network 
analysis.  Figure 2 below is a simple diagram of the make-up of that telephone conference 
on 12 November 1993.  Each participant is codified by their constituent organisation.  The 
National Secretary, Grahame McCulloch (UACA 4), arguably the most powerful broker, is 
depicted at the centre of the meeting.  McCulloch was pivotal in the negotiations that 
determined the make-up of the National Executive.  He was also the lead negotiator with 
the AHEIA and, with considerable industrial relations experience he was well in his comfort 
zone when he reported the detail of the Commission hearing.  From his privileged position 
in the network he also had the most up-to-date information to report to the meeting.  
However, as is immediately obvious in figure 2 below, although McCulloch may be at the 
centre of the committee, his influence was constrained by semi-peripheral actors.  Each 
other participant is a representative of their respective branches and divisions and therefore 
the broker between the National Executive and the membership who were upholding the 
bans.  There is another complicating factor.  Another powerful broker on the committee was 
Di Zetlin (FAUSA 1), the former general secretary of FAUSA.  McCulloch experienced 
firsthand the potential limitation of the most central position.  McCulloch was in favour of 
maintaining the bans.  However, when three participants (1 ACUSA, 1 UACA and the 
ANUAAOA rep) had to leave the meeting early, it was clear that FAUSA “had the numbers”.  
As chair of the meeting, Di Zetlin moved the meeting to a vote where FAUSA voted as a 
block to lift the bans.  Using Coleman’s framework a tightly knit group used their stronger 
relationship to act in concert in pursuit of shared goals and to sanction the network 
entrepreneur who had attempted to violate their norms (Burt 2001: 38).   
 
In the aftermath of this meeting, McCulloch again tried to exercise his power as most 
central actor.  McCulloch sought to sanction what he felt was a breach of trade union 
practice (the “use of numbers” to push through a decision without broader consultation) by 
exercising his degree centrality (his ability to communicate directly with others) McCulloch 
attempted to go around the close-knit unit within National Executive (semi-peripheral 
brokers) to communicate directly to the next layer of local leaders within the NTEU.  In a 
memo to the key representatives in the broader NTEU network (which did not include all 
members of National Executive), McCulloch reported the National Executive decision to lift 
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the exam bans pointing out “that several members were deprived of voting rights” and that 
to enact the National Executive’s decision branches would be required to conduct mass 
meetings of members or delegates to consider the recommendation (McCulloch 15 
November 1993).  McCulloch thereby breached another deeply held FAUSA norm, branch 
based autonomy, and thus sparked a counter-sanction.  There was an angry exchange of 
letters between McCulloch and Zetlin and other FAUSA representatives.  Interestingly, 
exchanges of words like “trust”, “improper”, “acceptable”, “disappointed”, “partisan”, 
“relationship”, “courtesy”, “behaviour” all point to the breach of tacitly understood 
boundaries and norms.  What came next was a protracted formal process in face to face 
meetings of the National Executive to determine democratic protocols and the conduct of 
teleconference meetings (NTEU NE Minutes 19 November 1993).   
 
It is in this way that the new National Executive began to establish new collective norms and 
potentially out of this process began to form the kinds of strong relationship ties required 
for shared learning (and also for sanctioning other “incursions” in the future).  This situation 
is a reminder of an important point when analysing two-mode network data: two people 
who frequently attend the same meetings do not necessarily agree, share close bonds or 
like each other.  This is why it is important to be clear on the attribute being studied here: 
the exchange of “know how” within the NTEU.  This bitter exchange actually had important 
learning outcomes for the newly formed National Executive of the NTEU.  The National 
Executive developed explicit processes and procedures to enable easier decision making in 
the future.  But perhaps more importantly, over time these formal processes would likely 
become tacitly understood norms, the “shared approach” to problem solving that is 
necessary for group learning.  This “negative” exchange created the conditions for a positive 
learning outcome. 
 
 
 
 
182 
 
  
 
 
Empowered semi-peripheral actors 
The power of semi-peripheral actors within the NTEU was evident once again when it came 
to implementing the leading sites strategy in round two (discussed in chapter eight of this 
thesis), but with very different outcomes.  In this case, the majority of National Executive 
representatives (as the central-most node) were powerless to assert their will over a 
maverick semi-peripheral broker.  Figure 3 below is a simple diagram of the dynamic at work 
where even a clear majority on National Executive could not overpower the influence of the 
semi-peripheral actor.  In round two, the Victorian Division and the local leadership of 
University of Melbourne resisted the discipline of the National Executive when they moved 
to endorse the University of Melbourne agreement despite the fact that it breached the 
mandatory settlement points ratified at National Council.  A semiperipheral actor therefore 
experienced veto rights over the wishes of the national organisation by virtue of their 
position in the network.   Any number of censorious motions and memos could not 
overcome the power of the broker.  One interesting aspect of this situation is the shift in 
Grahame McCulloch’s position.  This time, the National Executive voted to empower 
Grahame McCulloch to overstep the semi-peripheral actor to go the University of 
Figure 2    National Executive teleconference 12 November 1993 
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Melbourne and appeal directly to a mass meeting of members.  What was once an 
unconsciounable violation of branch autonomy was now a sanctioned act in defence of 
national unity.  An important shift in the norms of the National Executive had occurred since 
amalgamation.  There were two elements to this new norm: first, was the need to maintain 
national unity against the decentralizing influence of enterprise and second, was the need 
to adhere to the discipline of national democratic decisions.  Both of these elements had 
been explicitly debated and agreed upon in round one.  The National Executive was 
becoming less of a confederation of varying constituent groups and increasingly learning to 
act as a united group.  Lessons learned during the earlier years were becoming enculterated.  
As the situation at Melbourne University demonstrates, this process was uneven.   
 
The power of semi-peripheral actors has important implications for organisational learning 
in the NTEU.  The debate on National Executive regarding the Melbourne University 
agreement was not restricted to the issue of national discipline or to the particular clauses 
that could or could not be endorsed at Melbourne University.  The debate at this time 
contained important arguments about appropriate trade union strategy at the branch level.  
Adrian Ryan, John O’Brien and Mike Donaldson among others argued strongly for the need 
for an industrial campaign to defeat the Melbourne University agreement.  Ryan’s argument 
was directed at the local leadership of Melbourne University which he argued had proven it 
was not “able or willing to organise” an industrial campaign (Ryan letter tabled at NTEU NE 
minutes 26 March, 1997).  The unwillingness of the semi-peripheral actors to heed this 
advice hindered the ability of the NTEU to spread a culture of industrial militancy (a culture 
in existence at other campuses around the country) to the Melbourne University campus.  
Ryan, O’Brien and Donaldson were reliant on a secondary broker (McCulloch) to 
communicate this lesson to the membership at Melbourne University.  Although McCulloch 
was able to gain some concessions by appealing directly to the membership, he was unable 
to effectively transmit the important lessons about ways to develop leadership capacity and 
membership engagement necessary for industrial action.  As the qualititative study in earlier 
chapters indicated, it is likely that the embodied “know how” of trade union leadership 
articulated by Ryan, O’Brien and Donaldson which had been learned in communities of 
practice over time could not be transmitted in a one-off mass meeting of members via a 
broker.  Moreover, it is likely that the local Melbourne University leadership had a closed 
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network around them at the branch level resistant to the input of an external broker.  
Further, as Brown and Duguid point out in their analysis of “sticky” and “leaky” knowledge, 
it is communal understanding built from shared practice and experience that most readily 
transmits “know how” (2001: 207).  Although McCulloch had extensive experience in 
national negotiations but very limited experience in leading and organising at the branch 
level.  Further, once a very different practice had been established at Melbourne University, 
the campus was not “speaking the same language” as other activists in the NTEU.  Crucial 
“know how” was almost certain to be lost in transmission from activists from other 
branches on the National Executive to  local leaders and members in the Melbourne 
University branch. 
 
 
Increasing influence through diversification 
A network analysis of the NTEU at this time can be used to analyse another important 
aspect of influence within a network: diversification.  Diani has used network theory 
extensively in his studies of social movements.  In his study of the environmental movement 
in Milan in the mid-1980s, he identified the ability of an organisation to diversify its scope of 
interest as a significant way to increase its influence within a social movement: so those 
Figure 3   National Executive: implementing the leading sites strategy, round two 
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environmental groups which tackled both urban ecology issues and traditional conservation 
issues enjoyed greater influence in the broader social movement (Diani 2003: 108).  This 
observation can be adapted to offer insight into this discussion.  Those individuals who were 
able to traverse the industrial (Industrial Matters Committee) and the political (National 
Executive) built broader ties and were able to enjoy greater influence as brokers between 
these two key aspects of the NTEU’s core business.  Further, as the regulation of 
employment relations in higher education became increasingly industrial those who learned 
to speak both languages coped better with the transition.   
 
Figure 4 below is a two-mode network  (individual attendance at meetings) of the NTEU for 
enterprise bargaining strategy from the period of NTEU amalgamation and round one of 
enterprise bargaining: the Industrial Matters Committee and the National Executive.  For 
illustrative purposes the National Secretariat and National Industrial Unit have also been 
added as nodes.  As the figure shows, there were a number of brokers between these two 
major committees.  In line with the previous observation, those individuals who diversified 
between the industrial and political wings of the national NTEU over time increased their 
influence within the NTEU.  Among the elected representatives (green squares) brokers 
between the Industrial Matters Committee and National Executive is Grahame McCulloch 
(National Secretary), National Assistant Secretary, Kerry Lewis (ACUSA 1), future National 
President, Carolyn Allport (FAUSA 1) and other central players, Bill Ford (FAUSA 4) and 
Howard Guille (QAASCAE).  The other obvious brokers were members of the National 
Industrial Unit.  As discussed in chapters six, the National Industrial Unit was responsible for 
compiling detailed industrial reports for the consideration of both the Industrial Matters 
Committee and the National Executive and for communicating the industrial components of 
these decisions to the broader organisation.  An interesting feature of figure 4 is the mirror 
images of the National Secretariat and the National Industrial Unit as the subgroups that 
bind the Industrial Matters Committee to the National Executive.  In some ways these two 
subgroups mirror each other’s role: the National Secretariat performed a political role via 
embodied knowledge and the National Industrial Unit conveyed the industrial/codified side 
of the knowledge transmission between the Industrial Matters Committee and the National 
Executive.  
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Figure 5 below has converted the 2-mode data (members within meetings) from figure four 
to one-mode data (person to person relationships within those meetings).  There is a line 
between those individuals for each time they attended the same meeting and the thickness 
of the tie is calculated in line with frequency of contact.  On the right hand side is the 
National Executive, showing quite dense ties among them.  There is a close group forming 
among the National Executive and secretariat (within the cluster to the right) and a looser 
cluster of individuals on the left which is the Industrial Matters Committee.  This network 
will be discussed again later to analyse the changes in these ties over time. 
 
 
 
Figure 4   Round one enterprise bargaining – 2 mode network 
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Radical innovation to respond to changes in the environment 
Round two of enterprise bargaining was characterised by massive change in the external 
environment with the victory of the Coalition government in March 1996.  The Coalition’s 
Workplace Relations Bill fundamentally changed the industrial relations environment for the 
NTEU whilst a 5% federal budget cut to higher education defeated the NTEU’s round one 
wages strategy.  Chapter seven of this thesis discussed the various attempts by peripheral 
actors from the NSW Division to influence the strategic direction of the NTEU to respond to 
these dramatic changes.  In the contest for influence there were both successful and 
unsuccessful attempts to influence the strategic direction of the organisation.  These 
discussions will now be revisited using a network analysis.  How can the relative 
conservatism of the national leadership of the NTEU at this time be explained?  Why did the 
Industrial Matters Committee and the National Executive of the NTEU resist the input of the 
NSW Division? 
 
Granoveter in the 1970s introduced an important concept to social network theory, “the 
strength of weak ties”.  He argued that it is often through quite weak, transitory ties that 
Figure 5    Round one enterprise bargaining – 1 mode data 
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new and different information is made available (1974: 54 quoted in Scott 2000: 35).  
Granoveter’s observation intersects nicely with the observations of researchers discussed in 
the knowledge management literature who argue that radical innovations rely on input 
from outside established groups.  In line with activity theory, “constant ties” run the risk of 
developing “group think” and can become stuck in their ways (Leonard and Sensiper 1998: 
118; Swan, Scarbrough et al. 2002: 478), whilst, applying Granoveter’s “strength of weak 
ties” (1974: 54 quoted in Scott 2000: 35),  some transient relationships may offer 
information that have a pivotal impact on the fortunes of an individual or organisation.  
However, Granoveter also pointed out that ideas that are radical which come from marginal 
forces may be considered highly deviant and can be dismissed by those in privileged 
positions in the network or resisted by close-knit groups (1973: 1367).  Often therefore a 
marginal idea will require the backing of leaders or brokers in order to be adopted.  Other 
researchers have argued that it depends on the level of risk associated with adoption of the 
idea: where an innovation is considered safe and uncontroversial, central figures are more 
likely to adopt it quickly but where there is high risk, marginal operators will be the earliest 
to take it up (Gravonetter 1973: 1367).   
 
These observations may help to explain the NTEU’s resistance to change at this time.  
Figures 6 and 7 below are two depictions of the full network engaged in enterprise 
bargaining strategy.  Figure 6 is a 2-mode data network depicting individual attendance at 
meetings, and figure 7 is a 1-mode network depicting individual to individual contact within 
the meeting structure.  What can be learnt from these networks?  There are two issues at 
work here.  In the 1-mode network below (figure 7), the thickness and length of the lines 
joining individuals is related to their regularity of contact in meetings.  In comparison to 
round one network (figure 5 above) there has been a tightening of the network around the 
National Executive.  One possible reading of this structure is that the national leadership has 
coalesced into a more centralised, stable grouping which is potentially therefore less open 
to new approaches.  Key brokers between the National Executive and the Industrial Matters 
Committee (both elected representatives and industrial officers) have moved more tightly 
into the central national grouping.  Meanwhile, peripheral members of the IMC (VIC Div 5, 
SA Div 4, QLD Div 2, ACT Div 4, VIC Div 2, SA Div 2) have moved slightly outwards towards 
the perimeter of the network.   
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 Perhaps a more important feature of figure 7 is the change over time, with constant ties 
forming among the inner circle.  In figure 7, those who were actively engaged in round one 
strategic decision making at the national level have highlighted in red to show the 
emergence of long term ties at the national level.  Those in red had therefore been working 
together at the national level for at least three or four years.  Furthermore, several 
individuals who had been at the periphery of the network in round one had been pulled in 
more tightly to the centre, most notably Ted Murphy (VIC Div 4 formerly UACA 1) who went 
on to become National Assistant Secretary.  Figure 7 therefore shows the development of 
“constant ties”.  For new ideas to break into this group they must gain uptake by key 
brokers within the network.  As discussed in chapter seven, key brokers in the National 
Industrial Unit and Grahame McCulloch were opposed to the NSW proposals and therefore 
the proposals were rejected.  It is possible that the stable centre perceived the alternative 
approach coming from the outside as too deviant or too risky to be readily adopted.  The 
NSW Division’s “Survival Committee” demanded dramatic changes to the NTEU’s approach 
to combat the Workplace Relations Act.  Their argument to certify all award conditions into 
locally negotiated enterprise agreements may have been seen as a fundamental threat to 
national unity.  The bonding tenet of the national leadership coming out of round one was a 
commitment to maintaining national unified wages and conditions.  By round two, it 
appears this norm had crystalised and grown brittle.  On some level, it is likely that the 
national leadership perceived this opposing opinion as a fundamental threat to their tightly 
knit group and in turn to the national organisation.  How could the union maintain national 
unity if it lost its binding commitment to the award system? 
 
Another difficulty for the NSW Division was the relatively weak ties that linked it to the 
National Executive and Industrial Matters Committee.  Figure 6 (2 mode data) shows that 
there were just three elected representatives acting as brokers between the two groups: 
NSW Div 1, NSW Div 2 and NSW Div 3.  Two of those three had also been involved in round 
one.  The knowledge management discussion in this thesis outlined that the success of 
boundary spanners (or brokers) is dependent on the individual abilities of the brokers 
themselves to interpret and translate two different languages (Tushman and Scanlan 1981: 
292).  However, as has been shown in various ways during this chapter, it is likely that the 
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individual’s position within the network has a greater impact on whether that individual or 
group can gain influence than their individual ability to communicate.  In trying to influence 
the NTEU to respond to the Workplace Relations Act, it is likely that personal ability was not 
at issue as the centre of the network was closed off to radical new approaches.  As 
discussed in chapter seven, the NSW Division pursued their approach on the floor of 
National Council where clause by clause they got their framework approaches adopted.  As 
has already been found, the looser structure of National Council, which was not bound to 
practices of the past and more open to the external environment, more readily adopted the 
NSW position. 
 
   
  
Figure 6   Round two network – two mode data 
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Increasing the network 
In the lead up to round three, the NTEU opted to increase the number of members engaged 
in strategic decision making for the NTEU.  Figure 8 below is a two-mode network which 
shows that the major sources of increased engagement were the enterprise bargaining 
conference and the leading sites committee.   The enterprise bargaining conference 
involved the lead negotiator and the branch president of each institution, Division 
secretaries and industrial staff responsible for bargaining support, a representative from 
WAC and the Casuals network and all national executive members (NTEU National Council 
papers 2-4 October, 1997).  The difficulties encountered at Melbourne University and other, 
lesser incursions on the national strategy during round two were the primary drivers for a 
change of approach.  The explicit goal of the national bargaining conference decided at 
National Council was to draw those involved in local negotations closer to the establishment 
of bargaining policy at the national level.  Individual reference groups were also designed to 
shore up commitment of broader sections of the NTEU to the NTEU’s mandatory settlement 
points by engaging them directly in developing the claims.  The reference groups as shown 
Figure 7  Round two network – one mode data 
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in figure 8 developed the core elements of the NTEU’s demands on: salaries, 
superannuation, casualisation, academic and general staff workloads and modes of 
employment.  From a network perspective, the NTEU was attempting to unite all 
empowered semi-peripheral actors (local branch leaderships) around an agreed national 
strategy.  Furthermore, as Melbourne University showed, the national strategy could be 
held hostage to just one or two semi-peripheral actors who were the local leaders of an 
institution.  Opening up the network to draw erstwhile peripheral actors into the discussion 
in effect lessened the power of individual semi-peripheral actors by opening up alternative 
paths to reach the membership.  From a learning perspective, potentially the enterprise 
bargaining conference developed more brokers to transmit bargaining “know how” 
between the national decision making body and the membership in the branches.  However, 
as discussed in chapter nine, when it came to negotiating round three agreements, 
commitment to the nationally determined mandatory settlement points was only one 
aspect of what was required.  Many campuses lacked the strategic capacity, among both 
leaders and members, to wage the campaign necessary to win these demands. 
 
The purpose of the leading sites committee was to bring branch based leaderships from the 
front-runner institutions into group discussion to formulate strategy.  Once again the 
prospect of “know how” leaking (Brown and Duguid 2001: 207) among like practitioners 
might have assisted learning at this time.  “Know how” could readily be transmitted among 
branch leaderships from the leading sites who were sharing similar challenges and 
experiences.  The leading sites committee is where these activists could share stories, 
exchange information and strategise.  Chapter seven of this thesis discussed the mixed 
experience of the leading sites committee.  The leading sites committee was a major source 
of innovation for the NTEU at this time.  However, from a network perspective, the key 
difficulty with the leading sites committee was that as leading sites from successful 
branches acheived their agreements they progressively withdrew from the leading sites 
committee.  Therefore the most important committee for developing bargaining strategy 
experienced high turnover.  The stable close knit group required to assimilate “know how” 
was not adequately established.  Furthermore, by their nature, more successful branches 
with arguably more skilled local leaderships were the first to gain their agreements and 
withdraw from the committee taking their “know how” and new strategies with them.  The 
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final leading sites committees were dominated by representatives from the lagging sites.    
 
The leading sites committee demonstrated once again the difficulties in transmitting “know 
how” via semi-peripheral brokers (local leaderships) to influence behaviour in the branches.  
In chapter seven, John O’Brien’s experience at ANU and the University of Canberra were 
used to analyse the level of experience and skill required to lead a branch through 
enterprise bargaining against hostile managers.  Attempting to quickly educate 
inexperienced branch leaderships in the myriad of intricate relationships and instincts  
required and to effectively guide branch leaderships was not possible from the leading sites 
committee.  This difficulty was compounded by the very difficult external environment.  
Those leaders from previous rounds of enterprise bargaining, including the leading sites, 
were unlikely to have encountered the aggressive anti-union tactics of the new guard of 
Vice Chancellors and senior managers that characterised the experience for the lagging 
sites.  The “know how” to tackle this was unlikely to be found within the NTEU at this time. 
 
Loosening the constant ties 
It is significant that the recommendation both for the enterprise bargaining conference and 
for the  leading sites committee came from semi-peripheral actors (ACT and NSW Divisions) 
who had firsthand experienced of the resistance to new ideas of the Industrial Matters 
Committee and the National Executive during round two.  The most notable change in the 
network in figure 8 from previous rounds is the disappearance of the Industrial Matters 
Committee.  The Industrial Matters Committee, dominated by constant ties, had become 
resistant to new ideas and did not represent the branch leaders directly engaged in 
enterprise bargaining in the branches.  As the industrial relations framework moved closer 
to the branches, these branches required greater representation in strategic decision 
making.  The leading sites committee was also about uniting those who wanted to move 
quickly to secure agreements against a perceived complacency among the national 
leadership.  The Industrial Matters Committee was therefore replaced with the more 
responsive leading sites committee.   
 
The organisation needed to loosen the close-knit group at the national level to open it up to 
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the external environment and expose it to new ideas from the periphery of the 
organisation.  Figure 8 shows that this had occurred with a much less centralised structure 
with many centres for influence.  The one-mode network in figure 9 verifies this trend 
showing many more individuals at the centre of the decision making process.  However, 
although figure 9 shows many interpersonal ties, caution is needed when interpreting these 
ties.  As with the discussion of the leading sites committee, these ties should not be 
confused with the “constant ties” or closer knit ties evident in the committees in previous 
rounds.  The nature of the relationships among participants at a large one-off conference 
such as the enterprise bargaining conference where individuals may have only interacted 
briefly if at all is fundamentally different to the ties built by a regular smaller group 
discussion where it can be certain that individuals definitely did interact in some way.   
 
Radical innovations and confident branch leaderships were needed at this time to defeat 
the increasingly hostile local managements.  This required the free flow of new ideas and 
“know how” as well as stable communities of practice at both the branch and national levels 
to assimilate this know how.  As figures 8 and 9 show, there were likely many new ideas and 
“know how” flowing among this much larger network.  However without the cohesion 
provided by closer knit groupings there was nowhere for these ideas to be properly 
embedded and assimilated.  Therefore, there were two clear difficulties for the NTEU.  
Firstly, at the national level: how to solve the problem of “group think” associated with 
constant ties without losing the benefit of closer knit groups.  Secondly, at the branch level: 
how to grow the communities of practice at the branch level necessary to build the strategic 
capacity of the leadership and membership in the branches to cope with enterprise 
bargaining.  By their nature communities of practice are organic and naturally occurring; 
they are unlikely to be artificially developed from the outside via a national committee.  Is it 
possible that these two seemingly separate difficulties are related?  This chapter will return 
to this question later in the discussion.   
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Figure 8   Round three network – two mode data 
Figure 9    Round three network – one mode data 
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 Network vulnerability 
The inability of the NTEU at the national level to develop a new, more responsive 
community of practice to replace the closed ties continued into round four which in turn 
produced a new difficulty: network vulnerability.  Network vulnerability measures the 
extent to which the network is beholden to key points or actors for the flow or resources 
(Cook, Emerson et al. 1983: 299).  A network is vulnerable if the removal of key actors 
fundamentally threatens the flow of resources (Cook, Emerson et al. 1983: 299).  Also a 
network beholden to a few key actors to hold it together also becomes vulnerable to control 
as those key actors could potentially withhold or distort information within the network 
(Cook, Emerson et al. 1983: 299; Burt 2001: 36).  As discussed earlier in the chapter, a 
network characterised by structural holes can also be vulnerable to network 
entrepreneurship as individuals may strategically position themselves to bring together 
otherwise disconnected contacts (Burt 2001: 36).  Figure 10 below shows that the NTEU has 
maintained the same basic decision making structure from round three in preparation for 
round four: the national executive and a large enterprise bargaining forum with a series of 
reference groups devoted to developing policy around specific issues: workloads, modes of 
delivery, environment, casuals, etc.  With the inclusion of more general staff in the NTEU 
there was also another large forum, the general staff forum.  At the centre of this network 
of groups, a small number of individuals were holding this network together.  From among 
the elected representatives (green circles) it appears that just three members of the 
national secretariat are the links among these many different groupings: the National 
Secretary, the President and the National Assistant Secretary.  Another small number of 
industrial officers (blue circles) are also at the centre of the structure: National IO 3, 
National IO 9, NSW IO 4 and NSW IO 6.   
 
What can be interpreted from this?  The first obvious point about the network is the high 
numbers of individuals at the periphery of the network.  Peripheral players were held into 
the network by virtue of their attendance at a two-day conference or through their 
participation in a reference group.  Whilst these individuals may or may not have been 
better connected at the branch level, at the national level their ability to contribute to a 
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national strategic discussion was constrained by virtue of their powerless position within the 
network.  As discussed in chapter nine, there were high levels of turnover of these 
peripheral actors between rounds three and four.  This chapter also identified the problem 
generated by the reference groups: they were designed to develop lists of demands not 
strategies on how to achieve those demands.  By appealing directly to greater layers of the 
membership through the various bargaining forums, the central leadership has overcome its 
dependence on local branch leaderships (as semi-peripheral actors) to influence the broader 
membership.  However, sidestepping the local leaderships does not build the capacity of 
those local leaders.  Further, as with round three, appealing directly to the membership 
from the national level would not develop the cohesive communities of practice necessary 
for building the strategic capacity of both members and leaders in the branch that was 
required to cope with enterprise bargaining.   
 
Centrality equals control or powerlessness? 
Taken from a traditional social network analysis where centrality equals power, arguably 
figure 10 shows power concentrated in a handful of individuals.  From this framework, the 
NTEU network has become increasingly vulnerable to key actors whereas in the early days 
of the NTEU regional centres mediated this control.  However, taken from the perspective of 
network dependency, the most central actors are surrounded by peripheral and semi-
peripheral players.  Whilst the peripheral players have low levels of influence and 
engagement, there were a number of possibilities open to the semi-peripheral players 
whose importance at the branch level had increased under enterprise bargaining.  Semi-
peripheral players could: ignore national discipline, unite against it or work around it.  From 
this perspective, the position of most central actor might be seen as a position of strain or 
even paranoia: trying to hold the peripheral players in whilst keeping a sharp eye out for 
semi-peripheral network entrepreneurs and attempting to unite all semi-peripheral actors 
behind a common strategy.  Ironically, as discussed in chapter nine, the solution was 
temporarily provided by the unifying, mobilising impacts of the Liberal government’s 
HEWRRs legislation.  Luckily for the NTEU, these most central brokers were among the most 
experienced representatives in the organisation who had learned (through communities of 
practice built over time) how to lead a national campaign. 
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 As with round three, whilst there was the potential benefit of opening the NTEU up to the 
input of many more individuals and therefore potentially many more important ideas, from 
a network perspective what appears to be missing are the stable close knit groups required 
to synthesize these ideas.  What is also missing from this network is the input from 
empowered semi-peripheral actors such as the Survival Committee or even the Melbourne 
University leadership.  In rounds one and two robust debates around the various 
approaches and challenges generated by these regional centres was the source of 
innovation.  The loss of these regional centres appears to be linked to the receding of the 
“old guard”, the original members from the formative years of the NTEU.  These participants 
were often the ringleaders of debate and dispute.  At times very heated debate also enabled 
the breaking of old “frames” or norms which lead to formal clarification and over time the 
development of new norms.  Returning to the theory of “creative abrasion”; the clash of 
ideas within heterogeneous groups that were focussed on solving problems (Leonard and 
Sensiper 1998: 118) was a major source of learning for the NTEU.  This idea might even be 
taken one step further to argue that the tacit understanding that robust debate was a 
source of learning for the NTEU was itself a form of “know how”.  The experienced old guard 
certainly never shied away from it.   
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Summary 
This chapter has revisited the minutes and reports of the meetings devoted to enterprise 
bargaining strategy during the period 1993 to 2005 using a very different approach.  Using 
the attendance lists of decision making meetings, this chapter has conducted a network 
analysis of the individuals and groups involved in strategic decision making to build a greater 
understanding of the learning process in the NTEU.  The purpose has been to dissect which 
elements of the NTEU’s decision making structure might have enhanced and which might 
have inhibited the flow of “know how” and therefore the learning process in the NTEU.  This 
chapter has enlisted key concepts from network theory to analyse how issues of network 
centrality, power and influence, the ability of individuals to increase their influence through 
Figure 10   Round four network – two mode data 
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diversification, the flow of new ideas and of network dependence and vulnerability might 
have impacted on the learning process in the NTEU.  This chapter has also enabled an 
analysis of the NTEU network over time to observe the way in which the NTEU has 
attempted to shape its processes to respond to the challenges of the external environment 
and how these changes have impacted on the learning process in the NTEU. 
 
Enlisting a network analysis of the NTEU has unearthed a recurring theme for this thesis: the 
tension between branch-based autonomy and maintaining national unity in the NTEU.  Both 
the qualitative study and the network analysis have revealed that this tension was as much 
about the difficulty of ensuring union capacity at both the national and branch levels as it 
was a question of trade union democracy and governance.  Approached from a national 
perspective, developing an effective national strategy relied on the input of effective leaders 
at the branch level.  Meanwhile with the decentralisation of employment relations in the 
sector, there was little benefit in developing an effective national strategy if there was not 
adequate capacity among the leadership and membership at the branch level to deliver it.  
This thesis has therefore identified two clear challenges for the NTEU: firstly the need to 
establish a responsive leadership at the national level and secondly the need to develop 
trade union capacity at the branch level.  Attempting to develop both of these in a short 
space of time in turn generated two difficulties for the NTEU.  
 
Firstly, at the national level there was the difficulty of attempting to solve the problem of 
“group think” associated with constant ties without losing the benefit of closer knit groups.  
When the National Executive and Industrial Matters Committee proved too closed to adapt 
to the external environment, they were replaced with the much larger  Enterprise 
Bargaining forum which engaged many more semi-peripheral and peripheral members and 
the much more flexible leading sites committee which engaged leading negotiators from 
each branch.  However, as more and more peripheral individuals became involved in 
enterprise bargaining discussions, there appeared to be a composite decline in the close-
knit groups necessary to realise the potential of their input.  High turnover on both the large 
forums and the leading sites committee made it difficult for the NTEU to develop the 
relationships and to embed the norms and practices necessary to enable learning.   
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The second major difficulty was how to quickly grow trade union capacity at the branch 
level.  The NTEU attempted to address this by dramatically increasing the network of branch 
members directly involved in strategic decision making at the national level.  However, this 
approach generated a new problem: network vulnerability.  It became increasingly difficult 
at the national level to hold these peripheral individuals to the national organisation and to 
encourage them to act in unison.  However, with the decentralisation of the sector and the 
concentration of bargaining at the branch level, what was actually needed was to grow the 
communities of practice in the branches necessary to build the strategic capacity of the 
leadership and membership to cope with enterprise bargaining.  By their nature 
communities of practice are organic and naturally occurring; they are unlikely to be 
artificially developed from the outside via a national committee.  Returning now to the 
question asked earlier in the chapter: how might these two issues be related? 
 
Throughout this thesis the need to focus on the relationship between the leadership and the 
membership has been key.  The lack of capacity at the branch level, particularly its 
leadership capacity, had a direct relationship to the difficulties at the national level.  
Confident local leaders from branches around the country, with strong ideas on how best to 
navigate bargaining at the local level, would generate debate at the national level and 
deliver the creative abrasion necessary for innovation and to prevent “group think”.  From a 
trade union governance perspective, confident local leaders would challenge the closed ties 
and insist on a democratic say over enterprise bargaining strategy at the national level.  
There was some evidence of this battle for influence in the earlier years of the NTEU.  
However, there was also evidence of the local leadership’s influence over national decision 
making  receding over time.  But which came first, the receding of confident local leaders 
willing to push to claim national responsibility or the collapse of the structures at the 
national level that might enable it?  This is unclear.  However, what this chapter has 
revealed is the NTEU’s attempts to solve this problem by changing the structure of its 
decision making network did not assist the NTEU’s capacity to learn.   
 
This chapter has also unearthed what might intuitively seem an unlikely source of learning 
for the NTEU: internal conflict.  Open combat characterised the early days of the NTEU as 
various groups sought to sanction and discipline semi-peripheral actors and network 
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entrepreneurs.  Whilst the conflicts may have been unpleasant, from a learning perspective 
they performed a vital role in developing new norms and cultures.  Over time, conflicts and 
compromises could arguably produce a shared world view or approach to facilitate further 
learning.  Of course these new norms in turn might be challenged by the input of another 
wave of new ideas inspired by the challenges of the external environment.  Perhaps this is 
how adapting to change is done: new ideas conflict with old norms, in turn generating new 
norms which produce the conditions for another wave of conflict and so on.  One likely 
explanation for the loss of conflict/learning was that as the closed network of “old guard” 
NTEU members receded, the open networks of the new period did not allow the 
preconditions for a “new guard” of combatants to be developed.   
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Chapter Eleven 
Conclusion 
 
 
The introduction of enterprise bargaining was a major shift for all unions in Australia away 
from the industry-wide determination of wages and conditions that had been in place for 
nearly a century.  This set of changes posed problems for all unions and perhaps especially 
for a body such as the newly formed NTEU which operated in a sector that had, until that 
time, had limited exposure to the mainstream industrial relations framework.  Of key 
interest to this research was to ask: how do unions learn?  More particularly, how do they 
develop the skills necessary to adapt to change?  To answer these questions, this thesis has 
traced the steep learning curve that the NTEU travelled from 1993 until 2005.  The earliest 
years of the NTEU saw the difficulties of the amalgamation process where once distinct 
organizations with a variety of experiences and traditions were forced to learn to work 
together.  These early years also saw the NTEU deal with the challenge of attempting to 
codify a nationally unified standard of wages and conditions for all staff on the campuses 
into an award (including the idiosyncratic academic profession) before the decentralizing 
process of enterprise bargaining could erode them.  Then came enterprise bargaining and 
the negotiation of subsequent rounds conducted against the backdrop of progressive waves 
of deregulation and increasingly hostile industrial relations legislation under the Coalition 
governments.  This thesis therefore set out to analyse how the NTEU learned to navigate the 
introduction of enterprise bargaining and to negotiate subsequent rounds during a 
turbulent period in the history of higher education.  What has this thesis discovered?   
 
SUMMARY 
Impacts of deregulation in the sector 
Before proceeding to analyse the enterprise bargaining process, it was necessary to build an 
understanding of the context in which the NTEU was operating.  As this research has shown, 
the deregulation of the sector has had profound effects on industrial relations, generating a 
turbulent and hostile environment for the NTEU.  Chapter five revealed the scale of the 
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changes to the nature of employment relations during this period; the traditional notion 
that negotiating an employment agreement for academics might be a collegial, non-
confrontational affair built on mutual trust and with no formal registration of its outcomes is 
almost incomprehensible today.  Whilst the Dawkins revolution was the catalyst for many 
major changes in the sector, overall it was the introduction of market forces through 
deregulation, particularly of the student market, which has had the most profound impacts 
on the sector and those who work in it.  Market forces have lead to: the carving up of the 
sector along a spectrum of “elite” to “non-elite”, fierce competition for markets and 
resources among institutions, the rise of market fundamentalism and the emergence of 
centralised executive power concentrated around the Vice Chancellor.  Market forces in 
turn have driven the industrialisation of academic work, casualisation, increased workloads 
for all staff and a loss of engagement of staff in decision making.  Understanding this process 
has been essential information for analysing the many challenges that beset the NTEU 
during the period of 1993 to 2005.  Overall, the impacts of deregulation was to make the 
environment progressively more hostile and turbulent and increasingly difficult for the 
NTEU to make sense of its circumstances and to formulate appropriate national strategy to 
address it.   
 
Enterprise bargaining 
The early years of the NTEU, the period 1993 to 1995, saw the Dawkins revolution which 
drove the amalgamation of the NTEU, the NTEU’s first major national industrial campaign, 
the “Second Tier Dispute”, and the phased introduction of enterprise bargaining with a 
hybrid system under the National Framework Agreement.  The decisions and compromises 
made during the formative years of the NTEU became the foundation upon which the NTEU 
adapted to the many changes during subsequent years. 
 
The first major challenge for the NTEU was learning to work together as the amalgamation 
of unions and associations brought with it individuals and groups with a range of ideologies 
and traditions.  Attempts to forge relationships of trust and mutual respect whilst steering 
the organization through a national industrial campaign and then the first round of 
enterprise bargaining placed the newly formed National Executive under considerable 
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pressure.  However, although the NTEU may have been divided on many tactical issues, 
these early years instilled in the organization a profound and united sense of purpose: the 
shared conviction that the best way to defend academic and general staff wages and 
conditions was through a national award system.  Further, that the best way to deliver these 
outcomes was via one industry-wide union, the NTEU.  Arguably it is these two guiding 
principles which steeled the union through the many crises, internal arguments and 
challenges that followed.   
 
The unusual structure of branches, division and national offices which was an emergent 
product of the negotiations required to draw the many disparate organizations into one 
national structure had significant impacts on democratic engagement and strategic decision-
making in the NTEU.  One vital element of this process was the establishment of an 
equilibrium process that mediated the demands of local branches represented by 
empowered local leaderships and the demands of the national organization to maintain 
national unity.  This tension between local and national imperatives was the source of 
considerable conflict and yet was found to be a central component of the organization’s 
ability to learn, innovate and adapt.  This dual leadership also appears to have played an 
important role in enabling the NTEU to cope with the hybrid nature of the industrial 
relations legislation in these early years.   
 
Another important development from the amalgamation process was the National 
Industrial Unit which from the outset was required to develop considerable specialized skill 
to cope with the changing industrial relations environment.  One of the first steps of the 
National Industrial Unit was to develop an effective system for the national dissemination of 
codified information via industrial memos and reports which primarily relied on the shared 
language of industrial officers throughout the union.  This system endured and was a vital 
component of the NTEU’s ability to codify decisions and events and disseminate them 
throughout the organization to enable the NTEU to keep up with the steady pace of events.  
The learning process culminated in the National Industrial Unit’s pivotal role in gaining the 
upper hand against the Coalition’s HEWRRs mark II legislation at the end of round four.   
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Round two of enterprise bargaining covered the period from the end of 1995 up to National 
Council in late 1996.  March 1996 saw the election victory of the Liberal party and the 
formation of a conservative Coalition government.  The Coalition’s Workplace Relations Bill 
fundamentally changed the industrial relations framework whilst a 5% federal budget cut to 
higher education was the beginning of a dramatic reduction in government funding in the 
sector.  During this period the NTEU fought on three different fronts: attempting to 
implement its wages strategy, building a campaign to defend public funding in the sector 
and combating the Workplace Relations Act.  The NTEU’s inability to defeat the Coalition on 
these three fronts formed the foundation for strategic decision making in round two.  
Strategic decision making for round two involved drawing on the lessons learned from its 
experience in round one.  However, it also involved “unlearning” some aspects of its 
approach and to adopt new strategies to cope with the dramatic changes introduced by the 
Coalition government. 
 
Drawing on insights from the conceptual frames developed to guide this research, the 
process of innovation and the groups involved were closely analysed.  It was this approach 
that revealed some perhaps surprising discoveries.  The assumption that national strategy 
would continue to be generated by the same national bodies from round one was 
challenged with the emergence of key figures in the NSW Division as major players in the 
national discussion.  An uneven process of adaptation to change was apparent in the NTEU: 
a tightly knit network in the national office formed the framework upon which the older 
strategies, both effective and those growing obsolete, were maintained.  Meanwhile, the 
major source of innovation was a group concentrated around the NSW Division.  This 
demonstrated how adaptation occurred in the NTEU.  It was not a linear process, but one of 
conflict and clashes.  An established community of practice came into conflict with new 
approaches.  Out of this conflict, a new norm was established. 
 
New ideas in the NTEU were being generated by the demands of the external environment: 
the Coalition government’s budget cuts and the introduction of aggressive industrial 
relations legislation.  Those who had the closest ties to the external environment appear to 
have been the major sources of innovation in 1996: the NSW Division with close ties to 
Sydney University.  Therefore the site of innovation for the NTEU moved from the centre to 
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the periphery of the NTEU, a community of practice concentrated around NSW Division.  For 
example, the NSW Division’s Survival Committee rang the warning bells for the NTEU about 
the potential impacts of the Workplace Relations Act.  It was also the NSW Division that 
foresaw the urgent need for a radical overhaul of the NTEU’s strategic approach to 
enterprise bargaining.  NSW Division argued for the need to roll over award conditions into 
local enterprise agreements and for the abandonment of the highly centralized approach to 
bargaining of round one.  What was needed was a strategy that combined the NTEU’s core 
belief to preserve a national benchmark for wages and conditions with the flexibility to 
enable branches to lead local campaigns to win this benchmark at the local level: the leading 
sites strategy.  Insulated from the impacts of the external environment and growing prone 
to “group think” the National Executive and Industrial Matters Committee had grown 
resistant to change.  Meanwhile, those who were most receptive to innovation were those 
with limited attachment to the past and who were most receptive to the external 
environment: ordinary delegates at National Council.  Through the process of democratic 
discussion and debate at National Council, the impacts of the external environment and the 
will of the membership were ultimately able to shape the strategic direction of the NTEU.   
 
During round three, from just after National Council in late 1996 to National Council in late 
1998, the NTEU had its first experience in implementing the leading sites strategy under the 
full enterprise bargaining model.  Securing both wage rises and conditions at the branch 
level under the Liberal government’s Workplace Relations Act was new terrain for the NTEU 
and the effort for this largely fell to the local leaderships at the designated leading sites.  
The local environment for these leaders was becoming increasingly difficult.  Local leaders 
had to contend with demarcation tussles with other local unions and the full impact of 
deregulation was starting to take effect.  With the decline in government funding local 
managements became increasingly aggressive and resistant to the NTEU’s demands.  
Maintaining national unity against the decentralizing pressure of full enterprise bargaining 
was a major challenge for the NTEU.  Implementing the leading sites strategy revealed 
serious gaps in leadership capacity at the branch level and unearthed latent philosophical 
conflicts within the NTEU.  The lessons learned and the compromises reached out of these 
experiences formed the foundation for strategic decision making for round three of 
enterprise bargaining.   
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 In the discussion devoted to implementing the leading sites strategy, the research 
framework enabled an exploration of the kinds of skills required to lead at the branch level 
and how these skills might be developed.  There was very little by way of abstract bodies of 
knowledge or education that could assist local leaders during this time.  Rather, they relied 
on the strategic application of “know how” (instincts, hunches, relationships, philosophies, 
information) being drawn from many sources.  This required high levels of creativity and 
intellective skills as local leaderships primarily faced problems that required the 
development of original responses from first principles.  They not only had to develop 
solutions but had to convince local memberships through democratic dialogue to maintain 
their commitment and to inspire them into action.  Understanding the high level of complex, 
embodied skills required to perform the role of local leader during enterprise bargaining has 
helped to build an understanding of the difficulties the NTEU faced in developing them and 
in disseminating them to other branches.  Whilst attempting to codify the processes and 
steps taken along the way did no harm, of course the skills required could not be learned by 
prescription.  They could only be learned through experience and in groups: communities of 
practice.  During round two it started to become apparent that whilst there were isolated 
instances of these communities, the NTEU had difficulty developing the internal processes 
necessary to share and build these communities uniformly across the organization.   
 
Implementing the leading sites strategy also unearthed latent philosophical conflicts within 
the NTEU.  One factor that undermined the ability of the NTEU to share learning across 
branches was a fundamental divide between a “unionate” world view held by key players in 
the ACT, Queensland and NSW Divisions on one side and the more conservative, FAUSA 
tradition at the Melbourne University branch and evident in the Victorian Division at this 
time.  The two camps were simply not speaking the same language.  Furthermore, as shown 
in the discussion of the network at this time, branch leaderships who disagreed with the 
national strategy could essentially block the flow of information necessary to reach the 
membership.  It became necessary to try to work around these semi-peripheral actors to 
attempt to educate the local membership.  However, as with the discussion above, 
disseminating the high level of complex, embodied skills required to lead a branch through 
enterprise bargaining was not a straightforward process.  
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 On the positive side, one explanation for the NTEU’s capacity to innovate and adapt to 
change at this time appears to have been its ability to reorganize itself around sites of 
innovation.  The old, out of touch Industrial Matters Committee dissolved and was replaced 
with the more responsive leading sites committee.  The experiences of the local leaders 
from the leading sites were a major source of innovation and learning for the NTEU.  The 
leading sites strategy by its nature involved capitalizing on the learned experience of local 
leaders in the strongest branches in the country.  At the forefront of identifying potential 
perils for the rest of the organization, experienced activists fed their experience back into 
the union to prepare the others.  Lessons learned along the way were also written into 
processes and procedures.  Once again, an important body for ensuring the codification of 
new lessons and processes was the National Industrial Unit via the enterprise bargaining kit 
as well as with industrial memos and forms and checklists.   
 
Despite the many pitfalls encountered in round two, no alternative approach to the leading 
sites strategy was entertained.  The content of round three enterprise bargaining strategy 
therefore involved incremental adjustments to the leading sites approach.  Three major 
lessons were learned out of the NTEU’s first attempts at the leading sites strategy: firstly, 
the need for the whole of the organization to understand the importance of adhering to 
national policy to maintain unified wages and conditions across the sector, secondly, the 
need to maintain organisational unity against the decentralization of the sector and finally, 
the need to increase leadership and membership capacity in the branches.  The major 
innovation adopted to respond to these lessons was the establishment of the enterprise 
bargaining forum and enterprise bargaining reference groups which were designed to draw 
more members into the process of developing the goals and claims for round three.  As this 
thesis has found this approach did little to assist the NTEU’s progress.   
 
The difficulties encountered with the implementation of the leading sites strategy during 
round two were intensified in round three exposing the NTEU’s weaknesses in the lead up 
to round four.  Local managements, many emboldened by the combative industrial relations 
climate generated by the Liberal government, were aggressively opposed to the NTEU’s 
demands.  Round three was a gruelling round for the NTEU with many campuses engaged in 
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protracted and largely unsuccessful industrial campaigns including the disastrous strategy of 
exam results bans.  Coming out of the round, the NTEU experienced a fundamental difficulty 
in making sense of its circumstances and to develop effective national strategy.  Some of 
this difficulty can be explained by the deregulation of the sector which made it difficult to 
synthesize and develop a narrative that could cope with the disparate experiences of 
individual branches. 
 
The commencement of round four negotiations in mid-1999 showed early signs of 
difficulties for the NTEU in pursuing the leading sites strategy.  However, the round was 
interrupted by the Liberal government’s direct intervention into negotiations with the 
introduction of the HEWRRs legislation.  It is hard to imagine a more turbulent or hostile 
period.  An analysis of this period revealed both the considerable weaknesses and the 
considerable strengths of the NTEU.  Using the combined insights of trade union strategy 
and knowledge management literature enabled the development of a diagnosis of the 
origins and causes of both the NTEU’s weaknesses and its strengths.  Each will be discussed 
in turn. 
 
As with the conclusion of round two, despite the many pitfalls encountered during the 
round, no serious alternative approaches to the leading sites strategy was entertained.  This 
may reflect path dependence in the NTEU or it may have been that in the hostile and 
disaggregated environment generated by funding cuts under the Liberal government the 
NTEU simply had very few options.  Nonetheless, opening the discussion for round four to 
include the broader membership without a clear strategic framework to guide this 
discussion exacerbated the NTEU’s problem.  This difficulty was compounded by high levels 
of turnover among peripheral members and the decline in the involvement of star boundary 
spanners and experienced leaders within the organisation.  The NTEU therefore entered 
round four negotiations with a long list of ambitious demands with no clear strategy of how 
to win them at the branch level.   
 
Ironically, the federal government’s HEWRRs intervention rescued the NTEU by playing to 
the NTEU’s strengths.  By focusing the conflict at the national level, the NTEU was able to 
mobilize the considerable expertise at that level that had been accumulated over many 
211 
 
years.  Key figures were able to use the relationships built over time to reach out to the 
broader community, including key figures in the AVCC, to launch an impressive campaign.  
The development of inspirational goals that went beyond the industrial components of the 
issue to unite the sector as a whole, a vital lesson learned back in 1996 to defend public 
funding, was also vital for the success of the campaign.  Another “know how” stronghold 
was around the industrial processes developed by the NTEU over many years.  The national 
discipline entrenched in the NTEU and the skilled network built around the leading sites 
strategy was vital for ensuring a nationally unified response to the HEWRRs legislation.  This 
apparatus for delivering nationally sanctioned mandatory settlement points was the 
mechanism by which the NTEU achieved the landmark parental leave claim at all campuses.  
The accumulated talent of the National Industrial Unit and the National secretariat was also 
then successfully mobilized to defend the gains won in the 2003 campaign against the 
implementation of HEWRRS mark II.   
 
Learning to navigate enterprise bargaining: the NTEU 1993 to 2005 
Despite the many debates and conflicts that have characterized the NTEU’s decision making 
process, it has remained united around its founding philosophy: the conviction that the best 
way to defend academic and general staff wages and conditions was to maintain a national 
benchmark.  Further, that the best way to deliver these outcomes was via one industry-wide 
union, the NTEU.  At times, this philosophy crystalised and grew brittle and held it back from 
adopting appropriate measures to cope with the realities of the decentralized system.  For 
example, in round one it took the form of a highly centralised and nationally co-ordinated 
approach which relied heavily on the role of the National Industrial Unit and industrial staff 
throughout the sector.  However, attempting to maintain essentially an award based model 
within the enterprise bargaining framework, placed the NTEU under enormous strain.  The 
challenge for the NTEU was to develop enough internal discipline to rigidly adhere to 
national discipline to maintain unified wages and conditions whilst at the same time 
enabling the flexibility to adequate respond to the particular vagaries of bargaining 
negotiations in the branches to deliver it locally.  The strategy adopted was the leading sites 
strategy.   
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From a learning perspective the leading sites strategy demonstrates both the NTEU’s 
strengths and its vulnerabilities.  The leading sites strategy built around it a very effective 
apparatus in the form of Grahame McCulloch, Ted Murphy, Ken McAlpine and the National 
Industrial Unit which could communicate to the national organization via a conveyor belt of 
skilled industrial officers and elected officers.  However, whilst key individuals had 
developed considerable skills and formed effective systems around them, the network 
analysis in chapter ten revealed that over-reliance on key individuals at the national level 
had developed serious vulnerabilities for the organization as whole.  There was also 
evidence at various times of “group think” developing amongst leading members at the 
national level.  In the early years, the leading sites strategy also capitalized on the leadership 
and membership capacity in the most successful branches.  Both the successful outcomes 
regarding wages and conditions and the lessons learned were distributed to the broader 
organisation.  However, the decline of leadership capacity at the branch level as the original 
leaders receded left the branches and therefore the strategy vulnerable by weakening the 
ability of branches to “hold the line” in the branches and by eroding the vibrant equilibrium 
between the local and national leaderships.  At key times in the history of the NTEU, 
peripheral voices from the branches played a vital role in disrupting the “group think” at the 
national level and forcing the NTEU to adapt to change.  At other times, the national office 
played a vital role by intervening at the branch level to ensure the adherence of national 
strategy.  This process of push and push back has been an important source of innovation 
and learning for the NTEU.  The network analysis revealed that the NTEU’s solution of 
opening up debate to many more peripheral members exacerbated the difficulties for the 
NTEU.  Over-reliance on large forums made it more difficult for the NTEU to develop the 
closed groups necessary for embedding experience and know how. 
 
For the leading sites strategy to deliver its full potential the NTEU required leadership and 
membership capacity at the branch level and leadership capacity at the national level and 
most importantly a robust relationship between the two.  Confident leadership and 
membership capacity at the branch level was required to cope with the increasingly 
idiosyncratic and hostile conditions in the branches.  At the national level, the NTEU 
required the leadership capacity to make sense of the many disparate experiences across 
the sector and formulate effective national strategy.  Lastly, a robust relationship between 
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the two was required to enhance capacity at both levels.  Furthermore, a robust relationship 
between the local and national leaderships would have been self-reinforcing.  Confident 
leaders from the branches in dialogue with receptive leaders at the national level would 
learn from each other in a dynamic equilibrium that would in turn build the capacity of the 
organisation as a whole.  This model has been hard to achieve. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Implications for research into trade union renewal  
All researchers in the field of trade union renewal can agree that if the union movement is 
to thrive in the current complex and hostile environment they must learn to innovate and to 
develop responsive and effective strategies.  Yes, but how?  And where in the union 
organization should this be expected to happen?  Some researchers believe that radical 
innovation will come more or less spontaneously from the demands of the membership 
while others believe that it is more likely to be orchestrated by a highly skilled trade union 
leadership.  This thesis has contributed to those researchers who have reached beyond 
these rigid assumptions about the varying qualities of members and leaders to develop a 
more dynamic approach to trade union strategy.  Levesque and Murray’s “power resources” 
(Levesque and Murray 2002: 46; Fairbrother, Williams et al. 2007: 35), Pocock’s “union 
power” (Pocock 2000: 20) and Hyman’s “interest representation” (Hyman 1997: 311) 
models all emphasise the interactive relationship among the various layers of the union and 
between the internal life of the union and the external environment.  From this literature 
this thesis developed a list of core elements of effective trade union strategy: 
responsiveness, or the ability to accurately understand and adapt to external threats and 
opportunities; autonomy, or the ability to go beyond merely reacting to external pressures 
to develop an independent union voice; inspiration, or the capacity to not just develop an 
autonomous position but to inspire members and supporters into action; democratic 
legitimacy, or the ability to encourage membership participation in decision making to 
ensure commitment and finally the competence, culture and organizational capacity needed 
for implementation.  Further, these factors are interrelated.   
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More specifically, the ability to develop effective union strategy can be understood to rely 
on three key factors: firstly, the strategic capacity of union leaders, secondly the 
engagement and contribution of union memberships and supporters and thirdly and perhaps 
most importantly, structures and processes that maximize the effectiveness of the 
relationship between the two.  But how do unions develop the strategic capacity of their 
union leaders?  How can they most effectively engage the contribution of the union 
membership?  By adding the observations of activity theorists to the trade union strategy 
literature, this thesis has developed a framework to analyse how unions learn.   
 
This thesis combined the observations of the trade union strategy literature and knowledge 
management literature to build a new kind of framework.  In this conceptual context, the 
large quantities of archived minutes, reports, pamphlets and memos of the NTEU dating 
from 1993 through to 2005 became manageable and useful.  Understanding that “know 
how” is a process and not an object has directed this research to treat archived information 
as an artefact that points to the process by which this “know how” was developed.  Activity 
theory also suggests that generating and sharing “know how” is inherently practical; that 
learning and innovation is driven by the demands of the context in which participants are 
operating.  Each decision analysed has been treated as the outcome of this process and the 
task has been to look at a particular decision or innovation and try to trace the origins of 
that emergent strategy or approach.  Furthermore, an understanding that all learning is a 
collective experience has guided this approach.  The focus has been on groups of people 
interacting to solve the problems generated by the context in which they are operating.  
Even when discussing particularly talented and important individuals, the analytical task has 
been to assess the context and groups in which these skills have been built to trace the 
process of their development.  The literature also alerted this research to both the benefits 
and to the limitations of the group learning process.  The positive development of a shared 
language necessary for open and successful communication has a darker side, the exclusion 
or rejection of new ideas or fresh approaches.   
 
The development of a research framework that has enabled the study of organisational 
learning in the context of a trade union offers an important contribution to the study of 
trade union renewal.  Combining activity theory and network theory with a more traditional 
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approach to analysing trade union strategy has enabled this thesis to delve deeper into 
some important observations in the trade union renewal literature.  Firstly, the framework 
has enabled an analysis of how the capacity of trade union leaders might be built.  Secondly, 
it has enabled an explanation of why some strategies for building trade union capacity have 
been effective and others have not.  Thirdly, it has offered a way to analyse relationships 
and their contribution to the learning process.  Finally, the framework and particularly the 
network analysis, has offered a way to investigate “know how” as a cumulative process by 
observing changes over time.  Each issue will be discussed in turn below. 
 
The research framework enlisted in this thesis has enabled an investigation of how 
leadership capacity might be built in a trade union.  A recurring theme from Ganz, Hyman, 
Voss and Sherman among other researchers is the importance of the capacity of trade union 
leaders to make strategic use of opportunities in the external environment.  However, there 
was limited discussion on how these skills might be built.  For example, for Voss and 
Sherman, new ways to interpret situations from the international union movement (Voss 
and Sherman 2003: 69) or from leaders with activist experience from outside the labor 
movement (Voss and Sherman 2000: 303) were essential ingredients to union revitalisation 
implying that unions in decline must import expertise from outside its ranks.   But the 
question remained: how did those leaders develop their skills?  Further, is it possible that 
union organizations could discover ways to build these skills in-house?  
 
Enlisting activity theory has enabled an analysis of how the capacity of trade union leaders is 
built.  This thesis has shown that there is nothing “natural” about trade union leadership: it 
is learned through experience and in groups.  This research has therefore not taken any set 
of skills as given but has gone deeper to investigate how these skills were developed.  In the 
qualitative analysis of rounds one to four of enterprise bargaining, this thesis has built an 
understanding of what kinds of knowledge or “know how” were required by leaders at 
various levels of the union and how over time this “know how” was accumulated.  It has also 
shown that whilst individual skills built over time are important the effectiveness of their 
strategies was reliant on their responsiveness to the external environment.  For example, 
the NTEU’s highly centralized, award based approach which was effective in round one of 
enterprise bargaining under a Labor government was inappropriate and potentially 
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disastrous under full decentralization of rounds two onwards under the Coalition 
government.  Therefore, effectively responding to changes in the environment at times 
required experienced leaders to “unlearn” past experience and develop radical new 
approaches.  To achieve this often brought highly skilled individuals into conflict with one 
another in a battle for influence over national strategy.  
 
Focusing on leadership capacity in the National Industrial Unit this thesis demonstrated how 
the challenges of the external environment generated the group problem solving that built 
the skills in this unit.  Each new challenge required the creative application of already 
established “know how” and the folding in of new approaches.  This unit was also 
challenged by peripheral actors in the union and forced to innovate and fold radical new 
approaches into their repertoire.  Similarly, this thesis has analysed how leaders such as 
Grahame McCulloch have learned their skills through practice and also through group 
discussion at the national level.  Like the National Industrial Unit, at times this has involved 
conflict and challenges, sanctions and counter-sanctions, to enforce the process of 
“unlearning” and “relearning” necessary to adapt to changes in the internal and external 
environment. 
 
Enlisting activity theory has also enabled an explanation of why some strategies for sharing 
trade union “know how” were more successful than others.  For example why was the 
National Industrial Unit more successful in disseminating its “know how” throughout the 
organisation than the elected officers in the branches?  There are four likely explanations 
for this.  Firstly, a large element of the industrial unit’s information was easily codified, for 
example, model clauses or rulings from courts or industrial tribunals.  By comparison, 
overwhelmingly the skills of locally elected branch leaderships were embodied hunches, 
instincts, relationships and sensitivities which by their nature cannot be codified and were 
not easily transmitted or “taught” to others.  Secondly, the shared language developed over 
time among like minded industrial officers allowed all forms of “know how” to travel more 
readily along this conveyor than among elected officers who were from a much wider field 
of professional and personal identities.  This difficulty was compounded for branch 
leaderships by the fact that increasingly like were not speaking to like with the impact of 
deregulation and the increasingly idiosyncratic nature of conditions in each branch.  Thirdly, 
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a contributing factor was likely the difference between developing an on-going relationship 
among full-time employees of the union as compared to the difficulty of building a similar 
community among branch leaders who were mostly volunteers.  As the network analysis has 
demonstrated a major difficulty for the NTEU has been to develop the closed groups of 
elected branch leaderships at the national level that is necessary for the successful sharing 
and embedding of this embodied “know how”.  A final reason may have been the relative 
insulation of the national office from the very turbulent and hostile environments at the 
branch level which were as likely to destroy relationships among branch based volunteers as 
build them.   
 
Another important contribution of the research framework enlisted in this thesis has been 
the development of an approach to studying relationships in the context of trade union 
renewal.  Throughout the qualitative component of this thesis, a framework that focused on 
relationships as its central unit of analysis has enabled the identification of learning 
communities and other relationship ties that have been involved in strategic decision 
making.  To be more precise, it was not just the existence of a relationship but the quality of 
the relationship that was analysed.  The network analysis of the NTEU demonstrated that an 
examination of the quality of interactions among the various layers of the union was central 
to understanding the NTEU’s capacity to learn.  As the network analysis showed, when it 
came to developing effective national strategy, the transient and often one-way 
communication with the membership through the larger forums and surveys was no 
substitute for the mediated interaction with skilled local leaders who spanned the 
boundaries between the membership and the national leadership.  Another advantage of 
the network analysis was its ability to demonstrate visually the changes in the network of 
relationships within the NTEU over time.  For example, investigating changes to the network 
over time, revealed a key difficulty for the NTEU, the loss of ‘closed groups’ in the 
organization.  In line with the observation of network theorists, despite the potential pitfalls 
of “group think” that often accompanies closed groups, without them the organization 
could not capitalize on the “know how” travelling through its network.   
 
Finally, the research framework enlisted in this thesis has enabled an examination of how 
knowledge or “know how” in a trade union is cumulative; how lessons learned from the past 
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informed strategic decision making as the NTEU confronted new challenges.  This thesis was 
able to show how lessons learned were stored within groups either consciously or 
unconsciously, codified or embodied, to over time develop a pool of “know how”, a shared 
approach or world view, with which to approach the next problem that came along.  Once 
again, this cumulative group learning process has a potentially darker side in the form of 
path dependence and resistance to change.  However, as we saw with the fortunes of the 
Liberal government’s HEWRRs legislation, by the time of round four of enterprise bargaining 
the NTEU had built up an impressive repertoire of strategies and tactics.  Under sustained 
attack during the periods 2003 to 2005, the NTEU drew on every lesson it had learned in its 
efforts to defend itself and the entitlements of its membership.   
 
In conclusion, this thesis has developed a novel approach to the study of trade union 
renewal.  Combining activity theory and network analysis with more traditional approaches 
to the study of trade unions has enabled a thorough and multi-faceted analysis of the 
learning process in the NTEU.  Understanding learning as inherently a collective experienced 
driven by the demands of the context in which unions are operating has inspired the 
development of a dynamic research framework for analysing the development of trade 
union capacity.  It is hoped that this framework can contribute to the study of the successes 
and challenges of the broader trade union movement as it attempts to adapt to survive in 
the hostile and turbulent conditions they currently face.  
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